TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2006 (12) TMI 548
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....h, Advs. for P.H. Parekh & Co., Aparajita Singh, T. Mahipal, Sudhir Walia, Sanjay Hegde, Priank Adhyaru, Sanjay Jain, Mukesh Kumar, Himmat Singh, Shergill, Arun K. Sinha, R. Satish, Pallav Shishodia, Gopal Singh, Nishakant Pandey, Vimla Sinha, Chidananda D.L., K.K. Senthilvelan, Gaurav Dhingra, P. Parmeswaran and Ajay Sharma, Advs JUDGMENT Arijit Pasayat,. 1. Leave granted. 2. In each of these appeals challenge is to the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the petition filed by the appellant in each case questioning the validity of proceedings initiated under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short the 'Act') and/or the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'). In the latter category of cases the question raised is either lack of sanction in terms of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') or the legality thereof. 3. It is the stand of the appellant in each case that the proceedings were initiated on the basis of complaints which were lodged mala fide and as an act of political vendetta. It is stated that allegations are vague, lack in details and even if accepted at the face value, did....
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....mandatory. With reference to several judgments of this Court it is submitted that even offences punishable under Sections 468, 471 and 120B have been in certain cases held to be relatable to the official duty thereby mandating sanction in terms of Section 197 of the Code. 5. It is pointed out that the mala fide intention is clear as all these cases were registered at Mohali Police Station which was declared to be the police station for the purpose of investigation of the concerned cases and new Court was established for the trial of the concerned cases and jurisdiction was conferred on one officer without following the process of consultation with the High Court. These are indicative of the fact that action was taken with mala fide intention only to harass the accused persons as noted above. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that the decision in R.S. Nayak's case (supra) correctly lays down the position. Several attempts were made in the past to distinguish said case and to propound that the said decision did not indicate the correct position in law. The allegations of mala fide are clearly unfounded. No new court was established and in fact S....
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....ng anything to the contrary contained in this Act or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), there shall he no appeal by a convicted person in any case tried summarily under this section in which the special Judge passes a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding one month, and of fine not exceeding two thousand rupees whether or not any order under Section 452 of the said Code is made in addition to such sentence, but an appeal shall lie where any sentence in excess of the aforesaid limits is passed by a special Judge. 19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.-(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction,- (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; (c) in the....
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....ttee headed by Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand was constituted. The said Committee examined the true intent and purpose of Section 6 of the Old Act. It was inter alia noted by the Committee as follows: Section 6 of the Act prescribes that no prosecution under Section 5(2) is to be instituted without the previous sanction of the authority competent to remove the accused officer from his office. The exact implications of this provisions have on occasions given rise to a certain amount of difficulty. There have been cases where an offence has been disclosed after the officer concerned has ceased to hold office, e.g., by retirement. In such cases it is not entirely clear whether any sanction is at all necessary. Another aspect of the same problem is presented by the type of case which, we are told, is fairly common-where an officer is transferred from one jurisdiction to another or an officer who is lent to another Department, commits an offence while serving in his temporary office and then returns to his parent Department before the offence is brought to light. In a case of this nature doubts have arisen as to the identity of the authority from whom sanction for prosecution is to be sought. In....
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..... This plea shall be dealt with in the cases separately. 11. In reply, Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that much before R.S. Nayak's case (supra) this Court in C.R. Bansi's case (supra) held as follows: 9...But if a person ceases to be a public servant the question of harassment does not arise. The fact that an appeal is pending does not make him a public servant. The appellant ceased to be a public servant when the order of dismissal was passed. There is no force in the contention of the Learned Counsel and the trial cannot be held to be bad for lack of sanction under Section 6 of the Act. It is their stand that where the public servant has ceased to be a public servant in one capacity by ceasing to hold office which is alleged to have been misused, the fortuitous circumstance of the accused being in another capacity holding an entirely different public office is irrelevant. It was categorically held in R.S. Nayak's case (supra) in para 13 that "on analysis of the policy of the whole section the authority competent to remove the public servant from the office alleged to have mis-used is alone the competent sanctioning authority." In that case, it was ....
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....uthority set out in Clauses (a),(b) and (c) of Sub-section (1). The object underlying such provision was to save the public servant from the harassment of frivolous or unsubstantiated allegations. The policy underlying Section 6 and similar sections, is that there should not be unnecessary harassment of public servant. (See C.R. Bansi v. State of Maharashtra 1971CriLJ662 ). Existence thus of a valid sanction is a prerequisite to the taking of cognizance of the enumerated offences alleged to have been committed by a public servant. The bar is to the taking of cognizance of offence by the court. Therefore, when the court is called upon to take cognizance of such offences, it must enquire whether there is a valid sanction to prosecute the public servant for the offence alleged to have been committed by him as public servant. Undoubtedly, the accused must be a public servant when he is alleged to have committed the offence of which he is accused because Sections 161, 164, 165 IPC and Section 5(2) of the 1947 Act clearly spell out that the offences therein defined can be committed by a public servant. If it is contemplated to prosecute public servant who has committed such offences, whe....
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....consistently followed in C.R. Bansi case and K.S. Dharmadatan v. Central Government 1979CriLJ1127 . It therefore appears well settled that the relevant date with reference to which a valid sanction is sine qua non for taking cognizance of an offence committed by a public servant as required by Section 6 is the date on which the court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence of which he is accused. (underlined for emphasis) x x x 23. Offences prescribed in Sections 161, 164 and 165 IPC and Section 5 of the 1947 Act have an intimate and inseparable relation with the office of a public servant. A public servant occupies office which renders him a public servant and occupying the office carries with it the powers conferred on the office. Power generally is not conferred on an individual person. In a society governed by rule of law power is conferred on office or acquired by statutory status and the individual occupying the office or on whom status is conferred enjoys the power of office or power flowing from the status. The holder of the office alone would have opportunity to abuse or misuse the office. These sections codify a well-recognised truism that power has the ....
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.... before removing the bar, by granting sanction, to the taking of the cognizance of offences by the court against the public servant. Therefore, it unquestionably follows that the sanction to prosecute can he given by an authority competent to remove the public servant from the office which he has misused or abused because that authority alone would be able to know whether there has been a misuse or abuse of the office by the public servant and not some rank outsider. By a catena of decisions, it has been held that the authority entitled to grant sanction must apply its mind to the facts of the case, evidence collected and other incidental facts before according sanction. A grant of sanction is not an idle formality but a solemn and sacrosanct act which removes the umbrella of protection of Government servants against frivolous prosecutions and the aforesaid requirements must therefore, be strictly complied with before any prosecution could be launched against public servants. (See Mohd. Iqbal Ahmad v. State of A.P. 1979CriLJ633 ). The Legislature advisedly conferred power on the authority competent to remove the public servant from the office to grant sanction for the obvious reaso....
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....ter, and then ceased to hold the office before the court was called upon to take cognizance of the offence against him and therefore, sanction as contemplated by Section 6 would not be necessary; but if after committing the offence and before the date of taking of cognizance of the offence, he was elected as a Municipal President in which capacity he was a public servant under the relevant Municipal law, and was holding that office on the date on which court proceeded to take cognizance of the offence committed by him as a Minister, would a sanction be necessary and that too of that authority competent to remove him from the office of the Municipal President. The answer was- in affirmative. But the very illustration would show that such cannot be the law. Such an interpretation of Section 6 would render it as a shield to an unscrupulous public servant. Someone interested in protecting may shift him from one office of public servant to another and thereby defeat the process of law. Ode can legitimately envisage a situation wherein a person may hold a dozen different offices, each one clothing him with the status of a public servant under Section 21 IPC and even if he has abused only....
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.... to adopt that construction which would advance the object underlying the Act, namely, to make effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption and at any rate not defeat it. As is clear from a bare reading of the paragraph, this Court adopted a construction which is based on the avoidance of mischief rule. That being so, the plea that the effect of Section 6(2) of the Old Act was not kept in view does not merit acceptance. Though a mere reference to a provision in all cases may not in all cases imply consciousness as to the effect of that provision the case at hand does not fall to that category. In this case not only was there reference to that provision, but also this Court adopted a construction which kept in view the object of the statute and the need for interpretation in a particular way. Foundation for the interpretation is found in para 24 of the judgment. With reference to Davis & Sons Ltd. v. Atkins 1977 Imperial Court Report 662 it was held that legislation must at all costs be interpreted in such a way that it would not operate as a rogue's charter. 12. In Habibulla Khan v. State of Orissa and Anr. 1995CriLJ2071 it was held was as follows: 12. Ho....
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....er the colour of authority but which in reality is for the public servant's own pleasure or benefit then such acts shall not be protected under the doctrine of State immunity. In other words, where the act performed under the colour of office is for the benefit of the officer or for his own pleasure Section 19(1) will come in. Therefore, Section 19(1) is time and offence related. 13. This Court in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of Bombay reported in 1955CriLJ857 at pages 1186-1187 held as follows: We have therefore first to concentrate on the word "offence". Now an offence seldom consists of a single act. It is usually composed of several elements and, as a rule, a whole series of acts must be proved before it can be established. In the present case, the elements alleged against the second accused are, first, that there was an "entrustment" and/or "dominion"; second, that the entrustment and/or dominion was "in his capacity as a public servant"; third, that there was a "disposal"; and fourth, that the disposal was "dishonest". Now it is evident that the entrustment and/or dominion here were in an official capacity, and it is equally evident that the....
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....) of the Act is time and offence related. Section 19(1) of the Act has been quoted above. 15. The underlying principle of Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 have been noted above. Each of the above Sections indicate that the public servant taking gratification (Section 7), obtaining valuable thing without consideration (Section 11), committing acts of criminal misconduct (Section 13) are acts performed under the colour of authority but which in reality are for the public servant's own pleasure or benefit. Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 apply to aforestated acts. Therefore, if a public servant in his subsequent position is not accused of any such criminal acts then there is no question of invoking the mischief rule. Protection to public servants under Section 19(1)(a) has to be confined to the time related criminal acts performed under the colour or authority for public servant's own pleasure or benefit as categorized under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15. This is the principle behind the test propounded by this Court, namely, the test of abuse of office. Further, in cases where offences under the Act are concerned the effect of Section 19 dealing with question of prejudice has a....
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....een occasioned thereby. Section 19(1) is a matter of procedure and does not go to root of jurisdiction as observed in para 95 of the Narasimha Rao's case (supra). Sub-section (3)(c) of Section 19 reduces the rigour of prohibition. In Section 6(2) of the Old Act (Section 19(2) of the Act) question relates to doubt about authority to grant sanction and not whether sanction is necessary. 17. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol.26 it is stated: A decision is given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, in which case it must decide which case to follow; or when it has acted in ignorance of a House of Lords decision, in which case it must follow that decision; or when the decision is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or rule having statutory force. 18. In Govt. of A.P. v. B. Satyanarayana Rao (2000)IILLJ545SC it has been held as follows: The rule of per incuriam can be applied where a court omits to consider a binding precedent of the same court or the superior court rendered on the same issue or where a court omits to consider any statu....
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....y them while they are acting or purporting to act as public servants. The policy of the legislature is to afford adequate protection to public servants to ensure that they are not prosecuted for anything done by them in the discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause, and if sanction is granted, to confer on the Government, if they choose to exercise it, complete control of the prosecution. This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from the protection. The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Se....
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....ficial duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction - (a) in the case of person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government. * * * (2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. The section falls in the chapter dealing with conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. That is if the conditions mentioned are not made out or are absent then no prosecution can be set in motion. For instance no prosecution can be initiated in a Court of Sessions under Section 193, as it cannot take cognizance, as a court of original jurisdiction, of any offence unless the case has been committed to it by....
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....ing to act in the discharge of his official duty' employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, 'it is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be'. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision. Use of the expression, 'official duty' implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in the course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. The Section does not extend it....
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.... such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable (claim) but not a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty. If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty then it must be held to be official to which applicability of Section 197 of the Code cannot be disputed. 24. The above position was highlighted in State of H.P. v. M.P. Gupta (2004)2SCC349 , State of orissa through Kumar Raghvendra Singh and Ors. v. Ganesh Chandra Jew 2004CriLJ2011 , Shri S.K. Zutshi and Anr. v. Shri Bimal Debnath and Anr. AIR2004SC4174 , K. Kalimuthu v. State by DSP 2005CriLJ2190 and Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. The State of Bihar and Anr. 2006CriLJ808 . 25. In Rakesh Kumar Mishra's case (supra) it was inter alia observed as follows: 14. In S.A. Venkataraman v. The State 1958CriLJ254 and in C.R. Bansi v. The State of Maharashtra 1971CriLJ662 this Court has held that: There is nothing in the words used in Section 6(1) to even remotely suggest that previous sanction was necessary before a court could take cognizance of the offences m....
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....ing with Section 197, as it then stood, observed: it appears to us that protection under the Section is needed as much after retirement of the public servant as before retirement. The protection afforded by the Section would be rendered illusory if it were open to a private person harbouring a grievance to wait until the public servant ceased to hold his official position, and then to lodge a complaint. The ultimate justification for the protection conferred by Section 197 is the public interest in seeing that official acts do not lead to needless or vexatious prosecution. It should be left to the Government to determine from that point of view the question of the expediency of prosecuting any public servant. It was in pursuance of this observation that the expression 'was' come to be employed after the expression 'is' to make the sanction applicable even in cases where a retired public servant is sought to be prosecuted. 26. In P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim 2001CriLJ3505 it has, inter alia, held as follows: The legislative mandate engrafted in Sub-section (1) of Section 197 debarring a court from taking cognizance of concerned in a case where the acts complai....
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....ssertion has been refuted by Learned Counsel for the respondent-State with regard to various definite materials indicating commission of offence. Particular reference has been made to the following: 28. Pages 396-397, Volume 3 discloses how Rs. 9 crores were recycled by Badal family through the accounts of K.S. Siddhu into the project ORBIT Resort. Pages 398-399, 404-407, 416-420, 448 establishes facts showing recycling of several crores of rupees with the aid of Narottam Singh Dhillon, an NRI and close to Badal family. Illegally earned money used to be deposited in the account of Narottam Singh Dhillon who used to then get FDRs issued and thereafter used to take loans against the FDRs. His bank account shows operation during 1997-2002. This loan money has been given to Parkash Singh Badal, S. Kaur and Sukhbir Singh Badal as loans which have never been returned. This recycling involved making of fake entries in the bank. There is evidence showing taking of gratification in transfers, postings and promotions. Pages 430-434 show purchases of property and shares in the name of Satnam Singh and Namta Singh who were close to Badal family and the transfer of their interest to SB in th....
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....e, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him, to the person, if any whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given. (3) Where a superior officer of police has been appointed under Section 158, the report, shall, in any case in which the State Government by general or special order so directs, be submitted through that officer, and he may, pending the orders of the Magistrate, direct the officer in charge of the police station to make further investigation. (4) Whenever it appears from a report forwarded under this section that the accused has been released on his bond, the Magistrate shall make such order for the discharge of such bond or otherwise as he thinks fit. (5) When such report is in respect of a case to which Section 170 applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report- (a) all documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation; (b) the statements recorded under Section 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine....
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.... within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, the person accused of them may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, each of such offences. (4) If several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute when combined a different offence, the person accused of them may be charged with, and tried at one trial for the offence constituted by such acts when combined, and for any offence constituted by any one, or more, or such acts. (5) Nothing contained in this section shall affect Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). Section 72 IPC is also relevant. Same reads as follows: 72. Punishment of person guilty of one of several offences, the judgment stating that it is doubtful of which.--In all cases in which judgment is given that a person is guilty of one of several offences specified in the judgment, but that it is doubtful of which of these offences, he is guilty, the offender shall be punished for the offence for which the lowest punishment is provided if the same punishment is not provided for all. 30. The report in terms o....
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.... At the stage of framing charge it can be urged that no offence is made out. With reference to the absence of allegations under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act, it is submitted whether the charge sheet has reference to any particular material referred to in it and the relevance of it is to be considered at the time when the charge is framed. It would not be desirable to analyse minutely the materials as at that stage the Court is primarily concerned with the question as to whether charge is to be framed in respect of any offence and whether there prima facie appears existence of any material and not the sufficiency of the materials. Therefore, the appellants' stand that the charge sheet does not refer to any particular material cannot be accepted, more particularly, in view of the specific materials referred to by Learned Counsel for the respondent-State. 32. It is the stand of the State that the appellant-Parkash Singh Badal was the fulcrum around which the entire corruption was woven by the members of his family and others and it was his office of Chief Minister-ship which had been abused. Therefore, Sections 8 and 9 of the Act would not be applicable to him and would apply only....
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....nnot be read out of context. The offence of cheating under Section 420 or for that matter offences relatable to Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120B can by no stretch of imagination by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by any public servant while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty. In such cases, official status only provides an opportunity for commission of the offence. 35. In Baijnath v. State of M.P. 1966CriLJ179 the position was succinctly stated as follows: it is the quality of the Act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duty the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will be attracted. So far as the appellant Sukhbir Singh Badal is concerned, the stand is that he being a member of the Parliament is a public servant and cannot be charged with offences under Sections 8 and 9 of the Act. His contention is that Sections 8, 9, 12, 14 and 24 of the Act are applicable to private persons and not to public servants. The opening word of Sections 8 and 9 is "whoever". The expression is very wide and would also cover public servants accepting gratification as a motive or ....
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.... is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money. Thus, Sections 8 and 9 are wider than Section 13(1)(d) and clearly constitute different offences. Section 24 envisages the making of a statement by a person in any proceeding against the public servant for an offence under Sections 7 to 11 or Sections 13 and 15. It is clear from Section 24 that there can be a proceeding against public servant for which offence under Sections 7 to 11 which per se includes Sections 8 and 9. On the face of this provision, it cannot be contended that a public servant cannot be proceeded against Sections 8 and 9. 37. Great emphasis has been led by the appellants on some factual scenario to show that the complainant was close to incumbent Chief Minister and he has been rewarded subsequently for making the complaint. In essence, the plea is that mala fides are involved. This allegation of mala fides is also linked with the so called conferment of power with the particular police station at Mohali and conferment of jurisdiction on a particular Special Judge by Notification dated 17.11.2003. A plea of mala fides has not only to be clearly pleaded but specifically prove....
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....formation relating to the commission of a 'cognizable offence' (as defined under Section 2(c) of the Code) if given orally ( in which case it is to be reduced into writing) or in writing to "an officer incharge of a police station" (within the meaning of Section 2(o) of the Code) and signed by the informant should be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe which form is commonly called as "First Information Report" and which act of entering the information in the said form is known as registration of a crime or a case. 40. At the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate of Section 154(1) of the Code, the concerned police officer cannot embark upon an enquiry as to whether the information, laid by the informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the information is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer in charge of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case and then to proceed with the investigation if he has reason to suspect the commissio....
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....861 and 1872 was deleted and in that place the word 'information' was used in the Codes of 1882 and 1898 which word is now used in Sections 154, 155, 157 and 190(c) of the Code. An overall reading of all the Codes makes it clear that the condition which is sine-qua-non for recording a First Information Report is that there must be an information and that information must disclose a cognizable offence. 42. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before an officer incharge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such information. In this connection, it may be noted that though a police officer cannot investigate a non-cognizable offence on his own as in the case of cognizable offence, he can investigate a non- cognizable offence under the order of a Magistrate having power to try such non-cognizable case or commit the same for trial within the terms under Section 155(2) of the Code but subject to Section 155(3) of the Code. ....
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....orthwith notify to the informant, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the fact that he will not investigate the case or cause the case to be investigated. Section 156(1) which is to be read in conjunction with Section 157(1) states that any Officer Incharge of a Police Station may without an order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of the concerned police station would have power to enquire into or try under provisions of Chapter XIII. Section 156(3) vests a discretionary power on a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 to order an investigation by a police officer as contemplated in Section 156(1). It is pertinent to note that this provision does not empower a Magistrate to stop an investigation undertaken by the police. (See State of Bihar and Anr. v. J.A.C. Saldanha and Ors. 1980CriLJ98 ]. In that case, power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) to direct further investigation after submission of a report by the investigating officer under Section 173(2) of the Code was dealt with. It was observed as follows: The power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) ....
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....e transferred by the High Court and, therefore, the allegation of choosing any Special Judges with oblique motive is clearly without any substance. The notification regarding the re- organization of the police station with Police Station, Mohali having jurisdiction over the whole State of Punjab was notified on 19.12.2002. 46. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that allegations of impropriety were made because of the Notification dated 17.11.2003 relating to jurisdiction of the Special Judge. A few relevant aspects need to be noted at this juncture. The Court of Special Judge, Ropar was created by Notification dated 5.1.1990 of the State Government which was issued in consultation with the High Court for the area of Ropar District. Another Notification was issued on 5.9.2000 in consultation with the High Court. By this Notification, Sessions Judges in the State of Punjab were appointed as Special Judges within their respective districts. The Notification dated 31.10.1994 creating P.S., Chandigarh with Statewide jurisdiction which was shifted to P.S., Mohali by order dated 20.4.1995 was already in existence when Sessions Judges were made Special Judges. There is no dispute ab....