TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1931 (5) TMI 35
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....ame Court. 2. Action No. 4122 was instituted by the appellant on 19th June 1924 to recover a balance alleged to be due by the respondent upon a running account in respect of moneys advanced and goods sold and delivered, with interest to the date of the suit. The suit was instituted in the name under which the appellant carried on business, and the respondent inter alia pleaded that the appellant was precluded from enforcing his rights under the contract set out in the plaint, as he had failed to register his business name as prescribed by the Business Names Registration Ordinance No. 6 of 1918, S. 9 of that Ordinance provides as follows : Where any firm or person by this Ordinance required to furnish a statement of particulars or of any ....
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....nt's appeal succeeded, any further proceedings might be barred by limitation, the appellant made an application to the Supreme Court on 10th March 1927 to advance the hearing of the appeal, which was successfully opposed by the respondent. 5. In this situation, the appellant instituted the present suit, Action No. 4687 on 2nd June 1927 in the District Court of Ratnapura. The amount claimed in the plaint was the same as in Action No. 4122, with the addition of further interest. The respondent filed his written answer on 5th July 1927, in which he pleaded inter alia as matter of law that the action No. 4122 of this Court and the decree entered of record therein are a bar to this action. 6. It is unnecessary to detail the manoeuvres of....
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....ing. The parties in the two suits are the same and the subject-matter may be taken to be the same. 9. The District Judge concluded in the respondent's favour on the ground that the decree in Action No. 4122, though subject to appeal, was final and enforceable. In the Supreme Court Schneider, S.P.J., with whom Lyall-Grant, J., agreed, appears to have proceeded on two alternative views, viz., that the present appellant's cause of action had been merged in and superseded by the decree, or otherwise that in both actions the appellant was seeking to recover the same debt, and that, as he could not get decree for the same debt twice over, he was not entitled to maintain the second action at all. The learned Judge found it unnecessary to ....