1953 (11) TMI 20
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....e" is ,defined in section 4 (o) to mean "any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in -force." Contempt is punishable under the Contempt .of Courts Act, 1952, therefore it is an offence punish-able by a law which is in force ; consequently, it is an offence. Being an offence it is triable under the Criminal Procedure Code because section 5 makes the Code applicable not only to the trial of offences under the. Indian Penal Code but also to the trial of offences against "other laws." As it is a matter triable under the Criminal Procedure Code it must be a "case" within the meaning of section 527 and accordingly the section can be invoked here. We are unable to agree. In our opinion, the power ,of a High Court to institute proceedings for contempt and punish where necessary is a special jurisdiction which is,inherent in all courts of record section 1(2) of the Code expressly excludes special jurisdictions from its scope. The section runs- "In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing herein contained shall affect any special...... law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred by I....
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....sh for contempt is something inherent in every court of record. Sulaiman J. collected a number of English authorities at pages 728 to 730 of his judgment in In re Abdul Hasan Jauhar (I and concluded thus: "These leading cases unmistakably show that the power of the High Court in England to deal with the contempt of inferior courts is based not so much on its historical foundation as on the High Court's inherent jurisdiction." Apparently, because of this the Privy Council held in 1853 that the Recorder's Court at Sierre Leone also had jurisdiction to punish for contempt, not because that court had inherited the jurisdiction of the English courts but because it was a court of record. Their Lordships' language was this: "In this country every court of record is the sole and exclusive judge of what amounts to a contempt of court......... and unless there exists a difference in the constitution of the Recorder's Court at Sierre Leone the same power must be conceded to be inherent in that court...... we are of opinion that it is a court of record and that the law must be considered the same there as in this country." The 1884 edition of Belchamber....
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....n the High Court of Calcutta," and at page 733 went on to say that that applied "to every other High Court in this country." In the presence of all this history the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, was passed. The heading states that the Act is "to define and limit the powers of certain courts in Punishing contempts of courts." The preamble states- "Whereas doubts have arisen as to the powers of a High Court of Judicature to punish contempts of courts and whereas it is expedient to resolve these doubts and to define and limit the powers exercisable by High Courts and Chief Courts in punishing contempts of court : It is hereby enacted as follows Section 2 says :- "Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), the High Courts of judicature established by Letters Patent shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to them as they have and exercise in respect of contempts of themselves." This recognises an existing jurisdiction in all Letters Patent High Courts to punish for contempts of themselves, and the only limitation pla....
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....n a Full Bench for the third time and reached the same conclusion: In the matter of K. L. Gauba(2). This time they pointed out that the Sind, Rangoon and Nagpur High Courts had also punished summarily for contempts. They also referred to two American decisions where, though the power was said to have been derived from the common law, it was said that. "The power to fine and imprison for contempt from the earliest history of jurisprudence has been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of a court without which it could no more exist than without a judge............ Finally, in Parashuram Detaram v. Emperor(3 ) the Privy Council said that "this summary power of punishing for contempt.......... is a power which a court must of necessity possess." We have omitted references to the Bombay and Madras decisions after 1883 because the judicial Committee settled the powers of the three Chartered High Courts. What we are at pains to show is that, apart from the Chartered High Courts, practically every other High Court in India has exercised the jurisdiction and where its authority has been challenged each has held that it is a jurisdiction inherent in a court of rec....
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....ew of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, was repealed by Act XXXII of 1952. Section 3 of the new Act is similar to section 2 of the old and, far from conferring a new jurisdiction, assumes, as did the old Act, the existence of a right to punish for contempt in every High Court and further assumes the existence of a special practice and procedure, for it says that every High Court shall exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority "in accordance with the same procedure and practice." These words are new and would be inappropriate if the Criminal Procedure Code applied. In any case, so far as contempt of a High Court itself is concerned, as distinct from one of a subordinate court, the Constitution vests these rights in every High Court, so no Act of a legislature could take away that jurisdiction and confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority. It is true section 5 expands the ambit of the authority beyond what was till then considered to be possible but it does not confer a new jurisdiction. It merely widens the scope of an existing jurisdiction of a very special kind. On reflection it will be apparent that the Code could not be c....


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