TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2016 (4) TMI 1288
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....vement Trust vide lease deed dated 06.01.1951 granted lease of plot No. 2, Jhandewalan, "E" Block, Delhi in favour of original lessee Balraj Virmani. After enactment of the Delhi Development Act, 1957, the DDA was constituted by notification of the Central Government and by virtue of Section 60 of the aforesaid Act, all properties, movable or immovable, vested in the Delhi Improvement Trust came to be vested in the DDA. 4. The lease in respect of property in question was initially for a period of 20 years i.e., w.e.f. 11.08.1948 to 10.08.1968 and the same was liable to be extended for a further period of 20 years at the option of lessee in accordance with the terms and conditions contained therein. Clause (vi) of the lease deed is a relevant condition, which reads as under: "vi) not to use the said land and buildings that may be erected thereon during the said term for any other purpose other than for the purpose of cold storage plant without the consent in writing of the said lessor; provided that the lease shall become void if the land is used for any purpose other than that for which the lease is granted not being a purpose subsequently approved by the lessor." Clause III(b)....
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.... decreed the said suit in favour of the original lessee. The learned Sub-Judge has found notice dated 01.09.1972 of the DDA to be arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction. 8. Aggrieved by the decision of the learned Sub-Judge, the DDA preferred the First Appeal vide RCA No. 75 of 1982 before the Court of Additional District Judge (ADJ), Delhi. The learned ADJ vide judgment and order dated 29.09.1982 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and order passed by the trial court. 9. Aggrieved by the said judgment of the learned ADJ, DDA preferred the Second Appeal vide RSA No. 06 of 1983, before the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. During the pendency of the said second appeal an application vide CM No. 13336 of 2007 was moved Under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for substitution of M/s. Anant Raj Agencies Pvt. Ltd.-the Respondent herein in place of original lessee-Balraj Virmani. In the said application it was urged that the property in question had been purchased by the Respondent vide sale deed in view of compromise decree dated 22.06.1988 passed by the High Court in terms of settlement between the original lessee and the Respondent herein. The High Cour....
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....gh Court to hold that there was automatic renewal of the lease of the property in question only for the reason that the rent was deposited by the lessee in the office of the DDA. 15. It was further contended by the learned Counsel that the High Court has failed to appreciate that the original lessee created an interest in the said property, in favour of third party-Respondent, during the period when he was no more a lease holder, in respect of the said property, by virtue of determination of lease in his favour by efflux of time. Therefore, the original lessee, having no right, title or interest in the said property, could not have transferred the said property to the Respondent and therefore, the alleged transfer of the property in question in his favour is void and the same is not binding upon the DDA. 16. The learned Counsel further contended that the High Court has failed to appreciate that the deposit of the rent by the original lessee and its acceptance by the office of the DDA is administrative in nature and would not be construed as an estoppel or waiver of the DDA's right in respect of the property in question unless a specific intention to this effect is communicate....
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....tted that in view of the aforesaid it can be safely concluded that after the expiry of the first term of the lease and acquiescence of the DDA in letting the original lessee to continue in possession of the said property, the lessee became a tenant at will in respect of the said property. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court is not bad in law and thus, interference by this Court with the same is not warranted. 19. With respect to the substitution of the Respondent in place of the original lessee, during pendency of the second appeal, it was submitted by the learned senior Counsel that the said substitution of party was allowed by the High Court vide order dated 03.11.2009 in RSA No. 06 of 1983. The DDA did not even file a reply to the application for substitution filed by the Respondent and therefore, it is estopped from questioning such substitution of the Respondent in place of original lessee. It was further submitted by him that the order dated 03.11.2009 has not been challenged by the DDA and therefore, it has no right to raise any new plea in this regard at this stage. 20. The learned senior Counsel further submitted that the DDA has deliberat....
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..... From a reading of the said lease deed it becomes very clear that the original lease period was initially for a period 20 years, which period expired on 10.08.1968 as the lease period commenced w.e.f. 11.08.1948. No doubt, the original lessee availed his option of the renewal of lease as provided in the lease deed by making a request to the DDA vide his letter dated 23.2.1967, but the same was not acceded to by the DDA. Before expiry of the original lease period, notices were issued by the office of DDA on 09.02.1968 and 16.02.1968 to the original lessee alleging certain breaches of the terms and conditions (extracted above) of the lease deed. The original lessee was given 15 days time to remedy the said breaches. Though the original lessee made several replies to the aforesaid notices but he had failed to rectify the said breaches notified to him. Therefore, the DDA vide notice dated 01.09.1972 decided not to renew the lease of the property in question and terminated the lease in respect of the same, though in law the same was not even required on the part of the DDA in view of the conditions of the lease deed as after the expiry of the original period of lease it stands terminat....
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....xation of terms and conditions for the renewed period of lease by mutual consent and in absence thereof through the mediation of local mukhia or panchas of the village. The aforesaid renewal Clauses (7) and (9) in the agreement of lease clearly fell within the expression "agreement to the contrary" used in Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. Under the aforesaid clauses option to seek renewal was to be exercised before expiry of the lease and on specified conditions. 19. The lessor in the present case had neither expressly nor impliedly agreed for renewal. The renewal as provided in the original contract was required to be obtained by following a specified procedure i.e. on mutually agreed terms or in the alternative through the mediation of Mukhias and Panchas. In the instant case, there is a renewal Clause in the contract prescribing a particular period and mode of renewal which was "an agreement to the contrary" within the meaning of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the face of specific Clauses (7) and (9) for seeking renewal there could be no implied renewal by "holding over" on mere acceptance of the rent offered by the lessee. In the instant case, opt....
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.... held that the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 must prevail over the Rent Control Act. The relevant paras 55 and 70 of the decision read thus: "55. The Rent Control Act makes a departure from the general law regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant contained in the Transfer of Property Act inasmuch as it makes provision for determination of standard rent, it specifies the grounds on which a landlord can seek the eviction of a tenant, it prescribes the forum for adjudication of disputes between landlords and tenants and the procedure which has to be followed in such proceedings. The Rent Control Act can, therefore, be said to be a special statute regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant in the Union territory of Delhi. The Public Premises Act makes provision for a speedy machinery to secure eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises. As opposed to the general law which provides for filing of a regular suit for recovery of possession of property in a competent court and for trial of such a suit in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, the Public Premises Act confers the power to pass a....
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....ewal of lease in favour of the original lessee once it stands terminated by efflux of time and also by issuing notice terminating the lease. Merely accepting the amount towards the rent by the office of the DDA after expiry of the lease period shall not be construed as renewal of lease of the premises in question, in favour of the original lessee, for another period of 20 years as contended by the Respondent. 26. Further, the property in question, vested in the DDA, is a Nazul land, a developed land as is defined Under Rule 2(i) of the Nazul Land Rules, which reads thus: "Nazul land" means the land placed at the disposal of the Authority and developed by or under the control and supervision of the Authority Under Section 22 of the Act" 27. Section 3(2) of the DD Act says the Authority shall be a body corporate by the name Delhi Development Authority (DDA). Section 21 of the DD Act empowers the DDA in respect of the disposal of the land and Sub-section (3) of Section 21 makes it very clear that nothing in the aforesaid Act shall be construed as enabling the Authority or the local Authority concerned to dispose of the land by way of gift, mortgage or charge but subject to certain....
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....mises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever." 29. In the absence of renewal of lease after 10.8.1968, the pleadings of the original lessee that the DDA is estopped from taking the plea that there is no renewal of lease after having accepted the rent after 10.8.1968, in respect of property in question and after accepting certain sums in respect of the same, subsequently, for change of the property in question from leasehold to freehold are all irrelevant aspects for the reason that the same are contrary to the aforesaid provisions of the DD Act, the Nazul Land Rules applicable to the fact situation and the terms and conditions of the lease deed. Further, it is clear from the contents of the termination notice dated 01.09.1972 served upon the original lessee by the DDA that it has not only refused to renew the lease of the property but also asked the original lessee to hand over the possession of the property in question within 30 days, which is absolutely in consonance with Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occ....
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.... DDA. The High Court has failed to appreciate this important factual and legal aspect of the case. 33. The contention urged by the learned senior Counsel for the Respondent that it has deposited a sum of Rs. 96,41,982/- as conversion charges of the property in question from leasehold to freehold right of the same is also of no relevance and lends no support to the Respondent for the reason that in the absence of renewal of lease of the property by the DDA, the original lessee himself becomes an unauthorised occupant of the property in question. The deposition of conversion charges in respect of the same to the office of the DDA cannot help the Respondent in claiming any right with respect to the property in question. The question whether such a procedure in respect of the public property is permissible in law or not is not required to be decided in this case. The instant case having peculiar facts and circumstances, namely, after 10.08.1968 the lease stands terminated by efflux of time, which is further evidently clear from the termination notice dated 01.09.1972 and thereafter, the original lessee becomes an unauthorised occupant in terms of Section 2(g) of the Public Premises (E....