TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1996 (7) TMI 577
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....orce aircraft or helicopters from October 1, 1993 to November 30, 1993. When Writ Petition No. 432/95 was posted for hearing on July 17, 1995 before the learned Chief Justice of India and brother Justice S.C. Sen the Solicitor General for India, Shri Dipankar P. Gupta was sent for and the Court directed him to have the averments verified to be correct and directed the petition to be listed after two weeks. On August 7, 1995, the writ petition came before the Bench comprising the learned CJI, Justice S.C. Sen and Justice K.S. Paripoornan. It is not in dispute that the Solicitor General had placed the record before the Court and upon perusal thereof and after hearing the petitioner-in-person, the Bench summarily "dismissed" the writ petition which had triggered the petitioner to file yet another writ petition, this time against the learned Chief Justice of India, Justice A.M. Ahmadi. The Registry raised objections for its maintainability but, at the insistence of the petitioner, it was posted, with officer objections, for hearing, as unregistered Writ Petition (C) No. D- 17209/95 on January 13, 1996 before a Bench of three learned Judges, viz., Justice J.S. Verma and two of us (Justi....
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....sent-in-person is given notice of the contempt petition. He is required-to file his reply within four weeks to show cause why proceedings for contempt should not be initiated against him. We request the learned Solicitor General to assist the Court in this contempt matter. List the matter after notice of the date fixed by Registry is given to Dr. D.C. Saxena and the Solicitor General." While dismissing the petition, this Court observed in the later part of the order the petitioner's conduct in his persistence to stand by the scandalous averments made against the learned Chief Justice of India. This Court was constrained to initiate contempt proceedings and enlisted 14 instances which would prima facie constitute contumacious conduct of the petitioner to scandalise the Court. In the meanwhile, the petitioner wrote in a newspaper criticising Justice, T.S. Verma. Resultantly, Justice J.S. Verma recluses himself from the Bench. Thus the matter was posted before this Bench. On April 12, 1996, the petitioner filed his reply to the show cause notice styling the same as "preliminary submissions" and reiterated his averments, which, as pointed by this Court, would constit....
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.... 1995, he had placed the record before the Court which are confidential in nature. After their perusal and hearing the petitioner, the Court did not think it necessary to issue directions as sought for. At this stage, we would point out that when Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, as President of Indian National Congress or as the former Prime Minister, was alleged to have used the defence aircrafts, this Court obviously was of the view that the relationship between the two wings of the Government or the political party, i.e., the Indian National Congress is of debtor and creditor and that, therefore, prerogative writ under Article 32 of the Constitution would not lie to enforce contractual dues adjustable as per their practice. The exercise of the power under Article 32 was, therefore obviously thought to be uncalled for. Supreme Court being the highest judicial forum, the need to record reasons is obviated since there is no further appeal against the order of this Court. Recording reasons is not, therefore, necessary nor is called for. The learned Solicitor General, therefore, contended that when the Court dismissed the writ petition, the petitioner, being a professor of English in Chand....
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....n comments based on the Court proceedings and as per the law and were for public good. He stands to gain no personal benefit in the litigation. To the best of his understanding, the petitioner made only relevant allegations based on record and of law with no bad intention. They are valid defences to him. The Contempt of Court Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") is the legacy of the colonial rule and is ultra vires Article 19(1)(a) . All the contentions raised by him need to be decided by a Constitution Bench since they pose questions of considerable constitutional importance. The petitioner, therefore, has not committed any contempt of the Court. With a view to appreciate the respective contentions and to adjudge whether the petitioner has committed contempt of this Court, it is necessary to extract the relevant portions supplied to him by show cause and his reply thereto and of preliminary submissions and his modified statement as a substitution to the averments made in the second writ petition and the effect thereof. In respect of the averments made in the offending portions of item 1, 3, 5, 9, 13 and 14(a) and (d), the petitioner stood by them. He submitted his m....
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.... be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done. Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference of the course of justice.", he quoted the above statement of Lord Heward, C.J. Regarding Item 1 referred to hereinbefore; he justified the imputation stating that no person can be a Judge in his own cause directly or indirectly. In spite of his objection, the respondent (CJI) chose to constitute the bench himself as a presiding Judge. According to the petitioner the word "improper", therefore was used in that perspective. With regard to the averments made in Item 3, his reply was that the Court proceedings dated July 17, 1995 recording that the Solicitor General, Shri Dipankar Gupta appeared in his official capacity to Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, a private Party, He had stated that even assuming, though not conceding, that he (Solicitor General) was acting as amicus curiae also was not recorded in the Court proceedings. Therefore, his comment that CJI had fabricated false record is fair and an accurate report of the Court proceedings protected under Section 4 of the Act. With regard to Item 5, he states thus: "This....
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.... he has stated that "this is a fair and accurate submission of the Court proceedings on matter which had already been "heard and finally decided", (inverted commas were put by the petitioner himself). He sought protection to it, as a fair comment, under Section 4 of the Act. He further justified it stating that even the use of the word "browbeat" by the petitioner is a "fair criticism of judicial act" (inverted comma was put by the petitioner himself) to imply that proper hearing was not being granted to the petitioner who had approached the highest Court of the land to "protect and safeguard public property". He justified them as a "statement of truthful facts", for public good should not be construed as disrespect to the Hon'ble Court. After offering justification in his modified statement, he reiterates thus: "The petitioner discerned reluctance on the part of the presiding judge to allow the relief claimed, which was in public interest, and actuated by the desire to "preserve and protest public property," without any personal malice". It would, thus, indicate that the petitioner imputed motives to Justice A.M. Ahmadi, Chief Justice India, in the discharge of his....
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.... 18(c) reads thus: "For causing fabrication of courts proceedings of 7th August, 1995, and not mentioning the fact of appearance of the Solicitor General, would Justice Ahmadi not be liable to prosecution under the relevant provisions of the Indian Penal Code in consonance with the time- honoured maxim, "Be you ever so high, the law is above you ?" (inverted commas were put by the petitioner himself). In his preliminary submissions, he stated that "Although somewhat unhappily worded, it is one of the substantial questions of law, which needed to be determined by the Constitution Bench of the apex court". According to him, above maxim is one to which this Court has repeatedly stated to have avowed allegiance. In his modified version, he stated thus: "For inaccurate recording of the court proceedings of 7 August, 1995 and not mentioning even the fact of appearance of the Solicitor General for the respondent, what responsibility would ensue on the presiding judge, who dictated them ?" It would, therefore, in the language of the petitioner, be "discernible" difference of the imputation as originally made in the writ petition and reiterated in his preliminary ....
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....ly the petitioner as an individual, but that of the people of India, who are ultimately sovereign, as stated in the Preamble to the Constitution, has not Justice Ahmadi forfeited any legal protection, even if it were available to him ?" In his preliminary submissions, he has stated that "That first part of the sentence is based on the implicit constitutional provisions and in fact shows that the petitioner/defendant looks upon the apex court as the guardian of his fundamental rights and those of the voiceless millions. The second part raises a constitutional question, which needed determination by an appropriate bench." In the amended version, he reiterated that "for violating the fundamental rights of not only the petitioner, as an individual, but also that of the people of India, who are the ultimate sovereign, as stated in the Preamble to the Constitution, has not Justice Ahmadi sent wrong signals to the entire judiciary of which he is the head". In this paragraph, it is clear that the petitioner knew the distinction between the imputation as originally attributed to the Chief Justice of India as Head of the Institution, i.e., Judiciary and reiterated ....
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.... or constitutional rights one owes corresponding duties. The person who fails to perform the duty is accountable to the people. CJI willfully, in other words, deliberately with supine indifference dismissed the writ petition. CJI does not get legal protection but also forfeits his citizenship. Imputation 11 at page 8 in paragraph 18(h) reads thus: "For allowing his son who is a practising in the Supreme Court, to stay with him in his official residence, and presumably misusing official facilities and prestige of office of Chief Justice of India, is not Justice Ahmadi liable to be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, in view of the ratio decidendi of Veeraswami's case ?" In his preliminary submissions, he reiterated that this is a question of law based on information he had received from "public documents" (inverted commas were put by the petitioner himself) from an article which was said to have appeared in "India Today", with Justice Ahmadi's photograph and yet another one said to have been published in "The Times of India", authored by a woman Senior Advocate of this Court. He states that "It is widely talked in legal circles that apart ....
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....in paragraph 18(i) reads thus: "Is Justice Ahmadi not liable to pay from his pocket not only the legitimate costs incurred by the petitioner in C.W.P. No. 432 of 1995 and the present petition, but also the loss caused to the public exchequer by non-payment of dues with 18% interest by Shri P.V.N. Rao ?" In his preliminary submissions he reiterated it giving further justification thus: "This is the law laid down by this Hon'ble Court in relation to public servants. Whether it is also applicable to holders of constitutional office or not is a substantial question of law, which should have been answered by a Constitution bench." In his modified version he has stated thus: "who would be liable to reimburse the legitimate costs incurred by the petitioner by filing C.W.P. No. 432 of 1995, and the present petition and the huge loss caused to the public exchequer because of the persistent default in paying them by P. V. Narasimha Rao, with 18% interest ?" It would, thus, be apparent that for dismissal of the writ petition filed by a party, by a judicial act, the presiding Judge of the Court is liable to pay costs to the litigant and....
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....s appointed to the Supreme Court during the tenure of Justice A.M. Ahmadi as CJI, are amenable to influence in deciding the cases at the behest of the CJI as they owe their appointments to him. In other words, as soon as a writ petition under Article 32 or petition under Article 136 was filed attributing motives or bias to the CJI (it would equally apply to any Judge) he should desist to perform judicial and administrative work. He should proceed on leave till that case is decided. The senior-most puisne Judge should assume the work of the CJI. Imputations in Prayer (b) and (c) read as under: (b) strip the respondent (Justice A.M. Ahmadi) of his citizenship"; and (c) Direct the registration of an FIR against the respondent (Justice A.M. Ahmadi) under the Indian Penal Code for committing forgery and fraud. In his preliminary submissions, he has stated with regard to stripping of "citizenship of CJI that "this may have been the consequence of the Constitution bench affirming the view taken by the Calcutta High Court cited earlier. Moreover, this is only a prayer for relief sought, which does not fall within the mischief of the Contempt of Courts Act." With regard to pr....
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....tion to hear a case by a bench of which he is a member, it is his own personal volition. The Chief Justice's prerogative to constitute benches and assignment of judicial business would not hinge at the whim of a litigant. The decisions of different benches are the decisions of the Court. For the convenient transaction of business, the senior Judge among the members composing the Bench gets the privilege to preside over the Bench but the decision is that of the Court. The members composing the Bench collectively speak for the Court and would bear collective responsibility for the decision unless separate opinions are expressed by individual members composing the Bench. Majority opinion is the law as envisaged under Article 145(5) of the Constitution. Their opinion or order thus is the opinion or order of the Court. The minority opinion also would form part of the judgment or order but remains the minority view. The Chief Justice is first among the colleagues. The question, therefore, arises: whether the afore-enumerated imputations constitute contempt of this Court? Though the petitioner contended that the provisions of the Act are ultra vires Article 19(1)(a) of the Const....
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....he most precious liberties in our secular, socialist republic, freedom of expression is a prized privilege to speak one's open mind although not always in prefect good taste of all institutions. Since it opens up channels of open discussion, the opportunity of speech and expression should be afforded for vigorous advocacy, no less than abstract discussion. This liberty may be regarded as an autonomous and fundamental good and its value gets support from the need to develop our evolving society from unequal past to a vigorous homogeneous egalitarian order in which each gets equality of status and of status and of opportunity; social, economic and political justice with dignity of person so as to build an integrated and united Bharat. Transformation for that strong social restructure would be secured when channels for free discussion are wide open and secular mores are not frozen. All truths are relative and they can be judged only in the competition of market. Liberty is not to be equated with certainty. Freedom of expression equally generates and disseminates ideas and opinions, information of political and social importance in a free market place for peaceful social transforma....
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....pression should be looked at not only from the perspective of the speaker but also the place at which he speaks, the scenario, the audience, the reaction of the publication, the purpose of the speech and the place and the forum in which the citizen exercises his freedom of speech and expression. The State has legitimate interest, therefore, to regulate the freedom of speech and expression which liberty represents the limits of the duty of restraint on speech or expression not to utter defamatory or libelous speech or expression. There is a co-relative duty not to interfere with the liberty of others. Each is entitled to dignity of person and of reputation. Nobody has a right to denigrate others right to person or reputation. Therefore, freedom of speech and expression is tolerated so long as it is not malicious or libelous so that all attempts to foster and ensue orderly and peaceful public discussion or public good should result from free speech in the market place. If such speech or expression was untrue and so reckless as to its truth, the speaker or the author does not get protection of the constitutional right. Freedom of speech and expression, therefore, would be subject t....
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....ic at large by fearlessness and objectivity of the approach to the issues arising for decision, quality of the judgment, restraint, dignity and decorum a judge observes in judicial conduct off and on the bench and rectitude. In P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shankci 1988 CriLJ 1745 this Court has held that administration of justice and judges are open to public criticism and public scrutiny. Judges have their accountability to the society and their accountability must be judged by the conscience and oath to their office, i.e., to defend and uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear and favour. Thus the judges must do, in the light given to them to determine, what is right. Any criticism about judicial system or the judges which hampers the administration of justice or which erodes the faith in the objective approach of the judges and brings administration of justice to ridicule must be prevented. The contempt of court proceedings arise out of that attempt. Judgments can be criticised. Motives to the judges need not be attributed. It brings the administration of justice into disrepute. Faith in the administration of justice is one of the pillars on which democratic institution func....
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....ded allegations against any institution, much less the judiciary. In E.M.S. Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar 1970 CriLJ 1670 a Bench of three Judge had held that the law of contempt stems from the right of a court to punish, by imprisonment or fine, persons guilty of words or acts which obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice. This right is exercised in India by all courts when contempt is committed in facie curiae by the superior courts on their own behalf or on behalf of courts subordinate to them, even if committed outside the courts. Scandalising the judges or courts tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect and disregard and tantamounts to contempt. All acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity or its majesty or challenge its authority, constitute contempt committed in respect of single judge or single court or in certain circumstances committed in respect of the whole of the judiciary or Judicial system. Therein the criticism by the Chief Minister who described judiciary as an instrument of oppression and the judges as guided and dominated by class hatred, class interest and c....
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....ations of partiality or bias on the part of a judge or a court. On the other hand, criticism of a judge's conduct or of the conduct of a court, even if strongly worded, is not a contempt provided that the criticism is fair, temperate and made in good faith, and is not directed to the personal character of a judge or the impartiality of a judge or court. Therefore, it is of necessity to regulate the judicial process free from fouling the fountain of justice to ward off the people from undermining the confidence of the public in the purity of fountain of justice and due administration. Justice thereby remains pure, untainted and unimpeded. The punishment for contempt, therefore, is not for the purpose of protecting or vindicating either the dignity of the court as a whole or an individual judge of the court from attack on his personal reputation but it was intended to protect the public who are subject to the jurisdiction of the court and to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice. If the authority of the court remains undermined or impeded the fountain of justice gets sullied creating distrust and disbelief in the mind of the litigant public or the right....
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....public confidence in the administration of justice or majesty of justice. It would, therefore, be scandalising the judge as a judge, in other words, imputing partiality, corruption, bias, improper motives to a Judge is scandalisation of the court would be contempt of the court. Event imputation of lack of impartiality or fairness to a judge in the discharge of his official duties amounts to contempt. The gravamen of the offence is that of lowering his dignity or authority or an affront to majesty of justice. When the contemnor challenges the authority of the Court, he interferes with the performance of duties of Judge's office or judicial process or administration of justice or generation or production of tendency bringing the judge or judiciary into contempt. Section 2(c) of the Act, therefore, defines criminal contempt in wider articulation that any publication, whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations or otherwise of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course o....
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....er motives in judicial conduct would impair the efficacy of judicial dispensation and due protection of the liberties of the citizen or due administration of justice. This paramount public interest is protected by the definition in Section 2(c) of the Act. It is, therefore, not necessary to establish actual intention on the part of the contemnor to interfere with the administration of justice. Making reckless allegations or vilification of the conduct of the court or the judge would be contempt. The question, therefore, to be considered is: whether the imputations referred to hereinbefore have necessary tendency to impinge or tendency to impede the public confidence in the administration of justice or would create disbelief in the efficacy of judicial administration or lower the authority or interferes with majesty of Court ? The court, therefore, is required to consider whether the imputations made by a contemnor are calculated to bring or have the effect of bringing the court into contempt or casting aspersions on the administration of justice tends to impede justice etc. The court has to consider the nature of the imputations, the occasion of making the imputations and whethe....
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.... CriLJ 631, the appellant, a District judge was suspended and a spate of litigation in that behalf had ensued. When an order of suspension was set aside by the Government, in exercise of his power under Article 235 , the High Court further ordered suspension of him pending enquiry of the allegations made against Judges in a memorandum and letters sent to the Governor in a valedictory criticism of the judges in their function on the administration side. When contempt action was initiated, he challenged the jurisdiction of the court and the competency to initiate action for contempt on the specious plea that the acts done by the High Court were on the administration side and were not judicial actions. A three-Judge Bench had negatived the plea and convicted the appellant under Section 12 of the Act. When the matter had come up before this Court, a Constitution Bench considered the gravamen of the imputations and had held that the allegations made against the court in the memo submitted to the Government constituted scurrilous allegations against the High Court. Again some of the allegations made in the memo of appeal and various communications to the Supreme Court were held to consti....
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....adhere to a code of conduct in seeking redressal on the perceived aberration of the conduct of a judge otherwise than in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article 124(4) of the Constitution. The respect for and the dignity of the court thereby was protected from scurrilous attack on the judge or the court. If the forum of the judicial process is allowed to mount scurrilous attack on a judge, the question arises whether the forum of the judicial process of vilification of the judges of imputations to the judges in the pleadings presented to the court would give liberty of freedom of expression to an advocate or a litigant. In the light of the above discussion, we have little doubt to conclude that when an advocate or a party appearing before the court requires to conduct himself in a matter befitting to the dignity and decorum of the court, he cannot have a free licence to indulge in writing in the pleadings the scurrilous accusations or scandalisation against the judge or the court. If the reputation and dignity of the judge, who decides the case are allowed to be prescribed in the pleadings, the respect for the court would quickly disappear and independence of the judici....
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....y were advocating their client's interest at that time. The lawyer's behavior threatens the dignity and authority of the courts was held to constitute contempt of the Court. In Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India and Anr. 1988 CriLJ 181, in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution the advocate indulged in mud-slinging against advocates and this Court. It was held that those allegations were likely to lower the prestige of this Court. This Court accordingly held that he committed contempt in drawing up the petition and directed to initiate proceedings against him for overstepping the limits in particular of self-restraint. It would, thus, be seen that when the first writ petition was dismissed by this Court, as a responsible citizen, the petitioner would have kept quite. When the result animated by the petitioner was not achieved, he embittered to foul at the process of this Court and emboldened to file the second writ petition with imputation made against this Courts, in particular targeting the Chief Justice of India, Justice A.M. Ahmadi. As stated hereinbefore and need not be reiterated once that it is the duty of the Court to hear and decide any matter posted ....
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....t, unfair, arbitrary and unlawful, flagrant violation of mandate of Article 14 "Violation of the sacred oath of office" and to "declare Justice A.M. Ahmadi unfit to hold the office as Chief Justice of India". When these imputations were pointed out to the petitioner by three-Judge Bench presided over by brother Verma, J. while dismissing the second writ petition, to be scandalous and reckless, he had stated that he "stood by" those allegations. He reiterated the same with justification in his preliminary submissions. He has stated that the accusations made were truthful and "carefully" worded. In this backdrop scenario, the effect of these imputations is obviously reckless apart from scandalising this Court, in particular the Chief Justice of India and was intended to foul the process of the Court or lower or at any rate tends to lower the authority of the Court in the estimate of the public and tends to undermine the efficacy of the judicial process. It would, therefore, be clear that the accusations are gross contempt. At the height of it, he stated that since the first writ petition was not disposed of by a bench of not less than five Judges, the writ petition was not dismissed ....
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....ons together with the phrase that CJI brow boated him ex facie scandalise the Court and tend to lower the authority of the Court. As seen, the insinuations tend to bring the court into contempt in the estimate of the general public and that the court lacked fairness, objectivity and dismissed the writ petition for known reasons. It also tends to interfere with the administration of justice and that the court should give reasons lest the order be believed to be shrouded with suspicion. Therefore, it is ex facie contumacious. The contemnor seeks to justify his averments under Section 4 of the Act as fair and accurate report of the judicial proceedings and that, therefore, they are not contempt. Even in his modified statement, for his statement that the Chief Justice of India browboated him in dismissing the writ petition, he stated the "discerned reluctance" on the part of the presiding Judge. In other words, his revised imputation compounds the commission of flagrant contempt by substituting the word "browbeat" with the words "discerned reluctance". In other words, he attributed motives to the Court for dismissal of the first writ petition. It would, thus, be clear that the contemno....
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....hief Justice of India and is accordingly liable to prosecution. This bravado not only impinges upon the protection given by Article 124(4) of the Constitution and under relevant provisions of the Protection of Official Act ex facie it is an outrageous tendency to lower the authority of the Court and interference with judicial administration. The assertion of the petitioner that this is a constitutional conundrum required to be decided by a Constitution Bench of this Court highlights contumacious conduct of the contemnor. In item 8 he attributes that this Court "willfully" and "advertently" (emphasis supplied) violated fundamental rights of contemnor and of other people in not granting relief of direction to Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao to pay the alleged dues. The word "advertently was carefully used by the petitioner and the word "willfully" was employed for refusal of the relief. They do emphasise the emphatic tone of the language and the motive of the contemnor and attribute motives to this Court that the relief sought for in the first writ petition "advertently" was not granted and was "willfully" declined and thereby the Chief Justice Ahmadi lost constitutional protection of not ....
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....tification in his preliminary submissions that it being a question of law, it does not amount to personal imputation or insinuation. In spite of this Court pointing it out to be scandalous, when the second writ petition was dismissed and his persistence that he stood by those allegations, it does not lie in his mouth to contend either in his preliminary submissions or his modified form that the dismissal of the first writ petition amounts to failure to perform fundamental duties by the CJI and, therefore, it would further compound the contempt. In imputation 11, the petitioner attributed to the Chief Justice of India that he had allowed his son to practise in the Supreme Court and to stay with him in his official residence etc. The petitioner sought justification to the said imputation from reports said to have been published in the "India Today" and "The Times of India" by a lady senior advocate of this Court. But the petitioner has not placed on record the said material. Therefore, we do not have the advantage to verify their contents or correctness or otherwise of the statements said to have been published therein. When we pointed out to the petitioner whether he had made any....
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....of the court. Item 12 of the accusation relates to the payment of litigation cost incurred by the contemnor in both the writ petitions and the loss said to have been caused to the public exchequer by non- payment by Sri P.V. Narasimha Rao, from personal pocket of Justice Ahmadi as a Chief Justice for dismissal of the writ petition. He stated in his preliminary submission that when loss was caused by a public servant in his official capacity to the public exchequer due to his dereliction of duty and under the law it was recoverable from pay or pension of the public servant, on the same analogy Chief Justice of India should be liable to make good the loss incurred by him and by the State due to non-payment by Sri P. V..Narasimha Rao. The implication is that by judicial act, if a Presiding Judge dismisses a petition, he is liable to bear personally not only the costs incurred by the litigant but also the resultant loss to the State with interest payable thereon. This imputation is a deliberate interference with the judicial process and tends to lower the authority of the Court spreading the virus to repeat by drum beats of similar reckless imputations against the judiciary at every....
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....t Bench. Thus, the contemnor has committed the contempt of this Court under Article 129 of the Constitution. The question then is: what punishment is to be awarded to the contemnor? As pointed out earlier, the repeated assertions of the petitioner that he has no personal gain in the litigation and was actuated by the public duty and laid the petitions, bear no relevance or a defence. It is already held that in a contempt proceedings, the motive, in other words, the mens rea is not relevant. What would be the effect of the act or conduct or imputation is the relevant question for decision ? It is true that in an indictable offence under penal law generally mens rea is an essential ingredient and the burden lies on the prosecution to prove it affirmatively. In a contempt proceedings of summary nature, the proof of mens rea is absolutely unnecessary. What is material is the effect or the tendency of the act, conduct or the publication of the words, written, spoken or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise and whether it scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers or tends to lower the authority of the Court or prejudices or tends to prejudice or interfere or tends to i....
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....onths and in case of default, to undergo further imprisonment for a period of one month. The contempt petition is accordingly disposed of. N.P. Singh, J I have the privilege of perusing the judgments of my learned brothers K. Ramaswamy and S.P. Bharucha, JJ. I agree to the conclusions arrived at by them and the sentence imposed against the contemner. S.P. Bharucha , J. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment and order proposed by my learned Brother, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Ramaswamy. I agree with the order but very respectfully, now set out my reasons therefore. The alleged contemnor, Dr. D.C. Saxena, had filed a writ petition (C.W.P. No. 432/95) in this Court in the public interest seeking to recover from the then Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, expenditure incurred for the private use of Indian Air Force aircraft and helicopters and consequential reliefs. The alleged contemnor appeared in person when the writ petition was called out on 17th July, 1995, for admission before a Bench comprised or the Chief Justice of India, the Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.M. Ahmadi, and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.C. Sen. The Bench sent for the Solicitor Gen....
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....r hearing the alleged contemnor, the second writ petition was dismissed, the following order being passed: The several averments in the writ petition are scandalous and it is surprising that the petitioner, who is, said to be a Professor in a University, has chosen to draft and file such a writ petition. His understanding of the meaning of Article 32 of the Constitution, is ' to say the least, preposterous. The allegations made are reckless and disclose irresponsibility on the part of the petitioner. This writ petition is wholly misconceived and is an abuse of the process of the Court. The writ petition has no merit. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed In view of the attitude of the petitioner even at the hearing, when he persisted in this stand and, on our asking him, reiterated that he stood by the scandalous averment made therein, we consider it our duty to issue to the petitioner a notice to show cause why proceedings to punish him for contempt of this Court should not be initiated against him. The Registry to take the necessary steps for registering the matter as a contempt petition. The petitioner who is present in person is given notice ....
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....he fundamental right of not only the petitioner as an individual, but that of the people of India, who are ultimately sovereign, as stated in the Preamble to the Constitution, has not Justice Ahmadi forfeited any legal protection, even it if were available to him ? (ix) Page 8 Para-18(f) What are the legal consequences of the violation of the sacred oath of office by Justice Ahmadi ? (x) Page 8 Para-18(g) For deliberate and wilful failure to perform his fundamental duties and stultifying their performance by the petitioner, should not Justice Ahmadi be stripped of his citizenship, because duties alone can confer the corresponding legal and constitutional rights ? (xi) Page 8 Para-l8(h) For allowing his son who is practising in the Supreme Court, to stay with him in his official residence, and presumably misusing official facilities and prestige of office of Chief Justice of India, is not Justice Ahmadi liable to be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, in view of the ratio decidendi of Veeraswami's case ? (xii) Page 8 Para-18(i) Is Justice Ahmadi not liable to pay from his pocket not only the l....
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.... Court the Contemnor Dr. D.C. Saxena is present today in person. He has stated that he would modify the offending portions noted show case notice in Item (ii), (vi), (vii), (viii), (x), (xii), (xiii) and wishes to withdraw unconditionally item xiv, paras B and C. The learned Solicitor General has pointed out that even if the Contemnor withdraws or files statement in the modified form what the Court required to do is whether his statements made in the writ petition originally filed constitute contempt of the Court or not and his modification of the above statements would not be of material reliance for consideration. Since the contemnor seeks time to submit the show cause in the modified language which he wishes no place before the Court, at his request the matter is adjourned to May 2, 1996 at 2.00 p.m. The Registry is directed to supply complete set of papers to learned Solicitor General." Pursuant to this order the alleged contemnor submitted a statement of modifications. In regard to Item (ii) of the Contempt notice, the amended version read: "The petitioner discerned reluctance on the part of the presiding judge to allow the relief claimed, which was in pub....
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....eneral drew our attention to what has been set out above. He submitted that the averments in the second writ petition were made and remained on the record; they were ex-facie contumacious. The alleged contemnor had sought to delete some of these averments and modify some others but had expressed no regret for what he had already said. Even the modified averments were contumacious. The alleged contemnor submitted that he had the greatest respect for this Court and that he had expressed the same in his reply to the contempt notice. The modifications that he had made indicated his own fallibility, for he had used exaggerated language in the second writ petition. He submitted that the certified copy of the first order in the earlier writ petitions did not indicate that the Solicitor General had appeared amicus curiae. He drew attention to the judgment of this Court in C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee and Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 457, in support of his submission that the respondent to the second writ petition was liable to be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act for allowing his son "who is practising in the Supreme Court, to stay with him in his official res....
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....d been guilty of forgery, fabrication of evidence and partiality; in the court's opinion, "there could not be a clearer case of a serious contempt of court." (Re. Wiseman, (1969) NZLR 55). The contempt jurisdiction is not, therefore, to be found in "banana republics" but in democracies that abide by the rule of law. It is intended to uphold the authority and dignity of the courts of law which, on behalf of the State, deliver justice and protect the public confidence that is reposed in them. The contempt notice to the alleged contemnor pursuant to the order of dismissal of the second writ petition was issued in exercise of the power of this Court, recognised by Article 129 of the Constitution, to punish for contempt of itself. The issue of the constitutionality of the Contempt of Courts Act is, therefore, not germane. The earlier writ petition came up for admission on 17th July, 1995. The Solicitor General was, admittedly, called by the Bench and asked to look into the papers. The minutes show the Solicitor General as having appeared "for the respondent". Since the Solicitor General appeared on being called by the Bench, plainly, he could not have appeared "for the respond....
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....smissal of a writ petition by a judge is not a violation of his oath or fundamental duties; at worst, it might be a judicial error. The dismissal of a writ petition cannot warrant the charge of violation of his oath by a judge; and, in my book, no more serious charge against a judge can be made. What the alleged contemnor conveniently does not mention is that the three learned judges (including the respondent) who constituted the Bench found no merit in the earlier writ petition and dismissed it. The suggestion of the alleged contemnor in paragraph 15 of the second writ petition that the earlier writ petition was dismissed by the respondent suggests that the other two learned judges counted for nothing, and this is also contempt. The allegations are scurrilous and scandalise the court. It is the duty of the Chief Justice of a court to assign judicial work to his brother judges. It was, therefore, the duty of the respondent to assign the second writ petition to a bench to hear it. By doing so he did not, as is alleged, become, a judge in his own cause. It is contempt to imply, as the alleged contemnor does, that the respondent would assign it to a bench which would not pass an or....