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1968 (8) TMI 2

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....i for quashing the notices under sections 23(2) and 22(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, hereinafter called " the Act", which had been issued by the Income-tax Officer in that connection. The appellant firm filed a return for the assessment year 1952-53 on March 31, 1953. It also applied that it may be registered as a firm under section 26A of the Act, the partners being Bhagat Singh and his two sons, Kartar Singh and Dhian Singh, their shares being in the proportion of 4/16, 6/16 and 6/16 respectively. The Income-tax Officer passed an order on March 26, 1957, holding that the assessee constituted a Hindu undivided family and not a firm. The registration under section 26A was also refused. The appellants approached the Appellate Assistant Com....

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.... proceedings were taken. The second proviso, to section 34(3) of the Act reads : " Provided further that nothing contained in this section limiting the time within which any action may be taken, or any order, assessment or reassessment may be made, shall apply to a reassessment made under section 27 or to an assessment or reassessment made on the assessee or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under section 31, section 33, section 33A, section 33B, section 66 or section 66A. " In S. C. Pyashar v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas this court, by majority, held that the provisions of the second proviso to section 34(3) in so far as they authorised the assessment or reassessment of any perso....

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....pellate Assistant Commissioner. It was observed : " Modification or setting aside of assessment made on a firm, joint Hindu family association of persons, for a particular year may affect the assessment for the said year on a partner or partners of the firm, member or members of the Hindu undivided family or the individual, as the case may be. In such cases though the latter are not eo nomine parties to the appeal, their assessments depend upon the assessments on the former. The said instances are only illustrative. It is not necessary to pursue the matter further. We would, therefore, hold that the expression 'any person' in the setting in which it appears must be confined to a person intimately connected in the aforesaid sense with the....

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.... firm and all the three partners filed their returns of profit and loss on March 31,1953, with the Income-tax Officer and also made an application under section 26A of the Act for registration of the firm. It is true that in the assessment order of the Income-tax Officer the status of the assessee is shown to be Hindu undivided family but that has been apparently shown in the order because the Income-tax Officer gave an express decision about the status of the assessee and held that it constituted a Hindu undivided family. It, however, stands proved that the assessee filed the return claiming the status of a firm together with an application under section 26A for its registration which was disallowed by the Income-tax Officer but was allowe....

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....ore, cannot be accepted. The second limb of the argument of Mr. Veda Vyasa is based on the premise that the appellant which was a partnership firm was a distinct legal entity and was thus a total stranger to the Hindu undivided family the assessment of which came up for consideration before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in which the orders already referred were made by him. It is suggested that the appellant could not fall within the meaning of the expression " any person " in the second proviso to section 34(3) of the Act. If the observations made in Murlidhar Bhagwan Das's case are borne in mind it is again not possible to understand how the appellant can be taken out of the category of person or persons intimately connected wit....