TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2015 (5) TMI 886
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....it petition (T) no. 1263 of 2013 along with other writ petitioners. These batch of writ petitions were disposed of by this Court vide order dated 3rd September, 2013 and, therefore, appeals were preferred against the order in original passed by Additional Commissioner, Central Excise, Ranchi by the petitioners claiming benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act of 1963, to exclude the time consumed in disposal of the writ petition before this Court in computation of the delay. Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2011) 15 SCC Page no. 30 Ketan V. Parekh Vs. Special Director, Directorate of Enforcement and another as also relied upon the decision rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in [2011] 1 SCC 117 Coal India Limited Vs. Ujjal Transport Agency. Counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Gujrat High Court reported in 2012 (286) E.L.T. 676 (Guj.) Adani Enterprises Ltd. Vs. Union of India. On the basis of these decisions it is submitted that Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act 1963 is applicable for condonation of delay by the Commissioner (Appeals). This aspect of ....
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....e delay. Even otherwise also, as submitted by the counsel for the respondent-Union of India that prima-facie Section 14 of the Limitation Act 1963 is not applicable because there was no want of jurisdiction where the writ petition was preferred. Normally, the assesses are taking a chance by filing a matter directly in the High Court which is always at the peril and risk of the petitioner, specially when delay is not condonable. This petitioner is not exception to "chance taking petitioner." This aspects of the matter have been taken care of by deciding the matters in terms of reported decisions as stated hereinabove. Hence, this writ petition may not be entertained by this Court. 4. Having heard counsel for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case we see no reason to entertain this writ petition mainly on the following facts and reasons: (i) Order in original was passed by Additional Commissioner Central Excise on 31st December, 2012 which is appellable under section 85 (3-A) of the Finance Act, 1994. The period of limitation is sixty days. Delay can be condoned by Commissioner (Appeals) if there are reasonable reasons. But Commissioner (Appeals) have no ....
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....is Chapter, in hearing the appeals and making orders under this section, the [Commissioner] of Central Excise (appeals) shall exercise the same powers and follow the same procedure as he exercises and follows in hearing the appeals and making orders under the [Central Excises Act,1944] (1 of 1944)." (Emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decision and Section 85 (3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 no error has been committed by the Commissioner (Appeal) in not condoning the delay because it was beyond the period of condonable delay. (ii) It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Singh Enterprises Versus Commissioner of Central Excise Jamshedpur and others reported in 2008 (3) SCC 70 in Paragraph no. 3 to 10 which reads as under: 3. The Division Bench noted that since the Commissioner had no power of condonation beyond the statutorily prescribed period, therefore, the writ petition was without merit. Before the high Court reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in ITC Ltd. V. Union of India to contend that the high Court had the power to condone the delay. This stand was not accepted by the High Court. 4. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for t....
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....y shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days' time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days' period. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has emphasized on certain decisions, more particularly, ITC case to contend that the high Court and this Court in appropriate cases condoned the delay on sufficient cause being shown. 10. Sufficient cause is an expression which is found in various statutes. It essentially means as adequate or enough. There cannot be any straitj....
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....s type of " chance taking petitioner" that they should simultaneously prefer statutory appeals also so that whenever there are such type of clauses that limitation cannot be condoned beyond the period of thirty days the appeal may not be dismissed for want of condonation of delay. The petitioner is lethargic, but, certainly not an ignorant person and is knowing all fine niceties of law. Vigilant petitioner should have file their appeal within the limitation period or at least within condonable delay period. (vi) Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under : "14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction . - (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision , against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which....
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.... judgment very carefully and minutely. 33) We are unable to agree with Mr. Dhond that this judgment would enable us to conclude that section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked by the Petitioner to get over the outer limit or restriction in sub section (1) of section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962. In fact, all the judgments that have been referred by the Hon'ble Supreme Court take the view that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period. In that regard, the Hon'ble Supreme Court jhas, in para 21, referred to a judgment delivered by it in the case of Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise reported in (2008)3 SCC 70. In para 22, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to a three Judge Bench decision in the case of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Irrigation Department reported in (2008)7 SCC 169. In para 23 it specifically referred to two Judgments delivered by it, first in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs vs. Hongo India (p.) Ltd. Reported in (2009)5 SCC 791 and second in the case of Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company reported in (2001)8 SCC 470. None of these decisions have ....