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1990 (5) TMI 229
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..... Shroff and K.V. Sree Kumar JUDGMENT : K.N. SAIKIA. J. This analogous cluster of seventeen appeals by special leave, and a special leave petition involves a common question of law though they arise out of the following respective facts: c.A. Nos. 324 z-3248 of 1981 These eight appeals by the Land Development and Reclamation Corporation, Chandigarh are from the Judgment and Order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing its writ petitions challenging the Award dated 2.8.1980 of the Labour Court, Chandigarh holding that the respondents were entitled to reinstatement with back wages except Yaspal (C.A. No. 3242 of 1981) who was to get wages up to 10.10.1979, with benefits of continuity of service. The respondents were workmen under the management of the Corporation and their services were terminated on the ground that the Chairman had no power to appoint them. The Labour Court in its Award held that their services were terminated illegally without payment of retrenchment compensation under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act', and that they were entitled to reinstatement. C.A. No. 686 (NL) of 1982 This appeal is from the Judgment dated 9.1....
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....mounted to dismissal and accordingly he set aside the order and directed the corporation to reinstate and pay him his back wages amounting to Rs. 15,97 1.66 within one month. The Corporation having moved the State Industrial Court at Nagpur under s. 16(5) of the Settlement Act, that Court by its order dated 29.9.1973 allowed the application and set aside the Assistant Labour Commissioner's judgment and dismissed the workman's application holding that the acts of misconduct fairly stood proved and he deserved to be dismissed from service. The High Court on being moved by the workman set aside the Labour Court's order and restored that of the Assistant Labour Commissioner. Hence this appeal. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3025 .......... OF 1990 The services of the workman Sri Pratap Singh, driver respondent No. 3 were terminated with effect from 18.10.1974 under clause 9(a)(i) of the DRTA (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations 1952. As the conciliation efforts failed, the order was placed before the Labour Court, Delhi, who set aside the order on the ground of noncompliance with the provisions of s. 25F of the Act and ordered reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of ser....
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....gement's appeal. The respective cases were argued with some dexterity by the learned counsel Mr. B.N. Singhvi, Mr. N.B. Shetye, Mr. S.S. Javali, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Mr. V.A. Bobde, Mr. M.K. Ramamurthy, Mr. M.G. Ramachandran & Mr. R.S. Hegde. On the above diverse facts two rival contentions are raised by the parties. The learned counsel for the employers contend that the word 'retrenchment' as defined in s. 2(00) of the Act means termination of service of a workman only by way of surplus labour for any reason whatsoever. The learned counsel representing the workmen counted that 'retrenchment' means termination of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, other than those expressly excluded by the definition in s. 2(00) of the Act. The precise question to be decided, therefore, is whether on a proper construction of the definition of "retrenchment" in s. 2(00) of the Act, it means termination by the employer of the service of a workman as surplus labour for any reason whatsoever, or it means termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, and those expressly excluded....
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.... in the Bill are not new and were discussed at various tripartite meetings. Those relating to lay-off are based on an agreement entered into between the representatives of employers and workers who attended the 13th session of the Standing Labour Committee. In regard to retrenchment, the Bill provides that a workman who has been in continuous employment for not less than one year under an employer shall not be retrenched until he has been given one month's notice in writing or one month's wages in lieu of such notice and also a gratuity calculated at 15 days' average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months. A similar provision was included in the Labour Relations Bill, 1950, which has since lapsed. Though compensation on the lines provided for in the Bill is given by all progressive employers, it is felt that a common standard should be set for all employers" Clause 2(00) as inserted read as under: "'Retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include-- (a) voluntary retirement of the workma....
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....ffer earlier made by the company and accepted by the workers. The company having declined to pay and the dispute having been referred, the Industrial Tribunal held that the company was bound to pay and accordingly awarded a sum of Rs. 45,000 representing their share of the profits and the award was affirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Question before this Court in appeal was whether the termination of the workmen on the closure of the industry amounted to retrenchment. It was held that the award was not one for compensation for termination of the services of the workmen on closure of the industry, as such discharge was different from the discharge on retrenchment, which implied the continuance of the industry and discharge only of the surplusage, and the workmen were not entitled either under the law as it stood on the day of their discharge or even on merits to any compensation. The contention of the workmen was that even before the enactment of Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1953, the tribunal had acted on the view that the retrenchment included discharge on closure of business and had awarded compensation on that footing and that the award of the tribunal in Pipraich....
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.... India that the undertaking of the Railway Company would be purchased and taken over as from January 1, 1954. On November 11, 1953, the Railway Company served a notice on its workmen intimating that as a result of the talking over, the services of all the workmen of the Railway Company would be terminated with effect from December 31, 1953. The notice further stated that the Government of India intended to employ such of the staff of the company as would be willing to serve on the railway on terms and conditions which were to be notified later. About 77 per cent of the staff of the Railway Company were reemployed on the same scales of pay, about 23 per cent were reemployed on somewhat lower scales of pay and only about 24 per cent of the former employees of the Railway Company declined service under the Government. Applications for compensation having been filed on behalf of the erstwhile workmen of the Railway Company under s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, for payment of retrenchment compensation to the said workmen under clause (b) of s. 25F of the Act, the question was whether the erstwhile workmen were entitled to claim compensation under clause (b) of s. 25F of the Act....
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....titution Bench observed that in the first part of the section both the words 'retrenched' and 'retrenchment' were used and obviously they had the same meaning except that one was verb and the other was a noun and that to appreciate the true scope and effect of s. 25F one must first understand what was meant by the expression 'retrenched' or 'retrenchment'- Analysing the definition of 'retrenchment' in s. 2(00) the Court found in it the following four essential requirements: (a) termination of the service of a workman;, (b) by the employer; (c) for any reason whatsoever; and (d) otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. The Court then said: "It must be conceded that the definition is in very wide terms. The question, however, before us is does this definition merely give effect to the ordinary, accepted notion of retrenchment in an existing or running industry by embodying the notion in apt and readily intelligible words or does it go so far beyond the accepted notion of retrenchment as to include the termination of services of all workmen in an industry when the industry itself ceases to exist on a bona fide closure or discontinuance of his business b....
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....t there must then be compelling words to show that such a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended. Where, within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of the word, every single requirement of the definition clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word defined." The Court in Hariprasad dealt with two other contentions; one was that before the amending Act of 1953 the retrenchment had acquired a special meaning which included the payment of compensation on a closure of business and the legislature gave effect to that meaning in the definition clause and by inserting section 25F. The second was that section 25FF inserted in 1956 by Act 41 of 1956 was 'Parliamentary exposition' of the meaning of the definition clause and of section 25F. Rejecting the contentions the Court held that retrenchment meant the discharge of surplus workmen in an existing or continuing business; it had acquired no special meaning so as to include discharge of workmen on bona fide closure of business, though a number of Labour Appellate Tribunals awarded compensation to workmen on closure of business as an equi....
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....strial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 (4 of 1957), was promulgated with retrospective effect from 1st December, 1956." "This Ordinance was replaced by an Act of Parliament enacting the provisions contained in sections 25FF and 25FFF. These sections provide that 'compensation would be payable to workmen whose services are terminated on account of the transfer or closure of undertakings.' In the case of transfer of undertakings, however, if the workman is re-employed on terms and conditions which are not less favourable to him, he will not be entitled to any compensation. This was the position which existed prior to the decision of the Supreme Court. In the case of closure of business on account of the circumstances beyond the control of the employer, the maximum compensation payable to workmen has been limited to his average pay for three months. If the undertaking is engaged in any construction work and it is closed down within two years on account of the completion of its work, no compensation would be payable to workmen employed therein." Hariprasad (supra) having accepted the ordinary contextual meaning of retrenchment, namely, termination of surplus labour as the major ....
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....o compensation, as if the said termination was retrenchment. As it has been observed, the words "as if" brought out the legal distinction between retrenchment defined by s. 2(00) as it was interpreted by this Court and termination of services consequent upon transfer of the undertaking. In other words, the provision was that though termination of services on transfer or closure of the undertaking may not be retrenchment, the workmen concerned were entitled to compensation as if the said termination was retrenchment. Thus we find that till then the accepted meaning of retrenchment was ordinary, contextual and narrower meaning of termination of surplus labour for any reason whatsoever. In Anakapalla Co-operative Agricultural and Industrial Society Ltd. v. Workmen, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 730, a company running a sugar mill was suffering losses every year due to insufficient supply of sugarcane and wanted to shift the mill. The cane-growers formed a co-operative society and purchased the mill. As agreed between the company and the society, the company terminated the services of the employees and paid retrenchment compensation to them under section 25FF of the Act. This society employed ....
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....ssarily meant that the word 'retrenchment' in s. 25FF had to bear a corresponding interpretation." In Workmen of Subong Tea Estate v. The outgoing Management of Subong Tea Estate and Anr., reported in [1964] 5 SCR 602, it was similarly observed at page 613 of the report: "In dealing with the question of retrenchment in the light of the relevant provisions to which we have just referred, it is, however, necessary to bear in mind that the management can retrench its employees only for proper reasons. It is undoubtedly true that it is for the 'management to decide the strength of its labour force, for the number of workmen required to carry out efficiently the work involved in the industrial undertaking of any employer must always be left to be determined by the management in its discretion, and so, occasions may arise when the number of employees may exceed the reasonable and legitimate needs of the undertaking. In such a case, if any workman become surplus, it would be open to the management to retrench them. Workmen may become surplus on the ground of rationalisation or on the ground of economy reasonably and bona fide adopted by the management, or of other industrial or trade rea....
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....intment letter claiming to have been deemed to have had continuous service for one year within the meaning of s. 25(B)(2) of the Act, the Single Bench of the High Court having allowed his writ petition and the writ appeal of the appellant having also failed, this Court in appeal found as fact that the appointment was purely temporary one for a period of 9 days but might be terminated earlier, without assigning any reason therefor at the petitioner's discretion; and the employment unless terminated earlier, would automatically cease at the expiry of the period i.e. 18.11.1972. This 9 days' employment added on to what had gone before ripened to a continuous service for a year "on the antecedent arithmetic of 240 days of broken bits of service" and considering the meaning of 'retrenchment' it was held that the expression for any reason whatsoever was very wide and almost admitting of no exception. The contention of the employer was that when the order of appointment carried an automatic cessatioin of service, the period of employment worked itself out by efflux of time, not by act of employer and such cases were outside the concept of retrenchment. This Court observed that to retrench....
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....n to terminate is struck by the same vice as the post-appointment termination. Dexterity of diction cannot defeat the articulated conscience of the provision." The precedents including Hariprasad do not appear to have been brought to the notice of their Lordship in this case. It may be noted that since Delhi Cloth and General Mills (supra) a change in interpretation of retrenchment in s. 2(00) of the Act is clearly discernible. Mr. Venugopal would submit that the Judgment in Sundara Money's case and for that matter the subsequent decisions in the line are per incuriam for two reasons: (i) that they failed t0 apply the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Hon'ble Court in Hariprasad Shukla's case (supra) and (ii) for the reason that they have ignored the impact of two of the provisions introduced by the Amendment Act of 1953 along with the definition of "retrenchment" in s. 2(00) and s. 25F namely, ss. 25G and 25H. We agree with the learned counsel that the question of the subsequent decisions being per incuriam could arise only if the ratio of Sundara Money's case and the subsequent Judgments in the line was in conflict with the ratio in the Hariprasad Shukla's case (s....
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....s. 25F, 25G and 25H to only cases of termination of services of surplus labour for any reason whatsoever and not to other types of termination, whatever may be the reason for such termination. Even if a Judgment was to be based on two alternative reasons or conclusions, each one of these alternative reasons or basis, would form the ratio of the Judgment. It is also urged that the argument would equally apply to the ratio of Anakapalla's case rendering the Judgments in Sundra Money's case and the later decisions per incuriam, for not having noticed or followed a binding precedent of the Supreme Court itself, as the Judgment of the Constitution Bench binds smaller Divisions of the Court. We now deal with the question of per incuriam by reason of allegedly not following the Constitution Bench decisions. The Latin expression per incuriam means through inadvertence. A decision can be said generally t0 be given per incuriam when this Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or when a High Court has acted in ignorance of a decision of this Court. It can not be doubted that Art. 141 embodies, as a rule of law, the doctrine of precedents on which our judicial system is....
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....d in ignorance of a decision of the House of Lords. In the former case it must decide which decision to follow, and in the latter it is bound by the decision of the House of Lords. It has been said that the decision of the House of Lords mentioned above, refers to a decision subsequent to that of the Court of Appeal. However, "a prior decision of the House of Lords inconsistent with the decision of the Court of Appeal, but which was not cited to the Court of Appeal will make the later decision of the Court of Appeal of no value as given per incuriam." But if the prior decision had been cited to the Court of Appeal and that court had misinterpreted a previous decision of the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal must follow its previous decision and leave the House to rectify the mistake. In Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Ed. Vol. 10 para 745 it has been said: "While former decisions of the House are normally binding upon it, the House will depart from one of its own previous decisions when it appears right in the interests of justice and of the proper development of the law to do so. Cases where the House may reconsider its own previous decisions are those involving broad issues of j....
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....with the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law (either statutory or judge-made) and with the minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. The conclusion is the decision of the case, which may or may not establish new law--in the vast majority of cases it will be merely the application of existing law to the facts judicially ascertained. Where the decision does consititute new law, this may or may not be expressly stated as a proposition of law: frequently the new law will appear only from subsequent comparison of, on the one hand, the material facts inherent in the major premise with, on the other, the material facts which constitute the minor premise. As a result of this comparison it will often be apparent that a rule has been extended by an analogy expressed or implied." To consider the ratio decidendi of a case we have, therefore, to ascertain the principle on which the case was decided. Sir George Jessel in Osborne v. Rowlett, [1880] 13 Ch. D. 774, remarked that 'the only thing in a judge's decision binding as an authority upon a subsequent judge is the principle upon which the case was decided'. The ratio deciden....
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....and s. 25FFF providing for the payment of compensation to the workmen in case of transfer of undertakings and in case of closure of undertakings respectively." In Hariprasad (supra) the learned Judges themselves formulated the question before them as follows: "The question, however, before us is--does this definition merely give effect to the ordinary, accepted notion of retrenchment in an existing or running industry by embodying the notion in apt and readily intelligible words or does it go so far beyond the accepted notion of retrenchment as to include the termination of services of all workmen in an industry when the industry itself ceases t0 exist on a bona fide closure or discontinuance of his business by the employer." The question was answered by the learned Judges in the following words: "In the absence of any compelling words to indicate that the intention was even to include a bona fide closure of the whole business, it would, we think, be divorcing the expression altogether from the context to give it such a wide meaning as is contended for by learned counsel for the respondents ..... it would be against the entire scheme of the Act to give the definition clause rel....
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....f the Act applies is only one which arises out of an existing industry". Thus, the Court was neither called upon to decide nor did it decide whether in a continuing business, retrenchment was confined only to discharge of surplus staff and the reference to discharge of surplusage was for the purpose of contrasting the situation in that case, i.e. workmen were being retrenched because of cessation of business and those observations did not constitute reasons for the decision. What was decided was that if there was no continuing industry the provision could not apply. In fact the question whether retrenchment did or did not include other terminations was never required to be decided in Hariprasad and could not, therefore have been, or be taken to have been decided by this Court. Lord Halsbury's dicta in Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] AC 495 at page 506 is: " ..... every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The ot....
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.... State Bank of Patiala from July 13, 1973 till August, 1974 when her services were terminated. According to the workman she. had worked for 240 days in the year preceding August 21, 1974 and the termination of her services was retrenchment as it did not fall within any of the three accepted cases. The management's contention was that termination was not due to discharge of surplus labour but due to failure of the workman to pass the test which could have enabled her to be confirmed in the service and as such it was not retrenchment. This contention was repelled. Both Mr. Shetye and Mr. Venugopal submit that judicial discipline required the smaller benches to follow the decisions in the larger benches. This reminds us of the words of Lord Mailsham of Marylebone, the Lord Chancellor, "in the hierarchical system of courts which exists in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier ..... to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers". However, in view of the ratio decidendi of Hariprasad, as we have seen, there is no room for such a criticism. In Management of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore v. M. Boraiah, reported in [1984] 1 SCC 244, a Division Ben....
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....e for the reasons mentioned in the notice is not covered by any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of s. 2(00) which defines retrenchment and it is by now well settled that where the termination of service does not fall within any of the excluded categories, the termination would be ipso facto retrenchment. It was not even attempted to be urged that the case of the respondent would fall in any of the excluded categories. It is therefore indisputably a case of retrenchment." (Emphasis supplied) In a fast developing branch of Industrial and Labour law it may not always be of particular importance to rigidly adhere to a precedent, and a precedent may need be departed from if the basis of legislation changes. It was in realisation of the idea of a living law that in Reg v. Home Secretary, Ex. P. Khawaja, reported in [1984] AC 74 (H.L.) it was said at p. 84: The House will depart from a previous decision where it is right to do so and where adherence to a previous decision may lead to injustice in a particular case. Constitutional and administrative law are not fields where it is of particular importance to adhere to precedent. A recent precedent may be more readily departed from than o....
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....cessary then to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the lawgiver." As was stated in Thompson v. Gould, reported in [1910] A.C. 409 (420) "it is a wrong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing to do so." "The cardinal rule of construction of statute is to read statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning." [Jugalkishore v. Ram Cotton Co. Ltd., [1955] 1 SCR 1369] To interpret an Act of Parliament is to give effect to its intention. Lord Simon in Ealing L.B.C. v. Race Relations Board, [1972] AC 342 (360) said: "The Court sometimes asks itself what the draftsman must have intended. This is reasonable enough: the draftsman knows what is the intention of the legislative initiator (nowadays almost always an organ of the executive); he know what canons of construction the courts will apply; and he will express himself in such a way as accordingly to give effect to the legislative intention. Parliament, of course, in enacting legislation assumes responsibili....
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....bring about that remedy. The literal rules of construction require the wording of the Act to be construed according to its literal and grammatical meaning whatever the result may be. Unless otherwise provided, the same word must normally be construed throughout the Act in the same sense, and in the case of old statutes regard must be had to its contemporary meaning if there has been no change with the passage of time. However, the Law Commission 21 of England has struck a note of caution that "to place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of the words of a provision is to assume an unattainable perfection in draftsmanship". In Whiteley v. Chappelf, [1968-69] 4 L.R.Q.B. Div. 147, a statute concerned with electoral malpractices made it an offence to personate 'any person entitle to vote' at an election. The defendant was accused of personating a deceased voter and the court, using the literal rule, found that there was no offence as the personation was not of person entitled to vote. A dead person was not entitled to vote. A deceased person did not exist and had no right to vote and as a result the decision arrived at was contrary to the intention of Parliament. As it was pointed o....
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....oes not mean." However, a judge facing such a problem of interpretation can not simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. Lord Denning in his Discipline of Law says at p. 12: "Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsman of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A judge, believing himself to be lettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would cer- tainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do t....
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....2; Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union,Kanpur v. J.K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., [1952] L.A.C. 467; Halar Sali and Chemical Works, Jamnagar v. Workmen, [1953] L.A.C. 134;Prakriti Bhushan Gupta v. Chief Mining Engineer Railway Board,[1953] L.A.C. 373; Sudarshan Banerjee v. Mcleod and Co. Ltd., [1953] L.A.C. 702 (7 11). Besides, it is submitted, by its very nature the wide definition of retrenchment would be wholly inapplicable to termination simpliciter. The question of picking out a junior in the same category for being sent out in place of a person whose services are being terminated simpliciter or otherwise on the ground that the management does not want to continue his contract of employment would not arise. Similarly it is pointed out that starting from Sundara Money where termination simpliciter of a workman for not having passed a test, or for not having satisfactorily completed his probation would not attract s. 25G, as the very question of picking out a junior in the same category for being sent out instead of the person who failed to pass a test or failed to satisfactorily complete his probation could never arise. If, however, s. 25G were to be followed in such cases, the section w....
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....25F and 25G on the principle 'last come, first go'. Only then should he be given an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment- In substance it is submitted that there is no conflict between the definition of s. 2(00) and the provisions of ss. 25F, 25G and 25H. We find that though there are apparent incongruities in the provisions, there is room for harmonious construction in this regard. For the purpose of harmonious construction, it can be seen that the definitions contained in section 2 are subject to their being anything repugnant in the subject or context. In view of this, it is clear that the extended meaning given to the term 'retrenchment' under clause (00) of section 2 is also subject to the context and the subject matter. Section 25-F prescribed the conditions precedent to a valid retrenchment of workers as discussed earlier. Very briefly, the conditions prescribed are the giving of one month's notice indicating the reasons for retrenchment and payment of wages for the period of the notice. Section 25-FF provides for compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings. Very briefly, it provides that every workman who has been in continuous service for not les....
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....There may be two answers to this question. Firstly, those rights may have been affected by introduction of ss. 2(00), 25F and the other relevant sections. Secondly, it may be said, the rights as such are not affected or taken away, but only an additional social obligation has been imposed on the employer so as to give the retrenchment benefit to the affected workmen, perhaps for immediate tiding over of the financial difficulty. Looked at from this angle, there is implicit a social policy. As the maxim goes--Stat pro ratione voluntas populi; the will of the people stands in place of a reason. Regarding the seeming gaps in the definition one would aptly remember what Lord Simonds said against the view that the court having discovered the intention of Parliament must proceed to fill in the gaps and what the legislature had not written the court must write. "It appears to me to be a naked usurpation of the legisla- tive function under the thin disguise of interpretation. And it is the less justifiable when it is guess work with what material the legislature would, if it had discovered the gap, have filled it in. If a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act." The Court ....
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....) with the will of the norm creating authority that is to be determined somehow', (c) with the expression which the norm-creating authority has chosen, (d) with the one or the other of the contradictory norms; or (e) the concrete case to which the two contradictory norms refer may be decided under the assumption that the two contradictory norms annul each other. In all these cases, the law to be applied constitutes only a frame within which several applications are possible, whereby every act is legal that stays within the frame." The definitions is s. 2 of the Act are to be taken 'unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context'. The contextual interpretation has not been ruled out. In R.B.I. v. Peerless General Finance, reported in [1987] 2 SCR 1, O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. said: "Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the s....