2014 (11) TMI 451
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.... Act. A copy of the order was furnished to the respondent on 09.05.2006. Aggrieved by that, the respondent filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal rejected (obviously returned) the appeal through its order, dated 28.09.2006 on the ground that it is to be presented before the Commissioner (Appeals) and not the Tribunal. Thereupon, the respondent filed an appeal before the Commissioner (appeals) on 09.10.2006. The Commissioner, however, passed an order, dated 17.11.2006 refusing to entertain the appeal on the ground that it is barred by limitation. Aggrieved by that, the respondent filed Appeal No.E/224/07 before the Tribunal. The appeal was allowed, taking the view that the respondent was entitled to the benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, vis--vis the period, which was spent in pursuing the remedy before the Tribunal. The said order is challenged in this Central Excise Appeal. Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Standing Counsel for the Central Excise Department submits that Section 35 of the Act is a self- contained code, insofar as limitation for filing of appeals is concerned, and that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stand excluded, in relation to the p....
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....y on 28.09.2006, that the Tribunal informed the respondent that it has to avail the remedy before the Commissioner (Appeals). Accordingly the appeal was presented on 09.10.2006. The Commissioner however computed the limitation from the date of furnishing of the copy i.e., 09.05.2006 upto the date of presentation of appeal before him i.e. 09.10.2006 and took the view that the appeal is barred by limitation, even if the benefit of period stipulated under the proviso to Section 35(1) of the Act is extended. Section 35(1) of the Act reads: 35.Appeals to Commissioner (Appeal):- (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by a Central Excise Officer lower in rank than a Commissioner of Central Excise may appeal to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) [hereinafter in this Chapter referred to as the Commissioner (Appeal) within sixty days from the date of the communication to him of such decision or order: [Provided that the Commissioner (Appeals) may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of sixty days, allow it to be presented within a further period of thirty da....
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....hs of the judgment read: 32.As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35B, 35EE, 35G and 35H makes the position clear that an appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an 18 appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days. 33.Even otherwise, for filing an appeal to the Commissioner, and to the Appellate Tribunal as well as revision to the Central Government, the legislature has provided 60 days and 90 days respectively, on the other hand, for filing an appeal and reference to the High Court larger period of 180 days has been pro....
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....reme Court in Singh Enterprises s case (1 supra). In Amchong Tea Estates case (3 supra), their Lordships have just followed the judgment in Hongo India Private Limted s case (2 supra). In none of these precedents, the question as to whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act stood excluded vis--vis the proceedings under the Act, was considered, obviously because there was no occasion for that. There is a radical difference between the general purport of the Limitation Act, 1908 on the one hand and that of the Limitation Act, 1963 on the other hand. In the former, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 did not apply to the proceedings under the enactments, which stipulated a different period of limitation, unless they are specifically made applicable by those very enactments. In contrast, the Limitation Act 1963 contains Sections 29(2), which reads as under: Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any ....
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.... applications. If the limitation is for presentation of original proceedings, the question of condonation of any delay even for the best of the reasons, does not arise. However, latitude is shown by the Parliament itself, in respect of limitation for filing of appeals and other miscellaneous proceedings. Obviously because an appeal is treated as continuation of original proceedings, provision is made for condonation of delay in pursuing such remedies, subject however to the satisfaction of the Court or Forum. The second point of distinction, which needs to be kept in mind, is the one between the condonation of delay on the one hand and exclusion of period spent in pursuing the remedy before a wrong Forum, on the other hand. The first is covered by Section 5, which occurs in Part II of the Limitation Act and the second is dealt with under various provisions under Chapter III of that enactment. While condonation is invariably in respect of the proceedings, which are not original in nature, exclusion of time takes in its fold the original proceedings as well as the appellate proceedings. Further, the condonation of delay is in the discretion of the Court or Forum, whereas exclusion o....