TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
2010 (2) TMI 1069
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....994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98. The brief facts required to be noticed for the purpose of the present adjudication are set out herein below. The assessments of the petitioner under the provisions of the Act for the years 1993-94, 1994-95, 1995-96, 1996-97 and 1997-98 were completed on November 10, 1997 (reassessment); March 22, 1996, June 3, 1996, January 16, 1998 and November 15, 2000, respectively. Notice under section 18 of the Act was issued to the petitioner on January 25, 1999 contemplating reopening of the assessments for the year 1993-94 and 1994-95. Pursuant to the said notice the assessments of the petitioner for the two years in question were finalized on March 1, 1999. Aggrieved, the petitioner instituted an appeal where....
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....ncluded ex parte. In this regard the learned single judge found from the materials placed before him that notices in the reassessment proceedings were issued to the petitioner and the petitioner had appeared in the said proceedings through an authorized representative who had produced the books of accounts. Faced with the situation where the appellate order dated August 14, 2000 under challenge in the writ petition had been accepted by the appellant (petitioner) by participating in the consequential reassessment proceedings and the petitioner having offered no explanation for not availing of the statutory remedy of appeal against the reassessment orders, the learned single judge thought it proper to hold that the writ petition should not be....
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....) to the forum of appeal provided by the statute. Shri Dubey, the learned Departmental counsel, has controverted the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellant (writ petitioner) by contending that the reassessment orders of the five years are a sequel to the appellate order dated August 14, 2000. The appellant (writ petitioner) did not challenge the said appellate order at an appropriate point of time and instead-accepted the same, a fact manifested by the participation of the appellant (writ petitioner) in the consequential reassessment proceedings. Therefore, according to Shri Dubey, learned Departmental counsel, the conduct of the appellant (petitioner) in accepting the appellate order and thereafter turning back from the stand ear....
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....sessment order, the primary authority, i.e., the Income-tax Officer, had made the income in the hands of Hirday Narain and his minor son liable to tax by virtue of the provisions contained in section 16(3)(a)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1922. Hirday Narain filed a rectification application under section 35 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, pointing out that there is an ex facie error in the order passed by the Income-tax Officer, inasmuch as, section 16(3)(a)(ii) of the Act had no application in assessing the income of Hirday Narain along with his minor son in the status of an HUF. The Income-tax officer accepted the stand projected in the rectification application but refused to grant any relief to Hirday Narain by changing the status of Hirday ....
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....laid down any law of general application to the effect that once a writ petition is admitted for regular hearing, the same cannot be dismissed or rejected on the ground of maintainability, as asserted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. There are numerous decisions details of which need not burden this order, to show that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is not a rule of law but one of prudence and discretion and further that in the following three situations the availability of an alternative remedy should not be construed as a bar for entertaining a writ petition, (1) where a writ petition seeks enforcement of any fundamental right(s), (2) where there is violation of the principles of natural justice and (3) where the ....