TaxTMI 
TaxTMI 
1988 (1) TMI 312
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....e briefly stated. The assessee is a firm of coal merchants with its place of business in Jharia (Bihar State) and an office at Moradabad (in U.P.). It is not registered either under the Central or the State Sales Tax Act. According to the assessee it places orders for coal on the collieries at Jharia on behalf of constituents in Uttar Pradesh, realises the sale proceeds and remits the same to Jharia. The Sales Tax Officer assessed the assessee to sales tax in respect of the turnover of the coal thus supplied by the assessee. The assessee filed two writ petitions alleging that the assessment orders were without jurisdiction on several grounds. The High Court allowed the writ petitions on one of these grounds and hence did not go into the other contentions. It referred to section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act, as it stood at the relevant time, and held that the provision cast a liability to tax only on a registered dealer and not an unregistered dealer like the assessee. It is the correctness of this decision that is challenged in the present appeals. 3.. Section 9 relied upon by the High Court, reads thus: "9. (1) The tax payable by any dealer under this Act on sales of goods eff....
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....pecified in this sub-section." The High Court pointed out that, under the terms of the section, tax on sales of goods effected by a dealer in the course of inter-State trade or commerce shall be levied in the State from which the movement of the goods commenced; in this case, the State of Bihar. The proviso, however, carves out an exception. It provides that, if there is a subsequent sale of the same goods in the course of their movement from one State to another and such sale is effected by a registered dealer, tax can be levied and collected in the State from which such dealer obtained or could have obtained the forms prescribed under section 8(4)(a) (popularly known as "the C form"); in this case, the State of Uttar Pradesh. But, the High Court pointed out, the assessee was not a registered dealer and so there was no scope for his being taxed in the State of U.P. The High Court accordingly quashed the assessments in question and hence these appeals by the State. 4.. We may at once say that the conclusion of the High Court is unassailable in view of the decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kasturi Lal Har Lal [1987] 67 STC 154; 4 JT (1987) 3 SC 234, affirming the....
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.... in relation to the period commencing on the 5th day of January, 1957, and ending with the date immediately preceding the date of commencement of this Act as if that section also provided- (a) that all the provisions relating to penalties (including provisions relating to penalties in lieu of prosecution for an offence or in addition to the penalties or punishment on conviction for an offence but excluding the provisions relating to matters provided for in sections 10 and 10A of the principal Act and the provisions relating to offences) of the general sales tax law of each State shall, with necessary modifications, apply in relation to- (i) the assessment, reassessment, collection and enforcement of payment of any tax required to be collected under the principal Act in such State; and (ii) any process connected with such assessment, reassessment, collection or enforcement of payment; and (b) that for the purpose of the application of the provisions of such law, the tax under the principal Act shall be deemed to be tax under such law. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal or other authority, all penalties under t....
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.... while deciding Sales Tax Officer v. Coal & Coke Supplies Corporation [1988] 68 STC 392 (SC); JT (1987) 4 SC 472, we had assumed the correctness of the contention of Shri Manchanda as, in that case, the above argument that the amendment was retrospective was uncontroverted. Shri Harish Salve, appearing for the assessee in this case, however, contests the correctness of Shri Manchanda's contention. We have therefore considered this aspect and reached the conclusion that Shri Salve is right and that no retrospective operation to clause (b) of section 9(1) can be spelt out as suggested by counsel for the appellant. 6.. Act No. 103 of 1976 received the assent of the President on September 7, 1976 which is, apparently, what is referred to as the date of its commencement in section 9(1) of the said Act. The Act amended several sections of the Central Sales Tax Act and it did not mince its words when it desired to give any degree of retrospective effect to any particular amendment. The amendments to sections 3 and 4 of the principal Act thus are clearly retrospective: the provisions added thereto, it is declared, "shall be inserted and shall always be deemed to have been inserted with ef....
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.... law of each State shall, with necessary modifications, apply in relation to the assessment, reassessment, collection and the enforcement of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act. It is also necessary to validate the penalties which have been levied in the past, for the purposes of the Central Sales Tax Act, on the basis of the provisions of the State sales tax laws." Where the statute thus, on its face, clearly indicates retrospective effect where intended, there can be no justification to read retrospectivity into the amendment made by clause (a) of section 6 of the amending Act which does not contain any words to that effect. 7.. Counsel for the appellant, however, relied on two circumstances to say that such retrospective effect must necessarily have been intended. Firstly, he placed emphasis (a) on the fact that section 9(1) of the Amend ment Act refers to section 9 of the principal Act and not merely to section 9(2) and (b) on the use of the words "as if that section also provided". He submitted that this language can only mean that the legislature intended retrospective effect also to the amendment effected in section 9 by section 6 of the Validation Act. Secondly, he submit....
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....ber 7, 1976, the date when the Amendment Act came into force. So the validation section declares that the section should be read, even earlier, as if it comprehended also these substantive provisions. It is in this context that the word "also" is used. The employment of this word cannot therefore be treated as an indication of intention by the legislature that the amendment to section 9(1) by section 6 of the amending Act was to be effective from January 5, 1957. If the legislature had intended it, the intention could and would have been expressed clearly in clause (a) of section 6 itself as it had been in the other clauses and in the other sections. If section 9(1) of the Amendment Act had been inserted as clause (d) in section 6 thereof, it could not have changed the prospective effect of clause (a). The position is not different merely because this provision is contained in section 9 and not section 6 of the Amendment Act. Section 9(1) of the Amendment Act talks only of reading these extra words into section 9(1) of the principal Act between January 5, 1957 and September 7, 1976. It does not contain any operative words that require section 9(1) of the principal Act being read i....