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    <title>2020 (8) TMI 462 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT</title>
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    <description>The Tribunal could not, by procedural or inherent powers, require all section 7 insolvency applications to be supported only by an information utility default record. The statutory scheme under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and the application rules permits alternative modes of proving default, so section 7(3)(a) is not limited to information utility records alone and section 215 does not make submission to an information utility mandatory in every case. A direction imposing that requirement also could not operate retrospectively to pending applications absent express statutory authority. The challenged order was therefore beyond jurisdiction and inconsistent with the parent statute and delegated legislation.</description>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2020 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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      <title>2020 (8) TMI 462 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT</title>
      <link>https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=397519</link>
      <description>The Tribunal could not, by procedural or inherent powers, require all section 7 insolvency applications to be supported only by an information utility default record. The statutory scheme under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and the application rules permits alternative modes of proving default, so section 7(3)(a) is not limited to information utility records alone and section 215 does not make submission to an information utility mandatory in every case. A direction imposing that requirement also could not operate retrospectively to pending applications absent express statutory authority. The challenged order was therefore beyond jurisdiction and inconsistent with the parent statute and delegated legislation.</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2020 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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