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    <title>1961 (1) TMI 96 - Supreme Court</title>
    <link>https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=287986</link>
    <description>Statute No. 30 created a special, self-contained procedure for cases where an employee&#039;s continuance was thought detrimental to the University, and the Ordinances remained subordinate to the Act and Statutes. Once that special screening process was invoked and the matter had gone to the Solicitor-General and the Reviewing Committee, the University could not abandon it midway and fall back on general powers under the employment agreements or Ordinance No. 6. The discretionary language in Statute No. 30 did not permit action outside the statutory scheme, and the general appointing power could not override the special safeguards. The termination resolutions were therefore ultra vires and liable to be quashed.</description>
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    <pubDate>Tue, 10 Jan 1961 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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      <title>1961 (1) TMI 96 - Supreme Court</title>
      <link>https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=287986</link>
      <description>Statute No. 30 created a special, self-contained procedure for cases where an employee&#039;s continuance was thought detrimental to the University, and the Ordinances remained subordinate to the Act and Statutes. Once that special screening process was invoked and the matter had gone to the Solicitor-General and the Reviewing Committee, the University could not abandon it midway and fall back on general powers under the employment agreements or Ordinance No. 6. The discretionary language in Statute No. 30 did not permit action outside the statutory scheme, and the general appointing power could not override the special safeguards. The termination resolutions were therefore ultra vires and liable to be quashed.</description>
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      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Jan 1961 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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