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    <title>1977 (11) TMI 145 - Supreme Court</title>
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    <description>Direct filing of a charge-sheet before the Special Judge after pardon was tendered to an accomplice did not divest the Special Judge of jurisdiction to take cognizance. The statutory scheme required examination of the approver at the relevant stages, but Section 337(2B) did not restrict the Special Judge&#039;s power under Section 8(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. The fact that the approver might be examined once if proceedings began before the Special Judge, or twice if they began before a Magistrate, was not a substantial or qualitative procedural difference. The availability of two procedural routes therefore did not, by itself, offend Article 14, and the direct cognizance procedure was upheld.</description>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 09 Nov 1977 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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      <title>1977 (11) TMI 145 - Supreme Court</title>
      <link>https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=287397</link>
      <description>Direct filing of a charge-sheet before the Special Judge after pardon was tendered to an accomplice did not divest the Special Judge of jurisdiction to take cognizance. The statutory scheme required examination of the approver at the relevant stages, but Section 337(2B) did not restrict the Special Judge&#039;s power under Section 8(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. The fact that the approver might be examined once if proceedings began before the Special Judge, or twice if they began before a Magistrate, was not a substantial or qualitative procedural difference. The availability of two procedural routes therefore did not, by itself, offend Article 14, and the direct cognizance procedure was upheld.</description>
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      <pubDate>Wed, 09 Nov 1977 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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