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    <title>On the Importance of Independent Regulatory Institutions – The Case of the Central Bank (Dr. Viral V Acharya, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India - October 26, 2018 - Delivered as the A. D. Shroff Memorial Lecture, Mumbai)</title>
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    <description>Central bank independence shields monetary and financial stability functions from short-term political pressures by separating decision horizons: governments face electoral short-termism while central banks take medium-to-long-term views. Undermining independence-via politicised appointments, legislative attrition of powers, discretionary interference, or parallel regulatory bodies-creates fiscal and financial tail risks and invites market reprisals. Markets discipline both governments and central banks by repricing sovereign risk when credibility erodes. The Reserve Bank of India has strengthened independence through a rule-based Monetary Policy Committee, limits on deficit monetisation, and exchange-rate management, though challenges remain in public sector bank supervision, balance-sheet protections, and regulatory scope.</description>
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      <title>On the Importance of Independent Regulatory Institutions – The Case of the Central Bank (Dr. Viral V Acharya, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India - October 26, 2018 - Delivered as the A. D. Shroff Memorial Lecture, Mumbai)</title>
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      <description>Central bank independence shields monetary and financial stability functions from short-term political pressures by separating decision horizons: governments face electoral short-termism while central banks take medium-to-long-term views. Undermining independence-via politicised appointments, legislative attrition of powers, discretionary interference, or parallel regulatory bodies-creates fiscal and financial tail risks and invites market reprisals. Markets discipline both governments and central banks by repricing sovereign risk when credibility erodes. The Reserve Bank of India has strengthened independence through a rule-based Monetary Policy Committee, limits on deficit monetisation, and exchange-rate management, though challenges remain in public sector bank supervision, balance-sheet protections, and regulatory scope.</description>
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