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    <title>1996 (11) TMI 468 - Supreme Court</title>
    <link>https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=193284</link>
    <description>A belated challenge to a land acquisition cannot succeed once the acquisition has attained finality, compensation has been paid, possession has been taken, and the land has vested in the State. The Court noted that the original public purpose had ceased, but the statutory arrangement also contemplated surrender of land to the Government on such cessation, and the land had thereafter been resumed and allotted for another public purpose. In these circumstances, a writ challenge brought nearly three decades later was not maintainable, and the arguments based on Sections 40 and 44-B of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were rejected. Restitution or interference with the acquisition was therefore unavailable.</description>
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    <pubDate>Fri, 22 Nov 1996 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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      <title>1996 (11) TMI 468 - Supreme Court</title>
      <link>https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=193284</link>
      <description>A belated challenge to a land acquisition cannot succeed once the acquisition has attained finality, compensation has been paid, possession has been taken, and the land has vested in the State. The Court noted that the original public purpose had ceased, but the statutory arrangement also contemplated surrender of land to the Government on such cessation, and the land had thereafter been resumed and allotted for another public purpose. In these circumstances, a writ challenge brought nearly three decades later was not maintainable, and the arguments based on Sections 40 and 44-B of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were rejected. Restitution or interference with the acquisition was therefore unavailable.</description>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Nov 1996 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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