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    <title>1962 (12) TMI 80 - Supreme Court</title>
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    <description>For Article 133(1)(a) and (b), the court immediately below the Division Bench hearing a Letters Patent appeal was the single judge whose decision was appealed from, so the certificate for further appeal was competent. In second appeal, the High Court could examine whether the District Judge&#039;s findings were based on matters beyond the pleadings, an incorrect allocation of the burden of proof, or an erroneous application of the law on undue influence, and it did not exceed Section 100 CPC by doing so. A plea of undue influence required specific pleading and proof of domination and unconscionable advantage; on the evidence, the resolutions of 16 October 1945 were not shown to be vitiated by undue influence or coercion, and the declaratory and injunctive relief was restored.</description>
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      <link>https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=187350</link>
      <description>For Article 133(1)(a) and (b), the court immediately below the Division Bench hearing a Letters Patent appeal was the single judge whose decision was appealed from, so the certificate for further appeal was competent. In second appeal, the High Court could examine whether the District Judge&#039;s findings were based on matters beyond the pleadings, an incorrect allocation of the burden of proof, or an erroneous application of the law on undue influence, and it did not exceed Section 100 CPC by doing so. A plea of undue influence required specific pleading and proof of domination and unconscionable advantage; on the evidence, the resolutions of 16 October 1945 were not shown to be vitiated by undue influence or coercion, and the declaratory and injunctive relief was restored.</description>
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