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    <title>1999 (3) TMI 633 - Supreme Court</title>
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    <description>Mere recovery of foreign exchange from a person&#039;s vehicle did not by itself prove that he had bought, acquired or otherwise dealt with foreign exchange in breach of the statutory prohibition. The Supreme Court held that acquisition requires affirmative material showing knowing possession or other prohibited dealing, and that no such evidence existed on the facts. The respondent&#039;s explanation was not inherently impossible, and section 19J of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 and section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 did not shift the burden in the Department&#039;s favour. As the ingredients of section 4(1) were not established, penalty under section 23 could not be sustained.</description>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 11 Mar 1999 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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      <title>1999 (3) TMI 633 - Supreme Court</title>
      <link>https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=174738</link>
      <description>Mere recovery of foreign exchange from a person&#039;s vehicle did not by itself prove that he had bought, acquired or otherwise dealt with foreign exchange in breach of the statutory prohibition. The Supreme Court held that acquisition requires affirmative material showing knowing possession or other prohibited dealing, and that no such evidence existed on the facts. The respondent&#039;s explanation was not inherently impossible, and section 19J of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 and section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 did not shift the burden in the Department&#039;s favour. As the ingredients of section 4(1) were not established, penalty under section 23 could not be sustained.</description>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 11 Mar 1999 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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