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    <title>2012 (12) TMI 827 - Supreme Court</title>
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    <description>Delivery of a signed arbitral award under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 must be made to the party itself, not merely to its advocate or agent. The term &quot;party&quot; in Section 2(h) refers to the party to the arbitration agreement, and counsel&#039;s authority under a vakalatnama does not displace the statute&#039;s requirement of personal delivery. Limitation for an application under Section 34(3) begins only when the party actually receives the signed award. Earlier decisions under the Arbitration Act, 1940 were distinguished because that regime lacked an equivalent provision. On this reasoning, service on counsel alone was insufficient and the challenge was treated as timely.</description>
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    <pubDate>Fri, 21 Sep 2012 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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      <title>2012 (12) TMI 827 - Supreme Court</title>
      <link>https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=219812</link>
      <description>Delivery of a signed arbitral award under Section 31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 must be made to the party itself, not merely to its advocate or agent. The term &quot;party&quot; in Section 2(h) refers to the party to the arbitration agreement, and counsel&#039;s authority under a vakalatnama does not displace the statute&#039;s requirement of personal delivery. Limitation for an application under Section 34(3) begins only when the party actually receives the signed award. Earlier decisions under the Arbitration Act, 1940 were distinguished because that regime lacked an equivalent provision. On this reasoning, service on counsel alone was insufficient and the challenge was treated as timely.</description>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 21 Sep 2012 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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