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    <title>1997 (9) TMI 467 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH</title>
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    <description>A private company promoted by two family groups does not become a quasi-partnership without an express or implied understanding that shareholders will participate in management on partnership terms. Written notices of board and general meetings complied with the articles and statutory requirements, and members&#039; non-response to an additional-share offer could amount to implied consent to allotment to other applicants. Although the material did not establish oppression, mismanagement, or invalid share allotment, prolonged deadlock and mutual distrust made continued management impracticable. Company-oppression jurisdiction permits corrective directions, including valuation and a reciprocal share buy-out implemented by appointed special officers, to preserve the company as a going concern.</description>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 1997 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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      <title>1997 (9) TMI 467 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH</title>
      <link>https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=103932</link>
      <description>A private company promoted by two family groups does not become a quasi-partnership without an express or implied understanding that shareholders will participate in management on partnership terms. Written notices of board and general meetings complied with the articles and statutory requirements, and members&#039; non-response to an additional-share offer could amount to implied consent to allotment to other applicants. Although the material did not establish oppression, mismanagement, or invalid share allotment, prolonged deadlock and mutual distrust made continued management impracticable. Company-oppression jurisdiction permits corrective directions, including valuation and a reciprocal share buy-out implemented by appointed special officers, to preserve the company as a going concern.</description>
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