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    <title>1994 (6) TMI 158 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY</title>
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    <description>A conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude triggers an absolute statutory bar under the Companies Act, 1956 on appointment or continuance as Managing Director, and that disqualification is not lifted by pendency of a criminal appeal or an interim appellate order. Section 389 CrPC may suspend execution of the sentence or order appealed against, but it does not suspend the conviction itself, and section 482 CrPC cannot be used to create such a power. The distinction between Directors and Managing Directors, the prior consent terms, and any estoppel are ineffective against a mandatory public-interest disqualification. The injunction restraining interference with the office of Chairman and Managing Director was therefore unsustainable.</description>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jun 1994 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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      <title>1994 (6) TMI 158 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY</title>
      <link>https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=102596</link>
      <description>A conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude triggers an absolute statutory bar under the Companies Act, 1956 on appointment or continuance as Managing Director, and that disqualification is not lifted by pendency of a criminal appeal or an interim appellate order. Section 389 CrPC may suspend execution of the sentence or order appealed against, but it does not suspend the conviction itself, and section 482 CrPC cannot be used to create such a power. The distinction between Directors and Managing Directors, the prior consent terms, and any estoppel are ineffective against a mandatory public-interest disqualification. The injunction restraining interference with the office of Chairman and Managing Director was therefore unsustainable.</description>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 09 Jun 1994 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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