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    <title>1990 (2) TMI 250 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH</title>
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    <description>A director is not automatically liable for a company&#039;s statutory default merely by holding office, but a complaint can proceed if it contains averments capable of bringing the accused within the definition of an officer in default. The complaint here alleged repeated notices, continuing non-compliance, and that the petitioners, as directors during the relevant period, permitted the default to continue. Those allegations were sufficient to require proof at trial. Whether the petitioners actually satisfied the statutory definition, or had knowledge or wilfully permitted the default, was not a matter for quashing at the threshold under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.</description>
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    <pubDate>Thu, 15 Feb 1990 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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      <title>1990 (2) TMI 250 - HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH</title>
      <link>https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=101851</link>
      <description>A director is not automatically liable for a company&#039;s statutory default merely by holding office, but a complaint can proceed if it contains averments capable of bringing the accused within the definition of an officer in default. The complaint here alleged repeated notices, continuing non-compliance, and that the petitioners, as directors during the relevant period, permitted the default to continue. Those allegations were sufficient to require proof at trial. Whether the petitioners actually satisfied the statutory definition, or had knowledge or wilfully permitted the default, was not a matter for quashing at the threshold under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.</description>
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      <pubDate>Thu, 15 Feb 1990 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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