https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=98352 A winding-up court may entertain an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 because section 446(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 confers overriding jurisdiction over suits and proceedings by or against the company, enabling it to deal with disputes referable to arbitration. Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not treated as a universal residuary provision for every special-law application; on the stated facts, the right to apply had not accrued earlier because the dispute had not crystallised into a final refusal to arbitrate until 9 June 1962, and the application was also within time under section 458A of the Companies Act. The agreement was directed to be filed and the dispute referred to arbitration. en-us Fri, 09 Sep 1966 00:00:00 +0530 Fri, 20 Jan 2012 12:35:18 +0530 TaxTMI RSS Generator https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=98352 A winding-up court may entertain an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 because section 446(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 confers overriding jurisdiction over suits and proceedings by or against the company, enabling it to deal with disputes referable to arbitration. Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not treated as a universal residuary provision for every special-law application; on the stated facts, the right to apply had not accrued earlier because the dispute had not crystallised into a final refusal to arbitrate until 9 June 1962, and the application was also within time under section 458A of the Companies Act. The agreement was directed to be filed and the dispute referred to arbitration. Case-Laws Companies Law Fri, 09 Sep 1966 00:00:00 +0530 https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=98352