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    <title>1963 (6) TMI 21 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE</title>
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    <description>In winding up-related misfeasance proceedings, the court&#039;s procedural and inherent powers extend to requiring directors and the auditor, as persons best placed to explain company affairs, to appear in open court and give evidence on oath where no statutory or constitutional bar exists. The distinction between private examination for information and testimony during the trial was recognised, and the court treated the attendance order as a valid incident of its adjudicatory function. An interlocutory order of this kind was not liable to interference merely because fuller reasons were deferred until final disposal, and the challenge to the sufficiency of reasons therefore failed.</description>
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    <pubDate>Fri, 28 Jun 1963 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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      <title>1963 (6) TMI 21 - HIGH COURT OF MYSORE</title>
      <link>https://www.taxtmi.com/caselaws?id=98014</link>
      <description>In winding up-related misfeasance proceedings, the court&#039;s procedural and inherent powers extend to requiring directors and the auditor, as persons best placed to explain company affairs, to appear in open court and give evidence on oath where no statutory or constitutional bar exists. The distinction between private examination for information and testimony during the trial was recognised, and the court treated the attendance order as a valid incident of its adjudicatory function. An interlocutory order of this kind was not liable to interference merely because fuller reasons were deferred until final disposal, and the challenge to the sufficiency of reasons therefore failed.</description>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 28 Jun 1963 00:00:00 +0530</pubDate>
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