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<h1>No-confidence motion's viability tied to party alignments, affecting procedural budget adoption under constitutional rule.</h1> A no-confidence motion against the government hinges on parliamentary arithmetic and party alignments; the largest opposition group refuses to support it and centre-left parties have declined to join, reducing the likelihood of toppling the executive. The Prime Minister used constitutional executive powers to present the budget without a vote, invoking the provision that the budget is considered adopted if a subsequent no-confidence motion fails. Negotiated concessions-additional health funding, retention of certain education posts, and willingness to revisit pension changes-were offered to secure non-aggression assurances and facilitate budget passage while targeting a specific deficit ceiling.