PMLA anticipatory bail requires satisfaction of twin conditions, while predicate-offence protection does not extend to independent money-laundering pr...
School-affiliation charges remain taxable where not directly connected with examinations, while extended limitation requires proof of deliberate tax e...
Concessional penalty for search-disclosed unreconciled jewellery applies where substantive disclosure conditions are met despite omission from origina...
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CESTAT held that the statutory definition of "importer" in Section 2(26) of the Customs Act, 1962 is unambiguous and confined to the period between importation and clearance for home consumption; only a person exercising ownership, effective control or lien over goods during that period qualifies as importer. The appellant had no evidence of control or interest prior to clearance and acquired ownership only post-clearance, hence did not qualify as importer and was not liable under Section 28 for customs duty or interest. Absolute confiscation was unsustainable as gold is restricted, not prohibited; neither knowledge nor reason-to-believe under Section 111 was established, so penalty under Section 112(b)(i) failed. The impugned order was set aside and the original adjudication restored.
CESTAT held that the statutory definition of "importer" in Section 2(26) of the Customs Act, 1962 is unambiguous and confined to the period between importation and clearance for home consumption; only a person exercising ownership, effective control or lien over goods during that period qualifies as importer. The appellant had no evidence of control or interest prior to clearance and acquired ownership only post-clearance, hence did not qualify as importer and was not liable under Section 28 for customs duty or interest. Absolute confiscation was unsustainable as gold is restricted, not prohibited; neither knowledge nor reason-to-believe under Section 111 was established, so penalty under Section 112(b)(i) failed. The impugned order was set aside and the original adjudication restored.
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