Issues: Whether interim protection under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was warranted to secure the petitioner's monetary claim pending arbitration on account of a strong possibility that the respondent's assets available for execution may diminish or become insufficient.

Analysis: The invoices contained arbitration clauses, and the material prima facie showed acceptance of supplies, correspondence recording substantial outstanding balances, balance confirmation, and assurances of payment. Although disputes concerning reconciliation, credit notes, rebates, interest, and the nature and effect of the dishonoured cheque required determination in arbitration, they did not negate the prima facie basis for protection. The respondent's audited financial statements showed substantial losses, negative reserves, significant borrowings and trade payables, and minimal cash availability. Its disclosed immovable properties were of substantially lower gross value than the claim and were stated to be encumbered. Section 9 is preventive and does not require proof of dishonest intent; objective material establishing a strong possibility of diminution or insufficiency of assets available for execution is sufficient. The prima facie case, balance of convenience, and risk of serious prejudice supported preservation of the disputed amount rather than pre-award recovery.

Conclusion: The respondent must secure Rs. 32,60,37,480 by deposit with the Court or by furnishing an acceptable bank guarantee, pending the arbitral determination; the underlying monetary liability and all reconciliation-related disputes remain open before the Arbitral Tribunal.

Issues: Whether acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 merely because the cheque was issued towards a time-barred debt was sustainable.

Analysis: The transaction, execution of the cheque, its dishonour, issuance of demand notice, and non-payment were established. Issuance of a cheque towards a time-barred debt is not prohibited and operates as an acknowledgment of liability and revival of the debt; the debt consequently does not remain unenforceable merely because the underlying transaction was earlier barred by limitation.

Conclusion: The Magistrate erred in treating the time-barred character of the underlying debt as a bar to prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issues: Whether grounds were established under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for securing the disputed refund amount pending arbitration.

Analysis: Section 9 permits interim measures to secure the amount in dispute, but such relief requires more than a disputed monetary claim and must be justified by circumstances indicating that enforcement of a future award may become difficult. The registered deed of cancellation, the cheque issued for the identified principal amount, and its dishonour for insufficient funds prima facie supported the claim. The respondent's financial and contractual disputes, negligible disclosed bank balances, pending enforcement proceedings, and assignments of redevelopment rights collectively created a genuine concern regarding recoverability. The measure sought would only preserve the disputed amount and would not determine the underlying liability, which remains for arbitral determination. The balance of convenience favoured preservation of the amount.

Conclusion: Interim security of the identified principal amount by deposit was warranted pending arbitration, without adjudicating the parties' substantive rights or liabilities.

Issues: Whether additional documentary evidence may be brought on record after closure of the complainant's evidence under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 confers broad power to permit evidence at any stage where it is essential to a just decision. The controlling consideration is the materiality and necessity of the evidence, rather than the stage of the proceedings. The proposed invoice and related payment records bore a direct nexus to the payment relied upon in the defence and were relevant to explain whether that payment related to the liability in issue. Producing such material to explain a fact arising from defence evidence is distinct from impermissibly filling a lacuna in the original case. Closure of evidence does not by itself bar material evidence, particularly where the opposing party is afforded an opportunity to contest it.

Conclusion: The additional documents were permitted to be placed on record, with full opportunity to the respondent to contest their admissibility, authenticity and evidentiary value.

Issues: (i) Whether acquittal in a separate prosecution for criminal breach of trust and cheating extinguishes the independently acknowledged legally enforceable debt supporting the cheque-dishonour prosecution; (ii) Whether the drawer rebutted the statutory presumptions by a probable defence based on an uncorroborated claim that the cheque leaf was snatched; (iii) Whether the statutory demand-notice requirements were met despite the drawer's plea of non-service; and (iv) Whether the concurrent findings warranted interference in revisional jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether acquittal in a separate prosecution for criminal breach of trust and cheating extinguishes the independently acknowledged legally enforceable debt supporting the cheque-dishonour prosecution.

Analysis: A prosecution for cheque dishonour is founded upon the independently enforceable monetary liability underlying the cheque. The written declaration and notarized agreement acknowledging liability supplied an independent basis for the debt. An acquittal in the separate criminal prosecution because of deficiencies in proof of its distinct penal ingredients did not negate that written acknowledgment or the monetary liability.

Conclusion: The separate acquittal did not extinguish the legally enforceable debt underlying the cheque. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the drawer rebutted the statutory presumptions by a probable defence based on an uncorroborated claim that the cheque leaf was snatched.

Analysis: Upon proof of drawing, presentation and dishonour of the cheque, the statutory presumption of consideration and liability arose. Although the reverse onus could be discharged on a preponderance of probabilities, a bare statement under Section 313, unsupported by defence evidence, a contemporaneous police report or intimation to the bank, did not amount to a probable defence.

Conclusion: The statutory presumptions remained unrebutted, as the snatched-cheque defence was not probable. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether the statutory demand-notice requirements were met despite the drawer's plea of non-service.

Analysis: Dispatch of the notice by registered post to the drawer's admitted correct address attracted the presumption of due service. No reliable material established incarceration at the relevant delivery time. Further, receipt of court summons with the complaint afforded an opportunity to pay the cheque amount within fifteen days; failure to do so precluded reliance on an alleged defect in notice service.

Conclusion: The statutory notice requirements were satisfied. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (iv): Whether the concurrent findings warranted interference in revisional jurisdiction.

Analysis: Revisional jurisdiction is not a second appellate review and is exercisable only where concurrent findings are perverse, unsupported by evidence, or affected by gross illegality or procedural miscarriage. The findings rested on the cheque, dishonour memo, notice materials, written acknowledgment and the unrebutted statutory presumptions, without any demonstrated patent perversity or legal infirmity.

Conclusion: No ground for revisional interference was established. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The independently acknowledged liability, unrebutted statutory presumptions and valid notice process sustain the conviction and sentence for dishonour of cheque.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition seeking contractual refund was maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; (ii) Whether the insurer was entitled to retain the security deposit and unadjusted premium balance, and whether interest was payable on those amounts.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition seeking contractual refund was maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Article 226 permits relief in contractual matters where the action of a public authority is arbitrary and the material facts are documentary and not seriously disputed. The defences of statutory violations, fraudulent claims, lien and set-off were unsupported by contemporaneous documents, proceedings, quantified claims, or any demonstrated adjustment. Reasons not communicated when the money was withheld could not be subsequently constructed through affidavits.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the insurer was entitled to retain the security deposit and unadjusted premium balance, and whether interest was payable on those amounts.

Analysis: Under the MoUs, the security deposit could be adjusted only against a financial default. No financial default was established, identified, quantified, or adjusted against the deposit. The unadjusted cash balance represented unconsumed advance premium, and no appropriation towards any liability was shown. The contractual exclusion of interest applied only to the security deposit and not to the unadjusted cash deposit balance.

Conclusion: Retention of the security deposit and unadjusted cash deposit balance was unauthorized. The security deposit was refundable without interest, while the unadjusted cash deposit balance was refundable with simple interest at 7% per annum.

Final Conclusion: The insurer could not retain contractual deposits in the absence of a documented financial default, lawful adjustment, or established liability.

Ratio Decidendi: A public insurer's contractual deposits cannot be retained through an unsubstantiated lien or set-off; writ relief is available where the relevant facts are documentary and the asserted defence lacks contemporaneous support.

Issues: (i) Whether a statutory demand notice under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is validly served when it is sent by registered post to the drawer's correct address and received by the drawer's mother; (ii) Whether the decision treating service upon a drawer's spouse as insufficient without examining the correctness of the address or shared residence is binding precedent.

Issue (i): Whether a statutory demand notice under proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is validly served when it is sent by registered post to the drawer's correct address and received by the drawer's mother.

Analysis: Proviso (b) to Section 138 requires the payee to give written notice to the drawer. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 raise a rebuttable presumption of service where notice is properly addressed and dispatched by registered post. The statutory requirement concerns giving notice, not proof of its personal receipt by the drawer. Once dispatch to the correct address is established, the burden lies on the drawer to show that the address was incorrect, that the notice was not tendered, or that the drawer had no knowledge of its delivery at that address. Receipt by a family member at the shared residential address does not, by itself, rebut that presumption.

Conclusion: Dispatch of the notice by registered post to the drawer's correct address satisfied the statutory requirement of giving notice; the unrebutted presumption of valid service applied notwithstanding receipt by the drawer's mother.

Issue (ii): Whether the decision treating service upon a drawer's spouse as insufficient without examining the correctness of the address or shared residence is binding precedent.

Analysis: The earlier decision had disregarded binding larger-Bench authority establishing deemed service upon correct dispatch and had treated a spouse as equivalent to an unrelated third party without addressing whether the notice was sent to the correct address or whether the spouse resided with the drawer. Such an approach conflicts with the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and the settled rule that the drawer must rebut it.

Conclusion: The earlier decision was per incuriam and cannot operate as binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.

Final Conclusion: A correctly addressed statutory notice sent by registered post attracts a rebuttable presumption of service, and the drawer cannot defeat that presumption merely because a co-residing family member received the notice.

Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of proviso (b) to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, dispatch of a correctly addressed notice by registered post constitutes giving notice and raises a rebuttable presumption of service, which the drawer must displace by credible proof of non-service or lack of knowledge not attributable to the drawer.

Issues: Whether a merits order quashing the issuance of process warranted recall because the complainant was unrepresented when the matter was finally heard.

Analysis: The order sought to be recalled had adjudicated the complaint on merits after considering the pleadings and record and applying Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Although the complainant had remained absent when the matter was heard, the record reflected prior adjournments sought on its behalf and no cogent ground or infirmity was established to justify reopening the merits determination.

Conclusion: Recall of the merits order was unwarranted.

Issues: (i) Whether the complaint for cheating disclosed a prima facie case warranting refusal to quash the proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction; (ii) Whether non-compliance with the mandatory inquiry requirement before issuing process against accused residing outside the Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction required quashing or remittal; (iii) Whether the complaint lacked specific allegations against the director petitioners so as to preclude their prosecution.

Issue (i): Whether the complaint for cheating disclosed a prima facie case warranting refusal to quash the proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction.

Analysis: Inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases. Material arising from the related cheque-dishonour proceedings, including the forensic opinion indicating alteration of the cheque date, furnished prima facie support for the allegation that the cheque had been forged and used to institute proceedings. The non-disclosure of these subsequent developments by the petitioners, coupled with the evidentiary dispute requiring trial, prevented a finding that continuation of the cheating complaint was an abuse of process.

Conclusion: The cheating complaint was not liable to be quashed at the threshold.

Issue (ii): Whether non-compliance with the mandatory inquiry requirement before issuing process against accused residing outside the Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction required quashing or remittal.

Analysis: An inquiry or investigation before process is mandatory where the accused reside beyond the Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction. Although that inquiry was not conducted, the complaint could not be treated as disclosing no offence in view of the prima facie material concerning alleged forgery and cheating. The procedural defect therefore required fresh consideration at the pre-process stage rather than termination of the complaint.

Conclusion: The summoning order was set aside and the matter was remitted for compliance with the mandatory inquiry requirement.

Issue (iii): Whether the complaint lacked specific allegations against the director petitioners so as to preclude their prosecution.

Analysis: Criminal liability of company officers cannot rest solely on vicarious liability unless the governing statute so provides; active involvement and criminal intent must be prima facie alleged. The complaint alleged a conspiracy by the accused persons, and the forensic material prima facie supported the accusation of alteration of the cheque and its use in proceedings. The allegations were therefore not wholly devoid of a case against the director petitioners.

Conclusion: There was no basis to exclude the director petitioners from the complaint at the threshold.

Final Conclusion: The complaint remains open for fresh pre-process scrutiny under the mandatory statutory procedure; the available prima facie material does not justify its termination.

Ratio Decidendi: Failure to conduct a mandatory pre-process inquiry for out-of-jurisdiction accused requires remittal rather than quashing where the complaint and attendant material disclose a prima facie criminal case requiring further inquiry.

Issues: Whether the order issuing process and the complaint alleging an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 warranted quashing because the alleged settlement cheque was asserted to be improbable and its number differed from that referred to in a subsequent police statement.

Analysis: The order sheet showed that the earlier criminal matter had been posted for evidence before the date of the alleged cheque. The expression that the matter had reached the stage of evidence did not require that evidence must already have been recorded. The variation in cheque numbers involved a disputed factual question concerning the identity and evidentiary effect of the cheque, which requires trial-stage evaluation of the parties and documents. A quashing proceeding cannot be used for detailed appreciation of such factual disputes where the complaint pleads issuance of a specified cheque and the foundational allegations of the offence.

Conclusion: No ground existed to quash the issuance of process or the pending complaint; the disputed factual matters are to be determined at trial.

Issues: (i) Whether the Board's decision declining to concur with the Director (Discipline)'s prima facie opinion and closing the disciplinary complaint warranted interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; (ii) Whether the absence of a fiduciary or professional relationship was material to the Director (Discipline)'s prima facie opinion of other misconduct; and (iii) Whether pending criminal proceedings ousted the Board's disciplinary jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether the Board's decision declining to concur with the Director (Discipline)'s prima facie opinion and closing the disciplinary complaint warranted interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Judicial review under Article 226 is confined to examining the legality of the decision-making process and does not permit the Court to sit in appeal or substitute its assessment for that of the statutory disciplinary authority. The Board considered the circumstances in which access to the laptop and income-tax account was provided, found no material establishing mala fide intent or deliberate facilitation, and reached its conclusion upon appreciation of the record. Its view was plausible and was not shown to suffer from illegality warranting writ interference.

Conclusion: No interference with the Board's decision was warranted; the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the absence of a fiduciary or professional relationship was material to the Director (Discipline)'s prima facie opinion of other misconduct.

Analysis: Although absence of a fiduciary relationship does not by itself exclude the application of Item (2) of Part IV of the First Schedule, the Director (Discipline) had formed the prima facie opinion on the premise that the concerned chartered accountant was the petitioner's tax consultant. Both parties denied that any such professional relationship existed. The absence of that foundational fact was therefore material in assessing the correctness of the prima facie opinion.

Conclusion: The absence of a fiduciary or professional relationship validly supported the Board's disagreement with the prima facie opinion; the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether pending criminal proceedings ousted the Board's disciplinary jurisdiction.

Analysis: The pendency of criminal proceedings did not bar the Board from independently exercising its disciplinary jurisdiction. The Board's decision was founded on its assessment that cogent evidence of misconduct was lacking, rather than solely on the existence of criminal proceedings.

Conclusion: Pending criminal proceedings did not oust the Board's disciplinary jurisdiction; the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: A reasoned and plausible disciplinary determination founded on the material available is not open to substitution by writ review merely because another view is possible.

Ratio Decidendi: In Article 226 review, a court cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its view for that of a statutory authority where the authority's conclusion is plausible and based on the material on record.

Issues: (i) Whether the respondent must vacate the unutilised SEZ premises so that the petitioner may take possession and re-sub-lease it. (ii) Whether the parties' monetary claims, including claims relating to improvements and termination, must be resolved in arbitration.

Issue (i): Whether the respondent must vacate the unutilised SEZ premises so that the petitioner may take possession and re-sub-lease it.

Analysis: The supplementary agreement fixed a final deadline for commencing operations, which was not met, and the premises had remained unused for several years. The unresolved statutory questions concerning the applicable rent-control and SEZ regimes were not required to be determined for releasing the premises from continued non-use.

Conclusion: The respondent must vacate the premises after supervised inventory and removal of its movables, following which the petitioner is entitled to take vacant possession and sub-lease the premises to another entrepreneur.

Issue (ii): Whether the parties' monetary claims, including claims relating to improvements and termination, must be resolved in arbitration.

Analysis: Claims for sub-lease rent, maintenance charges, interest, damages, the value of infrastructure improvements, and the consequences of termination require evaluation. An arbitrator was appointed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with provision for an Advocate Commissioner and an expert evaluator to report on movables and improvements.

Conclusion: The parties' monetary claims, including any claim for damages arising from the termination and improvements, shall be adjudicated in the arbitral proceedings.

Final Conclusion: Possession of the premises is separated from the outstanding monetary disputes, which are reserved for arbitral determination.

Issues: (i) Whether the 2014 and 2017 Amendments are unconstitutional for want of prior Presidential assent; (ii) Whether the 2014 definition of sale conflicts with the Sale of Goods Act, 1930; (iii) Whether rice bran oil, rice oil and de-oiled rice bran are agricultural produce under the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 and can be included in its Schedule for market-fee levy; (iv) Whether market fees under the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 require actual services by the market committee; and (v) Whether the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 conflicts with the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.

Issue (i): Whether the 2014 and 2017 Amendments are unconstitutional for want of prior Presidential assent.

Analysis: Article 301 of the Constitution protects against direct and immediate impediments to the movement of trade and commerce, not against a fiscal levy which merely affects profitability. The amendments expanding agricultural produce and adding vegetable oils neither impeded physical movement of goods nor imposed a restriction attracting Article 304(b). The legislation fell within Entry 26 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, while Entry 33 of List III did not displace the State's competence in this field.

Conclusion: The 2014 and 2017 Amendments are intra vires and did not require prior Presidential assent; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the 2014 definition of sale conflicts with the Sale of Goods Act, 1930.

Analysis: Sections 4 and 5 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 regulate general contractual sales and preserve the operation of other laws. The statutory definition of sale, including transfer of agricultural produce between market areas, serves the distinct purpose of preventing market-fee evasion. It is within the State's legislative competence under Entries 26 and 66 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.

Conclusion: The statutory definition of sale does not conflict with the Sale of Goods Act, 1930; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether rice bran oil, rice oil and de-oiled rice bran are agricultural produce under the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 and can be included in its Schedule for market-fee levy.

Analysis: The original definition of agricultural produce did not permit the executive to enlarge that definition merely by amending the Schedule. Under the amended definition, processing covers the specified agricultural treatments and similar treatments, but excludes industrial manufacture resulting in a new commercially distinct commodity. Rice bran oil and de-oiled rice bran result from solvent extraction and refining processes, lose the character of paddy and are recognised in the market as distinct manufactured products. Their inclusion through executive notifications constituted excessive delegation beyond the parent statute.

Conclusion: Rice bran oil, rice oil and de-oiled rice bran are not agricultural produce; their scheduled inclusion, the notifications adding them, and all market-fee levies and demands founded on that inclusion are invalid. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether market fees under the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 require actual services by the market committee.

Analysis: The distinction between a tax and a fee does not require an exact quid pro quo or receipt of an individual service. Section 17 authorises levy on agricultural produce brought into or deemed to have been sold in the market area. The market committee performs regulatory functions for the market as a whole, and the statutory deeming fiction prevents avoidance of the levy through removal or storage outside an actual sale.

Conclusion: Actual receipt of services by the payer is not a condition for levy of market fees on agricultural produce covered by the statute; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 conflicts with the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.

Analysis: The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 regulates scheduled industries and their manufacturing process, whereas the State enactment regulates marketing of agricultural produce within market areas and imposes market fees. The enactments operate in distinct regulatory fields, leaving no repugnancy or conflict.

Conclusion: The West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 does not conflict with the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional validity of the amendments and the statutory definition of sale remain unaffected, but the impugned market-fee regime has no application to the manufactured products in question.

Ratio Decidendi: Executive power to amend a marketing statute's Schedule cannot encompass an industrially manufactured commodity falling outside the parent Act's definition of agricultural produce; processing does not include manufacture resulting in a new commercially distinct product.

Issues: (i) Whether concurrent findings of liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be disturbed in revision on the plea of a blank signed cheque, absence of transaction records, and lack of proof that the complainant owned the business; (ii) Whether the statutory demand notice was duly served; and (iii) Whether the sentence of three months' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,75,000, including compensation, warranted interference.

Issue (i): Whether concurrent findings of liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be disturbed in revision on the plea of a blank signed cheque, absence of transaction records, and lack of proof that the complainant owned the business.

Analysis: Revisional Jurisdiction is supervisory and does not permit reappreciation of evidence or displacement of Concurrent Findings absent perversity, jurisdictional error, or manifest miscarriage of justice. Admission of signature and issuance of the cheque activated the Presumption of Consideration and the Presumption of Legally Enforceable Debt under Sections 118(a) and 139. The Rebuttable Presumption required a Probable Defence supported by material. The inconsistent account of the tyre price and balance payable, absence of proof of part-payment, and admitted connection between the complainant and the business did not displace those presumptions. The absence of transaction records did not by itself require the holder to prove the underlying consideration.

Conclusion: The concurrent finding of liability was not liable to revisional interference.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory demand notice was duly served.

Analysis: Service of Statutory Notice was established by the acknowledgement bearing the accused's signature. The contention concerning a delayed presumption of service was inapplicable because actual service, rather than deemed service, was proved. Non-payment after receipt of the demand notice completed the relevant statutory requirement.

Conclusion: The statutory demand notice was validly served.

Issue (iii): Whether the sentence of three months' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,75,000, including compensation, warranted interference.

Analysis: The penal provision for cheque dishonour serves a deterrent purpose, while compensation is compensatory and restitutive. Considering the cheque amount, the prolonged delay before sentencing, loss of interest, and litigation expense, the imprisonment and monetary relief were regarded as adequate rather than excessive.

Conclusion: The sentence and compensation required no modification.

Final Conclusion: No perversity, jurisdictional error, or disproportionality was established in the concurrent determinations.

Ratio Decidendi: Admission of the signature and issuance of a cheque activates the statutory presumptions of consideration and legally enforceable liability; an unsupported blank-cheque defence does not rebut them, and concurrent findings are not revisable absent perversity or jurisdictional error.

Issues: Whether the complaint allegations of theft and criminal misappropriation warranted a direction for registration of an FIR and investigation despite the availability of a civil remedy.

Analysis: Availability of a civil remedy for a contractual dispute does not exclude criminal-law recourse where the allegations disclose criminal conduct. The complaint contained specific allegations of unauthorised removal of scrap materials, non-accounting of substantial sale proceeds, and lack of cooperation in furnishing accounts. Verification of documents and interrogation of the accused were necessary to ascertain the truth of those allegations.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to a direction for registration of an FIR and investigation into the allegations.

Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction could be invoked to challenge an order-in-original on merits despite failure to timely pursue the statutory appellate remedy, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.

Analysis: The governing principle of writ jurisdiction requires recourse to an efficacious statutory remedy unless exceptional grounds, including lack of jurisdiction or incompetence of the authority, are established. Expiry of the appellate limitation period and the requirement of pre-deposit do not justify bypassing that remedy. No jurisdictional or competence-based challenge was raised.

Conclusion: The challenge on merits could not be entertained in writ jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether the Section 34 petitions were barred by limitation; and (ii) Whether the District Judge, Sundargarh had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Section 34 petitions.

Issue (i): Whether the Section 34 petitions were barred by limitation.

Analysis: The arbitral award was dated 25.10.2021 and the petitions were filed on 08.12.2021, within the three-month period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The contrary finding of the High Court was inconsistent with the admitted record and was conceded to be erroneous.

Conclusion: The Section 34 petitions were filed within limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether the District Judge, Sundargarh had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Section 34 petitions.

Analysis: The contract provided for adjudication by the court having jurisdiction where the work was executed, and the work was executed in Sundargarh. Neither the order appointing the arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 nor any agreement between the parties designated Cuttack as the juridical seat. Conducting arbitral sittings at Cuttack for the arbitrator's convenience did not convert that venue into the seat. The State High Court's exercise of jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator did not confine subsequent proceedings to courts situated at the place where the High Court was located. Accordingly, Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 did not bar recourse to the competent court at Sundargarh.

Conclusion: The District Judge, Sundargarh had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Section 34 petitions.

Final Conclusion: The statutory challenge to the arbitral award must be considered on its merits by the competent court at Sundargarh.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of an express or agreed designation of a juridical seat, the place where arbitral proceedings are conducted is merely a venue and does not determine exclusive supervisory jurisdiction; appointment of an arbitrator by a State High Court does not itself select the local court competent under Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues: Whether cognizance of offences under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 can be taken on a police report or charge-sheet instead of a written complaint.

Analysis: Section 26 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 permits cognizance only upon a complaint in writing by the specified authorities or any person. A complaint carries the meaning assigned by Section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Although Section 25 makes the relevant offence cognizable and permits police investigation, that power does not displace the statutory bar against cognizance on a police report. The material collected during investigation may be used by the competent authority for filing a written complaint before the appropriate court. The express legal bar warranted exercise of inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process.

Conclusion: Cognizance on the police report was impermissible; the FIR and consequential proceedings were quashed qua the applicants.

Issues: Whether proceedings in a statutory appeal under Section 37(1)(b) against rejection of interim relief under Section 9 can, after constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal and by consent, be remitted to that Tribunal for treatment as an application under Section 17.

Analysis: Appellate jurisdiction under Section 37(1)(b) is vested exclusively in the competent Court contemplated by Section 2(1)(e). The Tribunal's power to grant interim measures under Section 17 is distinct in nature and source from the appellate power exercised over a Section 9 order. Remitting the appeal and requiring it to be treated as a Section 17 application would impermissibly transfer statutory appellate jurisdiction to the Tribunal. Following constitution of the Tribunal, liberty could instead be granted to independently seek available interim measures under Section 17, assessed on subsequent events and the relief then sought.

Conclusion: Statutory appellate proceedings under Section 37(1)(b) cannot be remitted to the Arbitral Tribunal or treated as an application under Section 17; the direction to that effect was set aside.