Issues: (i) Whether the 2014 and 2017 Amendments are unconstitutional for want of prior Presidential assent; (ii) Whether the 2014 definition of sale conflicts with the Sale of Goods Act, 1930; (iii) Whether rice bran oil, rice oil and de-oiled rice bran are agricultural produce under the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 and can be included in its Schedule for market-fee levy; (iv) Whether market fees under the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 require actual services by the market committee; and (v) Whether the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 conflicts with the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.

Issue (i): Whether the 2014 and 2017 Amendments are unconstitutional for want of prior Presidential assent.

Analysis: Article 301 of the Constitution protects against direct and immediate impediments to the movement of trade and commerce, not against a fiscal levy which merely affects profitability. The amendments expanding agricultural produce and adding vegetable oils neither impeded physical movement of goods nor imposed a restriction attracting Article 304(b). The legislation fell within Entry 26 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, while Entry 33 of List III did not displace the State's competence in this field.

Conclusion: The 2014 and 2017 Amendments are intra vires and did not require prior Presidential assent; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the 2014 definition of sale conflicts with the Sale of Goods Act, 1930.

Analysis: Sections 4 and 5 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 regulate general contractual sales and preserve the operation of other laws. The statutory definition of sale, including transfer of agricultural produce between market areas, serves the distinct purpose of preventing market-fee evasion. It is within the State's legislative competence under Entries 26 and 66 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.

Conclusion: The statutory definition of sale does not conflict with the Sale of Goods Act, 1930; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether rice bran oil, rice oil and de-oiled rice bran are agricultural produce under the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 and can be included in its Schedule for market-fee levy.

Analysis: The original definition of agricultural produce did not permit the executive to enlarge that definition merely by amending the Schedule. Under the amended definition, processing covers the specified agricultural treatments and similar treatments, but excludes industrial manufacture resulting in a new commercially distinct commodity. Rice bran oil and de-oiled rice bran result from solvent extraction and refining processes, lose the character of paddy and are recognised in the market as distinct manufactured products. Their inclusion through executive notifications constituted excessive delegation beyond the parent statute.

Conclusion: Rice bran oil, rice oil and de-oiled rice bran are not agricultural produce; their scheduled inclusion, the notifications adding them, and all market-fee levies and demands founded on that inclusion are invalid. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether market fees under the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 require actual services by the market committee.

Analysis: The distinction between a tax and a fee does not require an exact quid pro quo or receipt of an individual service. Section 17 authorises levy on agricultural produce brought into or deemed to have been sold in the market area. The market committee performs regulatory functions for the market as a whole, and the statutory deeming fiction prevents avoidance of the levy through removal or storage outside an actual sale.

Conclusion: Actual receipt of services by the payer is not a condition for levy of market fees on agricultural produce covered by the statute; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether the West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 conflicts with the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.

Analysis: The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 regulates scheduled industries and their manufacturing process, whereas the State enactment regulates marketing of agricultural produce within market areas and imposes market fees. The enactments operate in distinct regulatory fields, leaving no repugnancy or conflict.

Conclusion: The West Bengal Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act, 1972 does not conflict with the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951; this issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The constitutional validity of the amendments and the statutory definition of sale remain unaffected, but the impugned market-fee regime has no application to the manufactured products in question.

Ratio Decidendi: Executive power to amend a marketing statute's Schedule cannot encompass an industrially manufactured commodity falling outside the parent Act's definition of agricultural produce; processing does not include manufacture resulting in a new commercially distinct product.

Issues: (i) Whether concurrent findings of liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be disturbed in revision on the plea of a blank signed cheque, absence of transaction records, and lack of proof that the complainant owned the business; (ii) Whether the statutory demand notice was duly served; and (iii) Whether the sentence of three months' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,75,000, including compensation, warranted interference.

Issue (i): Whether concurrent findings of liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act could be disturbed in revision on the plea of a blank signed cheque, absence of transaction records, and lack of proof that the complainant owned the business.

Analysis: Revisional Jurisdiction is supervisory and does not permit reappreciation of evidence or displacement of Concurrent Findings absent perversity, jurisdictional error, or manifest miscarriage of justice. Admission of signature and issuance of the cheque activated the Presumption of Consideration and the Presumption of Legally Enforceable Debt under Sections 118(a) and 139. The Rebuttable Presumption required a Probable Defence supported by material. The inconsistent account of the tyre price and balance payable, absence of proof of part-payment, and admitted connection between the complainant and the business did not displace those presumptions. The absence of transaction records did not by itself require the holder to prove the underlying consideration.

Conclusion: The concurrent finding of liability was not liable to revisional interference.

Issue (ii): Whether the statutory demand notice was duly served.

Analysis: Service of Statutory Notice was established by the acknowledgement bearing the accused's signature. The contention concerning a delayed presumption of service was inapplicable because actual service, rather than deemed service, was proved. Non-payment after receipt of the demand notice completed the relevant statutory requirement.

Conclusion: The statutory demand notice was validly served.

Issue (iii): Whether the sentence of three months' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,75,000, including compensation, warranted interference.

Analysis: The penal provision for cheque dishonour serves a deterrent purpose, while compensation is compensatory and restitutive. Considering the cheque amount, the prolonged delay before sentencing, loss of interest, and litigation expense, the imprisonment and monetary relief were regarded as adequate rather than excessive.

Conclusion: The sentence and compensation required no modification.

Final Conclusion: No perversity, jurisdictional error, or disproportionality was established in the concurrent determinations.

Ratio Decidendi: Admission of the signature and issuance of a cheque activates the statutory presumptions of consideration and legally enforceable liability; an unsupported blank-cheque defence does not rebut them, and concurrent findings are not revisable absent perversity or jurisdictional error.

Issues: Whether the complaint allegations of theft and criminal misappropriation warranted a direction for registration of an FIR and investigation despite the availability of a civil remedy.

Analysis: Availability of a civil remedy for a contractual dispute does not exclude criminal-law recourse where the allegations disclose criminal conduct. The complaint contained specific allegations of unauthorised removal of scrap materials, non-accounting of substantial sale proceeds, and lack of cooperation in furnishing accounts. Verification of documents and interrogation of the accused were necessary to ascertain the truth of those allegations.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to a direction for registration of an FIR and investigation into the allegations.

Issues: (i) Maintainability of a civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against a Council notice requiring participation in mediation under Section 18(2) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006; (ii) Whether the fresh mediation notice amounted to an impermissible review of the Council's earlier decision; (iii) Whether pending commercial civil proceedings bar a supplier's claim before the Council.

Issue (i): Maintainability of a civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against a Council notice requiring participation in mediation under Section 18(2) of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006.

Analysis: Section 18 contemplates statutory conciliation before an adversarial dispute arises. A notice confined to calling a party for mediation does not create an adjudicatory lis; the dispute becomes adversarial only upon failure of conciliation. Judicial review under Articles 226 or 227 is therefore premature at the mediation stage.

Conclusion: The civil revision petition was not maintainable against the mediation notice, in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the fresh mediation notice amounted to an impermissible review of the Council's earlier decision.

Analysis: The earlier challenge was withdrawn after the Council indicated that it would entertain a fresh claim. The subsequent notice was consequently not an exercise of review of the previous decision.

Conclusion: The fresh mediation notice did not amount to an impermissible review, in favour of the respondent.

Issue (iii): Whether pending commercial civil proceedings bar a supplier's claim before the Council.

Analysis: The statutory remedy under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 is an independent right available to a registered supplier. Parallel proceedings before a commercial court do not create a legal bar to the Council dealing with the statutory claim.

Conclusion: The pending commercial proceedings did not bar the supplier's claim before the Council, in favour of the respondent.

Final Conclusion: The statutory mediation process may continue, and the Council may entertain the supplier's claim notwithstanding the parallel commercial proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice initiating statutory conciliation under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 creates no adjudicatory lis amenable to Article 227 review before conciliation fails, and the statutory remedy is not displaced by parallel civil proceedings.

Issues: Whether the direction requiring repayment of the amount released to the complainant under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was liable to be set aside because it was made by the trial court rather than the appellate court.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 148(3) mandates repayment, with stipulated interest, of an amount released to the complainant where the appellant is acquitted. The complainant had also undertaken before the appellate court to repay the amount subject to disposal of the appeal. Although the refund direction ought ordinarily to have been made by the appellate court, the subsequent deposit of the amount pursuant to court directions and the complainant's failure to comply promptly did not justify interference with the refund direction.

Conclusion: Upon acquittal of the accused, the complainant was bound to repay the released amount, and the refund direction was sustained against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the appellant, whose writ petition concerning forfeiture of earnest money deposit was relegated to the statutory remedy, should be permitted to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal notwithstanding the expiry of the ordinary limitation period.

Analysis: Section 17(1) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 provides an efficacious remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal against measures taken by the secured creditor. Rule 8(7)(f) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 requires disclosure of facts necessary for a purchaser to know the nature and value of the property; whether non-disclosure of a subsisting attachment falls within that requirement, and whether it was material to the auction purchaser, are matters for the Tribunal. The appellant had pursued the writ remedy diligently after refusal of refund, the Bank had objected only on the ground of alternative remedy, and the challenge disclosed an arguable case.

Conclusion: The appellant may file an application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within three weeks, which shall be accepted without requiring an application for condonation of delay; the Tribunal shall decide the matter on merits in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the statutory presumption of a legally enforceable debt arising from an admitted cheque signature stood rebutted, rendering the concurrent conviction for cheque dishonour unsustainable.

Analysis: Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 raise presumptions of consideration and discharge of debt, but those presumptions are rebuttable on a preponderance of probabilities. A probable defence may arise from deficiencies in the complainant's evidence as well as defence evidence. Once the financial capacity to advance the alleged cash loan was specifically challenged, the absence of bank records, receipts, or any financial trail required affirmative proof of capacity and of the underlying transaction. Although a voluntarily delivered signed blank cheque may attract the presumption under Section 139, it does not dispense with proof of a genuine underlying liability after a probable defence is raised. The withholding of a cited eyewitness to the alleged loan and delivery of the cheque warranted an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The consistent defence evidence, together with these deficiencies, rebutted the presumption; summary answers under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 could not cure the complainant's evidentiary gaps.

Conclusion: The statutory presumption stood rebutted and the alleged legally enforceable debt was not proved; the concurrent findings of conviction were perverse and legally unsustainable.

Issues: Whether the appellate pre-deposit requirement under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 applied to a convicted company director who was not the signatory or drawer of the cheque.

Analysis: Section 148 authorises an appellate court to direct a deposit pending an appeal by the drawer against conviction under Section 138. The record showed that another accused was the cheque signatory and drawer on behalf of the company, while the petitioner, arraigned as another director, had not signed the cheque and was not directly implicated by specific allegations in the complaint. The discretionary pre-deposit provision was therefore inapplicable to the petitioner.

Conclusion: The Section 148 pre-deposit condition could not be imposed upon the petitioner, who was not the drawer of the cheque.

Issues: (i) Whether the statutory presumptions arising from admitted execution of the cheque and money receipt were rebutted by the challenge to the complainant's financial capacity and alleged breach of loan-acceptance restrictions; (ii) Whether the conviction was vitiated because a successor Magistrate decided the case on evidence recorded by a predecessor.

Issue (i): Whether the statutory presumptions arising from admitted execution of the cheque and money receipt were rebutted by the challenge to the complainant's financial capacity and alleged breach of loan-acceptance restrictions.

Analysis: Admission of the petitioner's signatures on the cheque and money receipt attracted the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The challenge based on the complainant's financial capacity and the alleged violation of Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act did not displace those presumptions, as no cogent and reliable rebuttal evidence was produced.

Conclusion: The statutory presumptions remained unrebutted; the issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the conviction was vitiated because a successor Magistrate decided the case on evidence recorded by a predecessor.

Analysis: The trial record showed that the proceeding was conducted as a summons trial and not as a summary trial. Consequently, the restriction invoked under Section 326(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 did not establish prejudice or illegality.

Conclusion: The conviction was not vitiated on account of the successor Magistrate deciding the case; the issue is decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The concurrent findings of guilt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act disclose no perversity, material illegality, impropriety, or jurisdictional error warranting revisional interference.

Ratio Decidendi: Once execution of a cheque is admitted, the statutory presumptions of consideration and legally enforceable liability operate unless rebutted by cogent and reliable evidence; an unsubstantiated challenge to the payee's financial capacity does not suffice.

Issues: (i) Applicable Guidelines and sanction of professional fees exceeding prescribed ceilings for distinct valuation assignments; (ii) Entitlement to interest on delayed professional fees and inflation-linked enhancement; (iii) Source of recovery of the sanctioned fees and personal liability of third parties; (iv) Discharge of the Court Receiver and closure of the suit account.

Issue (i): Applicable Guidelines and sanction of professional fees exceeding prescribed ceilings for distinct valuation assignments.

Analysis: The assignment, undertaken in 2004, concerned inspection and valuation of immovable properties for their proposed sale. It was consequently governed by the Guidelines dated 1 February 1994, rather than the 1999 Guidelines relating to royalty or compensation or the subsequently issued 2007 Guidelines. Clause 9 required prior sanction before payment of fees exceeding the prescribed ceiling, not before appointment of the Valuer. The ceiling was ordinarily applicable separately to each distinct valuation exercise. The reports were accepted, the work was neither disputed nor found deficient, and the prolonged non-payment was not attributable to the Valuer.

Conclusion: The revised professional fees of Rs. 6,51,062 were sanctioned in full, including fees exceeding the ordinary ceilings and the higher charge for inspection and the status report.

Issue (ii): Entitlement to interest on delayed professional fees and inflation-linked enhancement.

Analysis: Although the 1994 Guidelines did not expressly provide for interest, reasonable compensation for deprivation of legitimately earned fees could be awarded in exceptional circumstances. Interest compensated for the time value of money during the delay. Granting a further inflation-linked multiplier, particularly on both principal and interest, would amount to double compensation for the same delay period.

Conclusion: The Valuer was entitled to interest of Rs. 8,20,338 up to May 2025 and further simple interest at 6% per annum on Rs. 6,51,062 from 1 June 2025 until payment; the inflation-linked enhancement claim was rejected.

Issue (iii): Source of recovery of the sanctioned fees and personal liability of third parties.

Analysis: Clause 8 of the 1994 Guidelines confined the Valuer's recourse to funds available in the concerned proceedings or with the appropriate insolvency authority. No fund or asset under the Court Receiver's control was available, and payment could not be ordered from the Receiver's general account or public funds. No substantive material established personal liability of an individual associated with the company or liability of separate corporate entities; mere association could not displace separate corporate personality.

Conclusion: The Valuer may lodge the sanctioned claim before the competent Official Liquidator, with the Court Receiver required to forward the relevant material; relief seeking personal liability and freezing of third-party corporate assets was rejected.

Issue (iv): Discharge of the Court Receiver and closure of the suit account.

Analysis: The Court Receiver had substantially completed the assigned functions, the underlying writ proceedings had ended, no funds remained in the suit account, and no further recovery action by the Receiver was warranted after the Valuer was permitted to pursue its claim in liquidation.

Conclusion: The Court Receiver was discharged without passing accounts, and the suit account was permitted to be closed without further costs, charges or expenses.

Final Conclusion: The Valuer's determined dues are enforceable only through the appropriate liquidation process, while no personal or public-fund liability arises merely from the Court-authorised engagement.

Ratio Decidendi: A Court-appointed Valuer may receive post facto sanction for reasonable fees exceeding guideline ceilings where the accepted work was properly performed, but interest for delayed payment precludes overlapping inflation-based compensation for the same period.

Issues: Whether an SEZ unit was entitled to exemption and refund of stamp duty and registration fee on a lease deed executed before promulgation of the Gujarat Special Economic Zone Ordinance, 2004, where the State's SEZ policy had already promised those fiscal benefits.

Analysis: The State policy dated 19.07.2002 extended complete exemption from stamp duty and registration fee to SEZ units and induced investment for industrial development. The Ordinance promulgated on 10.02.2004 gave formal statutory shape to that pre-existing policy. Denial of the promised fiscal benefit solely because the lease deed pre-dated the Ordinance would defeat the policy's object and differentiate without justification between similarly placed SEZ units based only on the date of execution. A lease transfers an interest in land and falls within the policy's intended fiscal benefit.

Conclusion: The exemption and consequential refund of stamp duty and registration fee were rightly available to the SEZ unit notwithstanding that the lease deed was executed before 10.02.2004.

Issues: (i) Whether proceedings for cheque dishonour could continue against a person described as a Joint Managing Director where uncontroverted corporate records established that he was never a director or officer of the accused company and the complaint disclosed no independent role; (ii) Whether corporate complainants in future complaints under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 must furnish documents verifying the accused company and the status of persons sought to be made vicariously liable.

Issue (i): Whether proceedings for cheque dishonour could continue against a person described as a Joint Managing Director where uncontroverted corporate records established that he was never a director or officer of the accused company and the complaint disclosed no independent role.

Analysis: Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 imposes vicarious criminal liability only on persons who were in charge of and responsible for the company's business at the relevant time, or whose consent, connivance, or negligence in relation to the dishonoured cheque is specifically disclosed. A Managing Director or Joint Managing Director may be proceeded against by virtue of that office, but the premise fails where reliable corporate records establish that the person never held such office in the accused company. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 may be exercised on unimpeachable evidence beyond doubt where continuation of prosecution would amount to abuse of process. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs records showed that the person was never a director of the accused company; this remained uncontroverted, and neither the complaint nor the material before the Court attributed any actual role in its business or in issuance and dishonour of the cheque.

Conclusion: The complaint and consequential proceedings were unsustainable against the petitioner and were quashed only as against him.

Issue (ii): Whether corporate complainants in future complaints under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 must furnish documents verifying the accused company and the status of persons sought to be made vicariously liable.

Analysis: Incorrect impleadment of persons who were not directors, authorised signatories, or otherwise responsible for the company's affairs causes avoidable harassment and delay. Verification of the company's corporate identity and of the office held by each proposed accused at the relevant time is necessary before criminal process is initiated against persons on a vicarious-liability basis.

Conclusion: Prospectively, every complaint against a corporate accused must annex the company's Corporate Identification Number obtained from Ministry of Corporate Affairs master data and a certified copy of Form DIR-12; registration without these documents is permissible only where their non-availability despite due diligence is specifically affirmed and reasons are recorded before cognizance.

Final Conclusion: Vicarious liability for a corporate cheque-dishonour offence cannot rest on an incorrect designation where incontrovertible corporate material negates the person's connection with the accused company, and future corporate complaints must be supported by verification of corporate status and responsible officers.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, uncontroverted corporate records demonstrating that a person never held office in, or responsibility for, the accused company justify quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 where the complaint contains no independent factual basis for liability.

Issues: Whether an MSME borrower that did not invoke the revival and rehabilitation framework in response to the demand notice or in an earlier writ petition could subsequently challenge the SARFAESI measures and auction notice on that ground despite the statutory remedy before the Debt Recovery Tribunal.

Analysis: The MSME framework requires an eligible stressed enterprise to seek a corrective plan or rehabilitation. A borrower may assert MSME status in its response to a notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, whereupon the secured creditor must examine the claim and keep further measures in abeyance if the claim warrants acceptance. No such claim or rehabilitation application was made when the demand notice was issued, and the earlier writ petition challenging the consequential recovery measures did not raise the protection under the framework. The auction notice was consequential to the earlier SARFAESI measures, and no independent procedural illegality in the auction was established. The Henderson Principle, constructive res judicata and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure bar a litigant from reopening a dispute by raising grounds that could and ought to have been raised in the first proceeding. The statutory remedy under Section 17 remained available before the Debt Recovery Tribunal.

Conclusion: The belated claim for protection under the MSME framework could not be raised to reopen the SARFAESI proceedings or challenge the consequential auction notice; no exercise of writ jurisdiction was warranted.

Issues: (i) Whether codeine-based cough syrup within the quantitative limits in Entry 35 of the notification dated 14.11.1985 attracts the NDPS Act when dealt with by a drug licence holder for medicinal use; (ii) Whether such cough syrup attracts the NDPS Act when stocked, sold or transported for intoxication or another non-medicinal purpose; (iii) Whether the respective applicants were entitled to bail on the material attributed to them.

Issue (i): Whether codeine-based cough syrup within the quantitative limits in Entry 35 of the notification dated 14.11.1985 attracts the NDPS Act when dealt with by a drug licence holder for medicinal use.

Analysis: Codeine is an opium derivative and ordinarily a manufactured drug, but Entry 35 excludes a preparation compounded with other ingredients, containing no more than 100 mg per dosage unit and no more than 2.5% concentration, which has been established in therapeutic practice. The expression concerns the established therapeutic character of the preparation, not the end-user's individual use. A codeine cough syrup satisfying these conditions and dealt with in the ordinary medicinal trade by a valid licence holder is outside the category of manufactured drug. A routine retail sale without a prescription may breach the Drugs and Cosmetics regulatory regime, but does not by itself invoke the NDPS Act absent material indicating knowledge of diversion to non-medicinal use.

Conclusion: A qualifying codeine-based cough syrup sold, stocked or transported by a licence holder for medicinal use is not a narcotic substance under the NDPS Act.

Issue (ii): Whether such cough syrup attracts the NDPS Act when stocked, sold or transported for intoxication or another non-medicinal purpose.

Analysis: The statutory exception is available only where the preparation is genuinely dealt with for medical or scientific purposes and consistently with the applicable licensing requirements. The NDPS Act operates in addition to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act; a licence does not protect dealings involving deliberate diversion of a codeine preparation for intoxication. Large-scale diversion, fictitious documentation or entities, absence of actual delivery or stock, forged transport records, and other material indicating non-medicinal trafficking may establish that the exemption is unavailable. Where the NDPS Act applies, the weight of the entire syrup mixture is considered in determining small or commercial quantity.

Conclusion: A qualifying codeine cough syrup knowingly stored, sold or transported for intoxication or another non-medicinal purpose is treated as a codeine preparation and manufactured drug attracting the NDPS Act.

Issue (iii): Whether the respective applicants were entitled to bail on the material attributed to them.

Analysis: Bail was assessed individually without deciding guilt. Bail was justified where the material did not prima facie establish conscious possession, knowledge of concealed contents, actual involvement in diversion, or participation in a trafficking conspiracy beyond unsupported confessional statements or weak circumstantial material. Bail was refused where the record prima facie disclosed organised diversion of very large quantities through fictitious firms, false invoices or transport records, unexplained financial routing, forged documentation, or other evidence of intended non-medicinal distribution.

Conclusion: Bail was granted to applicants against whom prima facie material of conscious involvement in non-medicinal trafficking was insufficient, and refused to applicants against whom such material was prima facie established.

Final Conclusion: The statutory exemption protects genuine medicinal dealings in qualifying codeine cough syrup, but cannot be used to shield its knowing diversion for intoxication; the individual applications were resolved according to the strength of the respective prima facie material.

Ratio Decidendi: A codeine preparation within Entry 35 remains outside the NDPS Act only while it is genuinely dealt with for medical or scientific purposes in accordance with the governing regulatory requirements; knowing diversion for intoxication defeats the exemption.

Issues: Whether a contractual claim for recovery of GST amounts paid to a service provider, following reversal of input tax credit, is ex facie non-arbitrable at the stage of appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: At the Section 11 stage, the enquiry is confined to the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement. The admitted arbitration clause covered disputes arising under the contractual engagement. A claim concerning reimbursement or the ultimate inter se incidence of an indirect-tax amount paid under a contract is a dispute in personam between the contracting parties; it neither determines tax liability vis-a -vis the revenue nor intrudes upon the State's sovereign taxing functions. Objections concerning jurisdiction and arbitrability remain available before the arbitral tribunal under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Conclusion: The reimbursement claim was not manifestly non-arbitrable, and a sole arbitrator was appointed, with objections on jurisdiction and arbitrability reserved for determination by the arbitral tribunal.

Issues: Whether dishonour of a cheque drawn on a bank that had merged with another bank, where the cheque was presented after expiry of the validity period prescribed for legacy cheques, attracts liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: Proviso (a) to Section 138 requires presentation of a cheque within its period of validity. Following the merger of Syndicate Bank with Canara Bank, legacy Syndicate Bank cheques could be presented only until 30 June 2021, after which the old banking codes were permanently disabled. The cheque was presented in 2025, long after that deadline, and was therefore invalid on the date of presentation. Continuation of a prosecution founded on such an invalid instrument would amount to abuse of process of law.

Conclusion: Dishonour of the invalid cheque did not attract criminal liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issues: Whether the complaints contained sufficient averments to fasten vicarious liability on the petitioner under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour of cheques under Section 138.

Analysis: Liability of a company director for an offence by the company requires averments that, at the time of the offence, the director was both in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business, or that the offence occurred through the director's consent, connivance or neglect. Directorship alone does not create deemed criminal liability. The petitioner was neither a party to the underlying agreement nor a signatory to the cheques, and the complaints contained only general allegations against all accused without material particulars of the petitioner's role in the company's day-to-day affairs or in the cheque transactions. The process-issuing orders also did not address the statutory requirements for vicarious liability.

Conclusion: The petitioner could not be prosecuted under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on the basis of the deficient complaints; the issue is decided in favour of the petitioner.

Issues: Whether a recovery plaint could be rejected as ex facie barred by limitation under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, despite signed balance confirmations and deductions and deposits of tax at source relating to the loan transaction.

Analysis: Rejection of a plaint on limitation is permissible only where the bar is apparent from a meaningful reading of the plaint and its relied-upon documents. Sections 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963 require consideration of acknowledgments and payments that may affect computation of limitation. Signed balance confirmations and tax deducted at source and deposited to the creditor's account, including deductions up to 31.03.2015, raised a triable issue as to acknowledgment and payment on account of the debt. The binding jurisdictional precedent recognised that deposit of tax deducted at source against the relevant transaction may constitute payment for purposes of Section 19. The ultimate evidentiary and legal effect of the documents requires determination on evidence and cannot be conclusively resolved at the threshold.

Conclusion: The suit was not liable to rejection at the threshold on limitation, and no jurisdictional error or patent illegality was established in the refusal to reject the plaint.

Issues: Whether a complaint for cheque dishonour is non-maintainable because the sole proprietary concern from whose account the cheque was issued was not separately arraigned as an accused, although its proprietor was prosecuted.

Analysis: Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 creates vicarious criminal liability where the drawer is a company, firm or association of individuals having an identity distinct from the persons responsible for its business. A sole proprietary concern is not a separate juristic person or an association of individuals; its trade name does not create an existence independent of its proprietor. Accordingly, prosecution of the proprietor is not a case of fastening vicarious liability for an offence by a distinct principal offender. The complaint disclosed the foundational allegations for an offence under Section 138, and no exceptional ground for quashing under the inherent jurisdiction was established.

Conclusion: Separate arraignment of a sole proprietary concern is not necessary where its proprietor is before the Court; the complaint and proceedings are maintainable against the proprietor. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether rejection of the petitioner's tender quotation and award of the catering contract warranted judicial interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Judicial review in government-contract matters is confined to the legality, fairness and rationality of the decision-making process; it does not permit re-evaluation of bids or substitution of the tendering authority's decision. Interference is justified only where the process is arbitrary, irrational, mala fide, discriminatory, contrary to tender conditions, or detrimental to public interest. The petitioner participated without seeking prior clarification on GST and could not, after rejection, alter the bid through a subsequent offer at a different rate. No unequal treatment, favouritism, mala fides, or procedural infirmity was established. The alleged outstanding dues under the earlier contract were independent of the validity of the fresh tender.

Conclusion: The rejection of the quotation and the concluded tender process did not warrant judicial interference; the issue was decided against the petitioner.