1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether proceedings under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed at the threshold under Section 528 BNSS on the ground that the accused director had resigned before dishonour of the cheques and issuance of statutory notice.

(ii) Whether Form DIR-12/MCA master data reflecting cessation of directorship constituted "unimpeachable, incontrovertible material" sufficient to dislodge the complaints' foundation, where the complainant disputed the genuineness/effect of resignation and alleged continued control, and the accused was the signatory of the cheques.

(iii) Whether, on the pleadings and admitted signing of the cheques, the complaints and summoning orders disclosed the basic ingredients of an offence under Section 138 read with Section 141 NI Act against the accused, such that disputed factual questions had to be left for trial in view of statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Quashing at threshold on the basis of resignation prior to dishonour/notice

Legal framework: The Court stated that at the quashing stage it may interdict proceedings only where, even accepting the complaint averments in full, the basic ingredients are not disclosed, or where "unimpeachable, incontrovertible" material completely dislodges the accusation. It reiterated that Section 138 comprises a sequence of acts (drawing, presentation, dishonour, notice, and non-payment), and that Section 141 fastens liability on persons who, at the time the offence was committed, were in charge of and responsible for the company's business, and also separately on those whose consent/connivance/neglect is alleged.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that responsibility for Section 141 purposes is not to be "frozen" only to the date of dishonour, because Section 138 is a composite offence involving multiple legally relevant stages. The Court found that deciding whether resignation insulated the accused would require adjudicating contested facts about the timing, bona fides, and effect of resignation, and about continued involvement in the companies' affairs-matters not suitable for determination in Section 528 BNSS proceedings.

Conclusion: The Court refused to quash on the resignation plea, holding that the case did not fall within the narrow category where threshold quashing is warranted on clear, undisputed disengagement.

Issue (ii): Whether DIR-12/MCA records were unimpeachable exculpatory material in the present facts

Legal framework: The Court applied the "unimpeachable and incontrovertible material" standard for quashing, emphasizing that competing versions are not to be weighed and evidence is not to be evaluated as at trial.

Interpretation and reasoning: While acknowledging that DIR-12/MCA extracts may be genuine corporate records, the Court noted that the complainant disputed their timing and legal effect and alleged the accused continued to control/influence the borrower entities "from behind the curtain." The Court also relied on the chronology: defaults arose before/around the recorded resignations, with one resignation being very close to the first default date, supporting the complainant's contention that the resignations could be a device after the accounts slipped into default. Because these aspects directly affected whether the accused was "in charge of and responsible" during the relevant period (issuance/presentation/dishonour/non-payment), the Court held the material could not be treated as unimpeachable exculpatory evidence at the threshold.

Conclusion: DIR-12/MCA filings, in the face of a live dispute on bona fides/effect and alleged continued control, did not satisfy the exacting standard required to quash the prosecution at inception.

Issue (iii): Sufficiency of complaint averments and effect of cheque-signatory status and statutory presumptions

Legal framework: The Court noted that for Section 141(1) the complaint must contain basic averments that the accused was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business at the relevant time; and that a cheque signatory occupies a distinct position. The Court further held that once execution of cheques is shown, presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act operate in favour of the complainant, and rebuttal on a preponderance of probability is a matter for trial.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found the complaints specifically attributed to the accused (a) being in charge/responsible for the companies' business, (b) negotiating loan facilities, (c) executing documents, and (d) signing the cheques. It emphasized there was no dispute that the accused signed the cheques and did not allege forgery or signing by another. Given these pleadings and the cheque-signatory role, the complaints disclosed the basic ingredients of offences under Section 138 read with Section 141. The Court held that the accused's defence (resignation and lack of responsibility; circumstances of issuance; alleged inconsistency regarding issuance) was fact-intensive and could only be tested through evidence, especially in light of the statutory presumptions.

Conclusion: The Court upheld the summoning/orders and declined quashing, holding that the complaints disclosed the requisite ingredients against the accused as cheque signatory and as a person alleged to be responsible at relevant stages; rebuttal and factual determination were left to trial.

Issues: Whether a single mortgage deed executed to secure four separate loan agreements constituted an instrument relating to several distinct transactions under Section 5 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, or several instruments used in a single transaction under Section 4 of the Act.

Analysis: The loan agreements were separate, executed on different dates, for different amounts, and in some cases involved different borrower configurations. Each agreement required creation of mortgage security before or at the time of execution, indicating that the security obligation attached to each loan instrument independently. The mortgage deed did not evidence one composite loan transaction merely by aggregating the amounts. Applying the principle laid down for construing instruments covering multiple loan transactions, the mortgage deed was held to embrace distinct matters or transactions. The contention that the loan agreements were only ancillary to one principal mortgage transaction was rejected, and remand was found unnecessary because the revisional authority had already considered the relevant clauses and applied the correct legal test.

Conclusion: Section 5 applied, not Section 4. The mortgage deed was chargeable with duty in respect of each distinct loan transaction, and the impugned revisional order was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: Where separate loan agreements, each carrying an independent obligation to create mortgage security, are later covered by a single mortgage deed, the instrument relates to several distinct transactions and attracts aggregate duty under Section 5 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958.

Issues: Whether the respondent was guilty of other misconduct under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 for his role in arranging ante-dated stock invests and facilitating irregular allotment in the public issue.

Analysis: The materials before the Court showed that the respondent, a Chartered Accountant and Chairman-cum-Whole Time Director of the company, was associated with the finance arrangement for obtaining ante-dated stock invests after the public issue had closed. The disciplinary record and the earlier SEBI findings indicated that the respondent was aware of the closure of the issue, yet applications supported by ante-dated instruments were accepted, withdrawal communications were ignored, and share certificates were still issued. The respondent also failed to file any effective response before the disciplinary process or before the Court. The Court accepted the disciplinary committee's reasoning that the conduct was unbecoming of a Chartered Accountant and that it fell within other misconduct under the Act.

Conclusion: The respondent was held guilty of other misconduct under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, and the reference was answered against him, warranting suspension from membership for one year.

Ratio Decidendi: A Chartered Accountant who, in an executive capacity, participates in or facilitates a manipulated securities allotment process involving ante-dated instruments and ignores the withdrawal and closure of the issue commits other misconduct under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 and is liable to disciplinary sanction.

Issues: (i) Whether Order XXIII Rule 1A is in derogation of Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; (ii) Whether Order XXIII Rule 1A is the exclusive source for transposition of a defendant as a plaintiff; (iii) Whether opposition to an application for transposition is confined only to the plaintiff.

Issue (i): Whether Order XXIII Rule 1A is in derogation of Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: Order I Rule 10(2) confers a broad power on the Court to add, strike out, or transpose parties at any stage where it is necessary for effectual and complete adjudication of the suit. Order XXIII Rule 1A is a special provision dealing with the contingency of withdrawal or abandonment by the plaintiff, but it operates in harmony with, and not in derogation of, the wider enabling power under Order I Rule 10(2). The two provisions are intended to prevent fragmented litigation and to protect substantive rights from being defeated by procedural manoeuvres.

Conclusion: Order XXIII Rule 1A is not in derogation of Order I Rule 10(2).

Issue (ii): Whether Order XXIII Rule 1A is the exclusive source for transposition of a defendant as a plaintiff.

Analysis: The statutory scheme shows that Order XXIII Rule 1A does not create an exclusive or exhaustive source of power. It merely identifies a particular situation in which the Court may consider transposition with special regard to the existence of a substantial question to be decided. The general power of transposition continues to flow from Order I Rule 10(2), which remains available wherever the interests of complete adjudication require such a course, including cases where the plaintiff displays procedural laxity though no formal withdrawal has been sought.

Conclusion: Order XXIII Rule 1A is not the single repository of power for transposition of parties.

Issue (iii): Whether opposition to an application for transposition is confined only to the plaintiff.

Analysis: The right to oppose a transposition application is not limited to the plaintiff. Since the test under Order XXIII Rule 1A turns on whether the applicant has a substantial question to be decided against the other defendants, those defendants are directly interested in the result and may be heard. The discretionary power under Order I Rule 10(2) is also exercised in the interests of justice and fair play, which requires consideration of objections from all affected parties.

Conclusion: Opposition to transposition is not confined to the plaintiff; any affected defendant may oppose it.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the refusal to transpose the appellant was set aside, and the appellant was directed to be transposed as a plaintiff so that the partition dispute may proceed to adjudication on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: The power to transpose parties flows from the Court's broad authority under Order I Rule 10(2) to secure complete and effective adjudication, while Order XXIII Rule 1A is only a special procedural safeguard for withdrawal or abandonment cases and does not exhaust that power.

Issues: (i) whether the revisional court could interfere with concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act; (ii) whether the presumption of liability arising from admitted signature and execution of the cheque was rebutted and the statutory ingredients of the offence were satisfied; (iii) whether service of notice and the timing of the complaint made the prosecution premature; (iv) whether the sentence of imprisonment and compensation called for interference.

Issue (i): whether the revisional court could interfere with concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Analysis: Revisional interference was confined to patent illegality, jurisdictional error, or perversity. Concurrent findings based on appreciation of evidence were not to be reappreciated in revision unless the findings were shown to be grossly erroneous or unsupported by material on record.

Conclusion: The revisional court declined interference with the concurrent conviction findings.

Issue (ii): whether the presumption of liability arising from admitted signature and execution of the cheque was rebutted and the statutory ingredients of the offence were satisfied.

Analysis: Once the accused admitted his signature on the cheque, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 arose that the cheque was issued for consideration and in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The accused's plea that the cheque was lost was unsupported by any prompt report to the bank or other convincing evidence. The cheque was proved to have been dishonoured for insufficiency of funds, and the complainant's evidence established the remaining ingredients of Section 138.

Conclusion: The presumption was not rebutted and the ingredients of Section 138 stood proved.

Issue (iii): whether service of notice and the timing of the complaint made the prosecution premature.

Analysis: The record showed delivery of the notice to the accused. The accused did not pay the cheque amount after receipt of summons either. The complaint was filed after the expiry of the statutory period available to make payment and within the permissible filing period, so it could not be treated as premature.

Conclusion: The objection regarding non-service of notice and prematurity of the complaint was rejected.

Issue (iv): whether the sentence of imprisonment and compensation called for interference.

Analysis: The offence under Section 138 is deterrent as well as compensatory. In the facts found proved, the sentence of simple imprisonment for one year was not excessive, and compensation equal to twice the cheque amount was not found disproportionate, especially having regard to the lapse of time and the complainant's loss.

Conclusion: No interference was warranted with the sentence or compensation.

Final Conclusion: The conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were sustained, and the revision was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: In revision, concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 will not be disturbed absent perversity or jurisdictional error, and admitted execution of the cheque raises a rebuttable presumption of legally enforceable liability which the accused must displace by credible evidence.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether, in an appeal against acquittal, interference was warranted on the ground that the Trial Court's appreciation of evidence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was perverse or ignored material evidence.

(ii) Whether the statutory presumptions attached to an admitted signature on the cheque stood rebutted on the basis of the complainant's own evidence, particularly regarding the alleged loan transaction and the complainant's financial capacity to advance the amount.

(iii) Whether, on the complainant's pleadings and testimony as to the loan having been advanced in 2014 and the cheque having been issued in November 2017 without particulars of advancement, the cheque related to a time-barred debt and therefore was not issued towards a "legally enforceable debt" under Section 138.

(iv) Whether the Trial Court's adverse inference founded on non-compliance with Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act could be sustained, and if not, whether its correction affected the final result.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Appellate interference with acquittal

Legal framework: The Court applied the settled parameters governing appeals against acquittal, namely that interference is justified only where the acquittal suffers from patent perversity, misreading/omission of material evidence, or results in a conclusion that no reasonable person could reach; and where two reasonable views are possible, the acquittal should not be disturbed.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated the appeal as one requiring strict scrutiny under the above parameters. It examined whether the Trial Court's doubts about the complainant's version and the resultant acquittal were unreasonable or perverse. After assessing the complainant's cross-examination and the absence of supporting proof for the alleged loan, the Court found that the Trial Court's view was a "reasonable view" based on the record.

Conclusion: No ground for appellate interference was made out because the acquittal was not shown to be perverse or based on ignoring material evidence.

Issue (ii): Rebuttal of presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act by questioning financial capacity and probability of the transaction

Legal framework: The Court accepted that admission of the signature on the cheque raises a presumption that it was issued for consideration and in discharge of liability, but reiterated that the presumption is rebuttable and can be displaced once contrary evidence emerges, including from the complainant's own testimony elicited in cross-examination.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found the complainant's evidence "highly unsatisfactory" on material aspects: the alleged cash advancement of a sum equivalent to about five years' salary; lack of explanation why payment was not transferred through banking channels despite claimed withdrawals; absence of any documentary record of the loan; inability to state dates of advancement; and non-examination of a claimed lender from whom funds were allegedly borrowed. The Court also noted internal inconsistency regarding the alleged need for the loan (purchase of land/house) vis-à-vis the complainant's admission that the accused already owned land and a house. On these circumstances, the Court held that the complainant's version about advancing the loan became doubtful, thereby displacing the statutory presumption and justifying insistence on proof of the loan/financial capacity.

Conclusion: The presumption stood rebutted on the basis of the complainant's own evidence and surrounding improbabilities; consequently, the Trial Court's doubt about the existence of liability and the complainant's financial capacity was upheld as a reasonable conclusion.

Issue (iii): Cheque allegedly issued beyond limitation-absence of legally enforceable debt

Legal framework: The Court applied the principle that a cheque issued towards repayment of a time-barred debt does not attract Section 138 as it is not issued for a "legally enforceable debt," and assessed maintainability on the complaint averments and sworn statement.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that, on the complainant's own case, the loan was advanced in 2014 in instalments, while the cheque was issued in November 2017. The complainant did not provide dates/details of advancement sufficient to demonstrate that the debt was within limitation when the cheque was issued. On this deficiency, the Court concluded that the cheque was issued beyond limitation and could not be treated as issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt; therefore, the complaint was not maintainable on the complainant's own pleadings and testimony.

Conclusion: The Court held that the cheque, on the complainant's showing, related to a time-barred debt and therefore did not satisfy the requirement of a legally enforceable debt for Section 138.

Issue (iv): Effect of alleged violation of Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act on enforceability

Legal framework: The Court considered whether a cash loan allegedly advanced in contravention of Section 269SS becomes invalid/unenforceable for purposes of Section 138, and held that such contravention attracts penalty but does not invalidate the underlying transaction or render the debt unenforceable.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court expressly disagreed with the Trial Court's reasoning that the alleged cash loan could not have been advanced due to Section 269SS and that such violation made the complainant's case suspect. The Court held that no adverse inference could be drawn solely on this ground because violation of Section 269SS results in penalty and does not, by itself, negate enforceability under Section 138 or rebut statutory presumptions.

Conclusion: While correcting the Trial Court on Section 269SS, the Court held that the acquittal still required no interference because independent and sufficient grounds-doubt about the loan/financial capacity and the finding of time-barred debt-supported dismissal of the appeal.

Issues: (i) Whether the cheque dishonour conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be sustained in view of the admitted signature on the cheque, the alleged cash loan, and the objections based on the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Money-Lending Act, 1976 and the Income-tax Act, 1961. (ii) Whether the compensation amount imposed by the trial court required modification.

Issue (i): Whether the cheque dishonour conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be sustained in view of the admitted signature on the cheque, the alleged cash loan, and the objections based on the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Money-Lending Act, 1976 and the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Once the drawer admitted the signature on the cheque, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 stood attracted. The cheque was therefore presumed to have been issued for discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability, and the burden shifted to the accused to rebut that presumption by cogent evidence. A mere plea that the transaction was in cash, or that the complainant was not a licensed money-lender, did not by itself dislodge the presumptions. A breach, if any, of Sections 269SS and 269T of the Income-tax Act, 1961 only attracts the penal consequence under Section 271D of that Act and does not render the underlying transaction void or unenforceable for the purpose of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The defence evidence was found insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption.

Conclusion: The conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the compensation amount imposed by the trial court required modification.

Analysis: The sentence imposed below was found to contain a technical error to the extent it treated the compensation direction separately from the fine structure permissible in law. The order was therefore corrected so that the monetary component would operate as the payable amount in the nature of compensation, with consequences attached to non-payment as directed by the Court.

Conclusion: The monetary part of the sentence was modified and aligned with the form of relief directed by the Court.

Final Conclusion: The conviction was maintained, but the sentence was modified in respect of the monetary component, and the revision succeeded only to that limited extent.

Ratio Decidendi: Admission of signature on a cheque attracts the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and a cash-loan or tax-law violation does not by itself render the debt unenforceable or rebut those presumptions in proceedings under Section 138.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to suspension of sentence in a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 without complying with the statutory deposit requirement under Section 148 of that Act.

Analysis: Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 makes deposit of a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation ordinarily mandatory in an appeal against conviction under Section 138. Waiver of deposit is permissible only in exceptional circumstances, and reasons must be recorded for granting such exemption. The petitioner did not deposit any amount despite repeated opportunities before the appellate court and before this Court, and his asserted financial incapacity was found inconsistent with his earlier conduct indicating willingness to pay substantial amounts and to settle the matter. No exceptional circumstance or patent illegality in the concurrent findings of conviction was shown to justify dispensing with the statutory condition.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to suspension of sentence without complying with the deposit requirement, and the applications were rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal or revisional challenge to a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, suspension of sentence is ordinarily conditioned on deposit under Section 148, and exemption can be granted only on a reasoned finding of exceptional circumstances.

Issues: Whether the detention order under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 was liable to be set aside for want of a real possibility of release on bail, alleged non-supply of relied upon materials, and violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The detention order was passed with recorded awareness that the detenue was in judicial custody and that his bail application had been rejected. The detaining authority also recorded its assessment that there existed a likelihood of release and a further likelihood of prejudicial activities if released. The materials relied upon were stated to have been furnished to the detenue, including the detention order, grounds, and supporting documents, and the detenue acknowledged receipt but did not submit any representation. The Court found that the safeguards under Article 22(5) were complied with and that the subjective satisfaction was formed after consideration of relevant materials. The challenge based on alleged non-connection with the specific seizure incident was rejected in view of the finding that the detenue was involved in continuing smuggling ies.

Conclusion: The detention order was held valid and was not liable to be interfered with.

Issues: (i) Whether the reliefs founded on the right to be forgotten were liable to be rejected at the threshold on the ground of limitation; (ii) Whether the trial court's exercise of discretion in balancing the competing rights under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 called for interference in appeal.

Issue (i): Whether the reliefs founded on the right to be forgotten were liable to be rejected at the threshold on the ground of limitation.

Analysis: The plaint contained distinct prayers founded not only on defamation but also on privacy, dignity and the right to be forgotten. The challenge based on Article 75 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was not accepted because the plaintiff had approached the civil court shortly after the criminal proceedings culminated in his favour. The question whether the plaintiff was ultimately entitled to the reliefs was held to be a matter for trial and not a threshold bar.

Conclusion: The plea of limitation failed, and the right to be forgotten claims were not rejected in limine.

Issue (ii): Whether the trial court's exercise of discretion in balancing the competing rights under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 called for interference in appeal.

Analysis: The balance between free speech and dignity was assessed through constitutional proportionality. The continued online availability of reports concerning the plaintiff after his exoneration was treated as capable of causing continuing reputational harm, while the media's inconvenience from the interim restraint was considered limited and reversible. The addition of brief updates was held insufficient to neutralise the impact of the original publications.

Conclusion: No interference with the interim injunction was warranted, and the trial court's discretion was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed and the interim protection in favour of the plaintiff remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where digital publication continues to associate a person with criminal allegations after exoneration, the right to dignity and privacy may outweigh press freedom for purposes of interim relief, and limitation based on the original publication date does not necessarily defeat distinct claims grounded in the right to be forgotten.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail on the ground that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to him in writing as required by Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The bail was sought only on the plea that the arrest was vitiated for non-communication of the grounds of arrest in writing. The Court examined the constitutional safeguard under Article 22(1), the statutory obligation under Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the later Supreme Court decisions explaining that the grounds of arrest are the basic facts constituting the offence and must be effectively communicated. On the facts, the arrest memo supplied to the applicant recorded the factual basis of arrest, namely demand and acceptance of bribe, and the Court treated that memo as conveying the grounds of arrest in writing. The Court held that separate recording on a distinct sheet was not legally required where the document supplied at arrest itself contained the grounds.

Conclusion: There was sufficient compliance with Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and no violation of the applicant's fundamental rights was established; the bail plea was therefore rejected.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1. Whether a single complaint under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, jointly filed by two distinct payees/complainants in respect of dishonour of two different cheques issued in favour of each of them, is maintainable; and if not, whether the entire proceeding must be quashed or can be allowed to continue in respect of one cheque/payee.

2. Whether the existence of an arbitration clause in the underlying commercial arrangement requires quashing of the Section 138 proceeding relating to dishonour of cheques.

3. Whether the complaint was liable to be quashed as "premature" for alleged non-compliance with the 15-day period after service of statutory demand notice, in view of multiple notices and different dates of receipt.

ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

1. Maintainability of a joint complaint by two payees for two cheques and the proper relief

Legal framework: The Court examined the scheme of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as applied in the judgment, emphasising that the offence is cheque-specific and relates to dishonour of a cheque drawn for discharge of debt or liability, followed by statutory notice and failure to pay within the stipulated period. The Court also proceeded on the basis that there is no provision authorising a "joint complaint" by multiple complainants for distinct cheques issued in favour of different entities and that Section 138 does not contemplate joint liability of complainants/payees for the purpose of maintaining one consolidated complaint.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found, on admitted facts, that two separate cheques were issued on different dates in favour of two different companies and that separate statutory notices were also issued/served on different dates. On those facts, the Court held the maintainability objection to be well-founded: the usual and legally appropriate course would be to lodge two separate complaints for the two separate dishonours. However, the Court declined to quash the entire proceeding merely because of this "procedural irregularity", holding that the foundation of the complaint was affected only to the extent it improperly combined distinct causes pertaining to two different payees/cheques. The Court adopted the course of permitting continuation as to one cheque/payee while quashing as to the other, with liberty to pursue appropriate remedy separately.

Conclusions: The joint complaint was held not maintainable in its combined form. The proceeding was permitted to continue only in respect of the cheque issued in favour of one complainant, while the portion relating to the cheque issued in favour of the other complainant was quashed with liberty to institute appropriate proceedings separately for that cheque.

2. Effect of arbitration clause on continuation of Section 138 prosecution

Legal framework: The Court considered the contention that disputes under the agreement should be referred to arbitration, and applied the principle (as relied upon in the judgment) that criminal proceedings and civil proceedings can continue simultaneously when arising from separate causes of action.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated dishonour of cheques as attracting the special statutory offence under the Negotiable Instruments Act, distinct from contractual disputes referable to arbitration. The Court also noted that the accused had not attempted to invoke the arbitration clause even upon exchange of legal notices, and held that the arbitration clause did not negate or bar prosecution for cheque dishonour.

Conclusions: The proceeding under Section 138 was not quashed on the ground of an arbitration clause; arbitration was held not to bar continuation of the cheque dishonour prosecution.

3. Alleged premature filing vis-à-vis the 15-day period after service of notice

Legal framework: The Court examined the statutory requirement that the drawer must be given 15 days from receipt of demand notice to make payment, failing which the cause of action to file complaint arises.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found that the demand notice was first received on 13 October 2023 and the complaint was filed on 22 November 2023, i.e., well beyond 15 days from first service. Although another notice sent through registered post was received later (7 November 2023), the Court rejected the argument that limitation/maintainability should be tested only from that later date. The Court concluded that, since initial service was on 13 October 2023, the complaint could not be treated as premature.

Conclusions: The complaint was held not to be premature; the maintainability challenge on the 15-day requirement was rejected.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act stood proved on the evidence, including issuance of cheques towards a legally enforceable liability, dishonour, service of statutory demand notice, and non-payment within the prescribed period.

(ii) Whether the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act stood rebutted by the defence that the cheques were blank/advance cheques, that payment was stopped due to alleged non-supply of goods, and that no legally enforceable debt existed.

(iii) Whether, despite affirming conviction, the sentence required modification in view of the appellant's age, lapse of time, and the period of incarceration already undergone.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

(i) Proof of ingredients of Section 138 (dishonour, notice, limitation, non-payment, liability)

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court examined whether the statutory requirements of dishonour, issuance and service of demand notice within time, and failure to pay within the statutory period were satisfied, and whether the cheques were issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt/liability.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted the complainant's evidence that five cheques aggregating to Rs. 1,41,000/- were delivered towards discharge of outstanding liability arising from commercial dealings, supported by the bill and statement of account produced. On dishonour, the Court relied on bank evidence showing return of the cheques unpaid and also accepted that the appellant's account had insufficient funds at the relevant time. The Court further found statutory compliance: dishonour occurred on 26.08.1993; demand notice was dispatched on 30.08.1993; acknowledgment cards reflected receipt on 02.09.1993; no payment was made within fifteen days; and the complaint was instituted on 23.09.1993.

Conclusion: All essential ingredients of Section 138 were held proved, and no perversity or material irregularity was found in the Trial Court's appreciation of evidence. The conviction was therefore affirmed.

(ii) Rebuttal of presumption under Section 139 and evaluation of defence of "blank cheques/stop payment/non-supply of goods"

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court applied the principle that once issuance of the cheque and its dishonour are established, the statutory presumption under Section 139 arises that the cheque was issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability, and the burden shifts to the accused to rebut it with cogent and credible evidence.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the appellant's defence-cheques given as blank cheques in advance, payment stopped, and alleged failure to supply goods-remained a mere assertion and, without cogent supporting evidence, was insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption. The Court noted that the complainant's documentary evidence (bill and statement of account) supported subsisting dues. On the dishonour aspect, bank witnesses established return unpaid and also demonstrated insufficiency of funds; this was further corroborated by the appellant's admission under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he had stopped payment and withdrawn the amount from the bank.

Conclusion: The presumption under Section 139 was not rebutted; the Court maintained that the cheques were issued towards a legally enforceable liability and upheld the finding of guilt under Section 138.

(iii) Modification of sentence while maintaining conviction

Legal framework (as discussed by the Court): The Court noted that Section 138 permits award of substantive sentence or fine or both, and considered whether the ends of justice warranted modification of imprisonment on the facts.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated the appellant's age (noted to be 61 years in 2002 and over 83 years at the time of decision), the extraordinary lapse of more than two decades during pendency of the appeal, and the period of incarceration already undergone (about five months) as mitigating circumstances. Considering these factors cumulatively, the Court held that ends of justice would be met by reducing imprisonment to the period already undergone, while leaving the conviction undisturbed.

Conclusion: The conviction under Section 138 was affirmed, but the sentence of imprisonment was modified to the period already undergone. The appeal was partly allowed to that limited extent.

Issues: (i) Whether complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 survived after the corporate debtor had entered insolvency and liquidation proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. (ii) Whether dishonour of cheques with the remark "ACCOUNT BLOCKED" attracted liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (i): Whether complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 survived after the corporate debtor had entered insolvency and liquidation proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Once the corporate debtor was admitted into CIRP, moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 came into force and management and control of the company's affairs vested in the IRP and thereafter the liquidator. The accused directors ceased to have authority over the company's bank account and could not validly issue cheques from the account after the insolvency process had taken over. In such a situation, the foundational requirement of a cheque drawn by a person maintaining the account was not satisfied, and the directors could not be fastened with liability on the basis of cheques allegedly issued after they had lost control.

Conclusion: The complaints were not maintainable against the petitioners in view of the insolvency and liquidation proceedings.

Issue (ii): Whether dishonour of cheques with the remark "ACCOUNT BLOCKED" attracted liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: Section 138 is attracted when a cheque is dishonoured for insufficiency of funds or where the account continues to be maintained by the drawer but payment fails for a reason legally covered by the provision. Where the account is blocked because of insolvency proceedings and the drawer has already been divested of authority and control over the account, the dishonour is not attributable to insufficiency of funds in a live and operative account maintained by the drawer. The statutory ingredients of the offence therefore remain unfulfilled.

Conclusion: Dishonour for "ACCOUNT BLOCKED" in the facts of the case did not constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Final Conclusion: The summoning orders and the connected criminal complaints were unsustainable and had to be quashed in consequence of the insolvency proceedings and the nature of the cheque dishonour.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a corporate debtor has entered CIRP and its bank accounts come under the control of the IRP or liquidator, a cheque presented thereafter cannot found prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 if dishonour results from the account being blocked pursuant to insolvency proceedings rather than from insufficiency of funds in an account maintained by the drawer.

Issues: (i) Whether the statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act stood rebutted by the accused; (ii) whether the complainant was required to prove financial capacity in the absence of a foundational challenge in reply to the notice; (iii) whether service of the statutory notice under the Negotiable Instruments Act was duly complied with.

Issue (i): Whether the statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act stood rebutted by the accused.

Analysis: Once execution of the cheque and its dishonour for insufficiency of funds stood established, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act operated in favour of the holder. The accused was required to rebut the presumptions by raising a probable defence on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. Mere denial, without cogent material, was insufficient to displace the presumption of a legally enforceable debt.

Conclusion: The presumptions were not rebutted and the finding of liability was upheld against the accused.

Issue (ii): Whether the complainant was required to prove financial capacity in the absence of a foundational challenge in reply to the notice.

Analysis: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the complainant is not required in the first instance to prove financial capacity unless the accused raises a specific foundational plea at the earliest opportunity, including in reply to the statutory notice. Where no such plea is taken and no supporting material is produced, the burden does not shift back to the complainant to adduce independent proof of means.

Conclusion: The objection to financial capacity failed and the complainant was not required to prove capacity in the facts of the case.

Issue (iii): Whether service of the statutory notice under the Negotiable Instruments Act was duly complied with.

Analysis: Where notice is sent to the correct address by registered post, statutory presumptions of service arise. The drawer cannot deny service after receipt of summons with a copy of the complaint if no payment is made within the statutory period. The notice and acknowledgment placed with the complaint were treated as sufficient compliance with clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138.

Conclusion: Service of the statutory notice was duly established against the accused.

Final Conclusion: The revision failed because the conviction for cheque dishonour was supported by statutory presumptions, no probable defence was made out, and the procedural requirements of notice were satisfied; the conviction and sentence remained intact.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution for cheque dishonour, once the foundational facts are proved, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 operate in favour of the complainant, and the accused must rebut them by a probable defence on preponderance of probabilities; absent a timely foundational challenge, the complainant need not first prove financial capacity, and proper dispatch of notice to the correct address satisfies the statutory requirement of service.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1.1. Whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case that the three impugned Memorandum of Agreements are fabricated and not duly executed loan/investment agreements.

1.2. Whether the contemporaneous email correspondence and draft Memorandum of Understanding support the plaintiff's plea that the actual agreed terms differed materially from those recorded in the impugned Memorandum of Agreements.

1.3. Whether the mention of specific cheque numbers in the impugned Memorandum of Agreements, in light of the bank certificates regarding issuance dates of the relevant cheque books, indicates fabrication of those agreements.

1.4. Whether, applying the tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, the defendants should be restrained from acting upon or enforcing the impugned Memorandum of Agreements, including for proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1 - Prima facie case of fabrication of the impugned Memorandum of Agreements

Interpretation and reasoning

2.1. The Court examined the plaintiff's case that he was doing coal supply business through a partnership firm, that defendant no.2 agreed to invest in his business through defendant no.1, and that documents signed by him under coercion/misrepresentation were later misused to manufacture the impugned Memorandum of Agreements showing financial assistance of Rs. 15,00,000/-, Rs. 1,15,00,000/- and Rs. 40,00,000/-.

2.2. The Court contrasted this with the defendants' stand that the three Memorandum of Agreements were duly executed and notarized in 2019 pursuant to the plaintiff's request for financial assistance, that the plaintiff defaulted in repayment, and that subsequent dishonour of cheques led to Section 138 proceedings, to which the present suit was allegedly a counterblast.

2.3. On the material placed, the Court focused on two key aspects indicating inconsistency with the defendants' version: (i) the terms relating to interest and returns as reflected in the contemporaneous draft Memorandum of Understanding and emails, and (ii) the reference to specific cheque numbers in the impugned agreements which, according to bank certificates, could not have existed at the stated dates of execution.

2.4. These circumstances, taken cumulatively, led the Court, at the interim stage, to doubt the authenticity of the impugned Memorandum of Agreements and to treat them as prima facie fabricated or manufactured documents, allegedly deployed when the defendants decided to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Conclusions

2.5. The Court held that, on a prima facie view, the plaintiff has made out a credible case that the three impugned Memorandum of Agreements appear to be fabricated and not reflective of the actual transaction or agreed terms.

Issue 2 - Effect of contemporaneous draft MOU and email correspondence on the agreed financial terms

Interpretation and reasoning

2.6. The Court scrutinized the email trail involving the plaintiff, defendant no.2 and the Chartered Accountant, Mr. Chandan Ghosh, including:

(a) Email dated 12 August 2019 from Mr. Ghosh indicating his engagement to draft the agreement on a concessional fee, showing his connection with defendant no.2.

(b) Emails where the plaintiff clearly asserted that the assured return to defendant no.1 would be a minimum of 18% per annum.

(c) Email dated 15 August 2019, by which Mr. Ghosh circulated a draft MOU dated 14 August 2019, recording that defendant no.1 would be entitled to 50% profit from the plaintiff's business, subject to a minimum of 18% per annum on Rs. 1,00,00,000/-.

(d) Email dated 16 August 2019 from a witness, also providing for interest at 18% per annum.

2.7. Clause 3(i) of the draft MOU dated 14 August 2019, as reproduced by the Court, explicitly provided for a minimum return of 18% per annum on Rs. 1,00,00,000/- or 50% of profits, whichever is higher, i.e., simple interest at 18% per annum on capital contributed.

2.8. The Court contrasted this with the clauses in the three impugned Memorandum of Agreements, which stipulate interest at 2.5% per month on a compoundable basis, along with additional specified profits, thereby drastically increasing the financial burden on the plaintiff.

2.9. The Court reasoned that, since the parties were negotiating and circulating drafts containing a term of simple interest at 18% per annum as late as mid-August 2019, it "completely defies logic" that within a day the terms would be unilaterally and drastically altered to compound interest at 2.5% per month and substantial additional profits, which materially prejudiced the plaintiff.

2.10. The Court further relied on an email dated 9 October 2019 from the plaintiff to defendant no.1 enclosing another draft MOU, again providing a guaranteed share of not less than 18% on the outstanding financial assistance, which email was duly acknowledged by defendant no.2. This indicated that the MOU was still under discussion and not executed at least till 9 October 2019, whereas the defendants' case was that the impugned Memorandum of Agreements had already been executed on 20 March 2019 and 17 August 2019.

Conclusions

2.11. The Court concluded that the contemporaneous draft MOU and email correspondence support the plaintiff's plea that the agreed terms contemplated simple interest at 18% per annum and profit sharing, not compound interest at 2.5% per month with additional profit payments, thereby reinforcing the prima facie inference that the impugned Memorandum of Agreements do not reflect the original understanding and appear suspect.

Issue 3 - Cheque numbers and bank certificates as indicators of fabrication

Interpretation and reasoning

2.12. The Court examined Clause 9 of the two impugned Memorandum of Agreements dated 17 August 2019 (with defendant no.1 and defendant no.3, respectively), which both recite that the plaintiff has "handed over" specified banker's cheques drawn on HDFC Bank Ltd., Ranchi Branch, and J&K Bank, Ranchi Branch, to secure the financial transaction and enable recovery in case of default.

2.13. The impugned clauses specifically refer to cheque numbers in the HDFC series (e.g., 000086, 000112, 000113, 000126, 000127, 000133) and J&K Bank series (e.g., 133442, 133443, 186444, 186445).

2.14. The plaintiff produced a certificate from HDFC Bank showing that cheques bearing serial numbers 000126 to 000150, including some of those mentioned in the impugned agreements, were issued only on 15 October 2020.

2.15. The plaintiff also produced a certificate dated 28 August 2023 from J&K Bank stating that cheques bearing serial numbers 186401 to 186450, which include the J&K Bank cheque numbers cited in the impugned agreements, were issued only on 4 December 2020.

2.16. The defendants argued that the cheques mentioned in the impugned documents were only recorded for security and were not actually handed over at the time of execution, and further relied on the plaintiff's admission that the cheque numbers relate to his own HDFC and J&K Bank accounts, suggesting that such details could only have come from him.

2.17. The Court held that this explanation is "plainly contrary" to the express language of Clause 9 in both agreements, which clearly states that the cheques have been "handed over" to the lenders at the time of execution, not merely noted as future securities.

2.18. At the interim stage, the Court found no reason to doubt the genuineness of the bank certificates. On the face of these certificates, the relevant cheque books were issued in October and December 2020, rendering it impossible for the plaintiff to have handed over those cheques on or before 17 August 2019 as recorded in the impugned agreements.

Conclusions

2.19. The Court held that the chronological impossibility arising from the bank certificates, when read against the clear recitals in Clause 9 of the impugned agreements, strongly supports the plaintiff's contention that the agreements were created or modified later and are prima facie fabricated.

Issue 4 - Entitlement to interim injunction restraining enforcement of the impugned Memorandum of Agreements

Legal framework (as applied by the Court)

2.20. The Court applied the settled threefold test for grant of interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: (i) existence of a prima facie case; (ii) balance of convenience; and (iii) likelihood of irreparable loss, harm or injury to the applicant if relief is denied.

Interpretation and reasoning

2.21. On prima facie case, the Court relied on (a) the inconsistency between the negotiated terms in the draft MOU/emails and the onerous terms in the impugned agreements, and (b) the bank certificates disproving the existence of the cheques at the time when the impugned agreements purport to record their handing over. These factors cumulatively indicated that the impugned agreements were, at least prima facie, fabricated or manufactured.

2.22. On balance of convenience, the Court noted that allowing the defendants to act upon the impugned agreements, including by relying on them in criminal complaints and other proceedings, would seriously prejudice the plaintiff, especially when the very validity and authenticity of those agreements is under substantial, prima facie supported challenge.

2.23. On irreparable loss, harm and injury, the Court held that if the defendants continued to file and prosecute cases against the plaintiff on the basis of the impugned Memorandum of Agreements pending adjudication of their validity, the plaintiff would suffer irreparable consequences that could not be adequately compensated by damages.

Conclusions

2.24. The Court concluded that the plaintiff has established a strong prima facie case, that the balance of convenience lies in his favour, and that he would suffer irreparable harm if interim protection is not granted.

2.25. Accordingly, the Court restrained the defendants, till final adjudication of the suit, from acting upon or enforcing the three impugned Memorandum of Agreements, namely:

(a) Memorandum of Agreement dated 20 March 2019 (Rs. 15,00,000/-);

(b) Memorandum of Agreement dated 17 August 2019 with defendant no.1 (Rs. 1,15,00,000/-);

(c) Memorandum of Agreement dated 17 August 2019 with defendant no.3 (Rs. 40,00,000/-).

2.26. The Court clarified that all observations are confined to the adjudication of the interim application and shall not affect the final decision in the suit.

Issues: Whether the secured creditor's prior mortgage and security interest had priority over the State's later attachment and revenue charge, and whether the Sub-Registrar could refuse registration of the SARFAESI sale deed on that basis.

Analysis: The charge in favour of the bank arose in 2013 on deposit of title deeds, whereas the State's attachment and revenue entry were created only in 2018. In the absence of any statutory first charge in favour of the State for the dues in question, the later administrative rapat entry could not defeat the earlier secured interest. The judgment relied on the priority accorded to secured creditors under the SARFAESI framework, including the overriding effect of the Act and the principle that a secured creditor's right to realise its debt prevails over competing revenue claims. The later attachment therefore could not justify refusal to register the sale deed issued pursuant to the e-auction.

Conclusion: The secured creditor's prior charge prevailed over the State's subsequent dues and attachment, and the refusal to register the sale deed was not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: Relief was granted to protect the earlier secured interest, direct registration of the auction sale deed, and set aside the later revenue charge, while leaving the State free to pursue its dues after satisfaction of the secured debt in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A later governmental attachment or revenue entry cannot override an earlier created security interest of a secured creditor, and the secured creditor's prior right to enforce its security prevails in the absence of a statutory first charge in favour of the State.

Issues: (i) Whether the municipal corporation had authority to levy and enhance licence fees for sky-signs, hoardings and advertisements under the municipal law framework; (ii) whether the levy was a tax or a regulatory fee; (iii) whether the Goods and Services Tax regime and deletion of Entry 55 from List II had extinguished the power to levy such fees; and (iv) whether the enhancement to Rs. 222 per sq. ft. per annum with ex post facto approval and retrospective effect was valid.

Issue (i): Whether the municipal corporation had authority to levy and enhance licence fees for sky-signs, hoardings and advertisements under the municipal law framework.

Analysis: Sections 244 and 245 regulate erection and control of sky-signs and advertisements, while Section 386(2) authorises a fee for every such licence or written permission at a rate fixed by the Commissioner with the sanction of the Corporation. The statutory scheme and the 2003 Rules contemplate licensing, renewal, inspection and ongoing supervision, and the municipal fund provisions also recognise fees as a source of municipal revenue. The power is therefore not confined to mere issuance of a paper permission, but extends to a structured licensing regime with fee fixation and enhancement.

Conclusion: The municipal corporation had authority to levy and enhance the licence fee.

Issue (ii): Whether the levy was a tax or a regulatory fee.

Analysis: The charge was held to be connected with regulation and control of the licensed activity, not a tax under the municipal taxing provisions. The absence of a strict quid pro quo did not convert the levy into a tax, because modern fee jurisprudence recognises that a regulatory fee requires only a broad correlation between the levy and the expenses and supervision involved in regulation. The Court treated the licensing charge as a regulatory measure supporting the municipal supervisory functions attached to sky-sign and hoarding permissions.

Conclusion: The levy was a regulatory fee and not a tax.

Issue (iii): Whether the Goods and Services Tax regime and deletion of Entry 55 from List II had extinguished the power to levy such fees.

Analysis: The Court held that the GST regime did not repeal Sections 244, 245 or 386(2), and the repeal provision in the GST legislation did not touch the municipal licensing provisions. Deletion of Entry 55, which concerned advertisement tax, did not eliminate the separate power to levy a regulatory licence fee under the municipal law. The relevant constitutional support was traced to Article 243X and the legislative fields in Entries 5 and 66 of List II, which remained available for municipal regulation and fees in respect of matters within the State List.

Conclusion: The GST regime and deletion of Entry 55 did not extinguish the power to levy the licence fee.

Issue (iv): Whether the enhancement to Rs. 222 per sq. ft. per annum with ex post facto approval and retrospective effect was valid.

Analysis: The Court read Section 386(2) as using the word "sanction" without the qualifiers "prior" or "previous", and held that the provision permits ratification by the Corporation, including ex post facto sanction, where the statutory context so warrants. The Commissioner had fixed the rate after the tender-based market response and the General Body later ratified that rate with effect from 1 April 2013. In the Court's view, the approval was not invalid merely because it operated retrospectively, and the rate was not shown to be so excessive or arbitrary as to warrant interference in writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The enhancement and its ex post facto ratification were held valid.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the municipal levy failed in entirety, and the statutory licensing regime for sky-signs and hoardings was upheld as a valid regulatory framework permitting fee enhancement and Corporation ratification.

Ratio Decidendi: A municipal charge imposed for grant and renewal of sky-sign and hoarding permissions under a licensing regime is a regulatory fee, not a tax, and may be fixed by the Commissioner with the Corporation's sanction, including ex post facto ratification, where the statute does not insist on prior sanction and the levy bears a broad correlation to regulation and supervision.

Issues: (i) Whether the freezing of the petitioner's bank account by the Cyber Cell and the Bank, without an order of the Magistrate and without following the procedure under Sections 106 and 107 of the BNSS, was lawful; and whether the bank must be directed to defreeze the account.

Analysis: The issue requires examination of the statutory framework distinguishing seizure and attachment and the procedural route for depriving a person of control over property alleged to be proceeds of crime. Under the statutory scheme referenced, seizure and attachment serve different purposes and attachment affecting the proprietary control over funds requires the Magistrate's order under the applicable provisions. The factual record shows the account was placed in lien at the request of the Cyber Cell without production of any Magistrate order authorising attachment; the Bank relied on a Cyber Cell request and its internal SOPs but did not produce judicial authorization permitting freezing. The Bank's ability to retain the lien was therefore dependent on lawful authority under the statutory procedure rather than solely on an administrative request from the Cyber Cell.

Conclusion: The freezing of the account without compliance with the statutory procedure under Sections 106 and 107 of the BNSS was not in accordance with law; the lien/freezing is set aside and the Bank is directed to allow operation of the account, subject to any future lawful action in accordance with the statutory procedure.

1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

1.1 Whether a writ petition under Article 226 challenging show cause notices and a consequential order is maintainable when an alternate and efficacious statutory appellate remedy is available.

1.2 Whether vague and cursory pleadings alleging breach of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, and violation of constitutional rights are sufficient to invoke the recognised exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of alternate remedies.

1.3 Whether, while declining to entertain the writ petition on the ground of alternate remedy, the Court should grant liberty regarding limitation for filing appeal and keep open the challenge to the show cause notices.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Maintainability of writ petition in the presence of an alternate and efficacious statutory remedy of appeal

Interpretation and reasoning

2.1 The Court noted that the impugned order is appealable and that an appellate remedy is available to the petitioner under the statute.

2.2 The Court found from the petition that the petitioner essentially wishes to assail the impugned order on merits but has chosen not to approach the Appellate Authority, apparently to avoid the statutory requirement of pre-deposit of a percentage of the demanded amount.

2.3 The Court held that the writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised in equity to bypass clear statutory provisions providing for an appeal, nor can it be invoked to permit parties to circumvent such alternate remedies.

2.4 Relying on the reasoning in a prior decision of the Court on exhaustion of alternate remedies, and the precedents considered therein, the Court reaffirmed that deviation from the settled practice of insisting on exhaustion of alternate remedies is not warranted in the present case.

2.5 The Court further relied on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reiterating that High Courts should not entertain petitions under Article 226 when effective statutory remedies are available, except in exceptional cases falling within recognised exceptions.

Conclusions

2.6 The writ petition challenging the impugned order was held not maintainable in view of the available and efficacious statutory appellate remedy, and the Court declined to entertain it on this ground.

Issue 2: Adequacy of pleadings to attract exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy

Interpretation and reasoning

2.7 The petitioner contended that certain submissions were not considered in the impugned order and invoked grounds including contravention of procedural fairness, lack of jurisdiction, absence of authority of law, being contrary to settled law, violation of principles of natural justice, and breach of rights under Articles 14, 265 and 300A of the Constitution.

2.8 The Court examined the pleadings, particularly the relevant paragraph, and characterised the averments as extremely vague and cursory, noting that practically all possible grounds were mechanically invoked without elaboration or supporting particulars.

2.9 The Court observed that to attract the recognised exceptions to the rule requiring exhaustion of alternate remedies, a petitioner must plead and establish an exceptional case, supported by proper pleadings and material.

2.10 It was further observed that in the present matter, an attempt was made at the stage of arguments to advance a case that was not even properly pleaded, while the case that had been cursorily pleaded was effectively given up.

Conclusions

2.11 The Court held that the vague and unsupported allegations of breach of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, and constitutional violations did not bring the case within any recognised exception to the rule of alternate remedy.

2.12 On this basis also, no ground was made out to entertain the writ petition in preference to the statutory appellate remedy.

Issue 3: Directions on liberty to appeal, limitation, and preservation of challenge to show cause notices

Interpretation and reasoning

2.13 While declining to entertain the writ petition, the Court considered the need to ensure that the petitioner is not prejudiced on the question of limitation in availing the appellate remedy.

2.14 The Court directed that if an appeal against the impugned order is filed within four weeks from the date of the order, and all legal requirements (including pre-deposit, if any) are complied with, the Appellate Authority shall entertain the appeal on its own merits without going into the issue of limitation.

2.15 The Court also noted the existence of a separate prayer challenging the show cause notices and considered it appropriate to preserve the petitioner's right to raise that challenge in the future, depending on the outcome of the appellate proceedings under the statute.

Conclusions

2.16 Liberty was granted to the petitioner to file an appeal against the impugned order within four weeks, with a specific direction to the Appellate Authority not to reject such appeal on the ground of limitation.

2.17 The challenge to the show cause notices, as contained in the relevant prayer clause, was expressly kept open to be pursued if the petitioner does not obtain relief from the appellate authorities.

2.18 The petition was disposed of in these terms, with no order as to costs.