Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition should be entertained despite the statutory appellate remedy; (ii) Whether the denial of concessional customs duty by treating Battery Management Systems and Cell Supervisory Circuits as Printed Circuit Board Assemblies was sustainable without a reasoned technical rebuttal of the expert report.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition should be entertained despite the statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: Although an appeal was available under Section 129A of the Customs Act, 1962, the challenge concerned adjudication of a specialised technical issue in which an independent expert report based on physical inspection and component-level analysis had been disregarded without a scientific basis. The circumstances warranted exercise of writ jurisdiction rather than relegating the petitioner to the appellate remedy.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable despite the alternate statutory remedy, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the denial of concessional customs duty by treating Battery Management Systems and Cell Supervisory Circuits as Printed Circuit Board Assemblies was sustainable without a reasoned technical rebuttal of the expert report.

Analysis: Serial No. 512 of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017 excludes Printed Circuit Board Assemblies from the concessional rate. The independent technical opinion, founded on physical verification and detailed component-level analysis, unequivocally stated that the imported products could not themselves be understood as PCBAs used in manufacture of battery packs. A specialised technical opinion cannot be discarded merely by substituting the adjudicating authority's own technical perception; disagreement requires a reasoned technical rebuttal supported by commensurate expert or scientific material. No such rebuttal or counter-expert opinion was obtained.

Conclusion: The denial of the exemption was unsustainable for want of a reasoned technical rebuttal of the expert opinion, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The technical question concerning the nature of the imported goods and their exemption eligibility remains to be determined afresh on a proper technical foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where customs classification or exemption turns on specialised technical facts, an adjudicating authority cannot reject a credible expert opinion based on technical examination without a reasoned rebuttal founded on commensurate scientific or expert material.

Outcome: Matter released for hearing before the regular Bench, with status quo maintained for four weeks.

Issues: (i) Whether detention of imported goods through a panchnama, without a contemporaneous statutory seizure or restraint order, permits the customs authorities to defer the limitation period for issuing confiscation notice; (ii) Whether the conditions imposed for provisional release on the basis of the circular were valid.

Issue (i): Whether detention of imported goods through a panchnama, without a contemporaneous statutory seizure or restraint order, permits the customs authorities to defer the limitation period for issuing confiscation notice.

Analysis: Section 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 requires the proper officer to record reasons to believe that goods are liable to confiscation. Where physical seizure is impracticable, the provisos require a statutory order governing custody or restraining dealings with the goods. Instruction No. 01/2017-Cus. dated 08.02.2017 likewise requires an appropriate seizure order, in addition to a panchnama, recording such reasons. A panchnama directing the importer not to deal with the vehicle was only detention and could not substitute the required statutory order.

Analysis: The seizure memo was issued more than a year after detention, followed by the confiscation notice. The authorities could not retain the vehicle indefinitely under the label of detention and then restart the limitation period by issuing a delayed seizure memo. The six-month period, with only the permissible further extension contemplated by Section 110(2), stood exhausted from the detention.

Conclusion: The delayed seizure memo and consequential confiscation notice could not sustain continued retention of the vehicle, which was required to be released.

Issue (ii): Whether the conditions imposed for provisional release on the basis of the circular were valid.

Analysis: The provisional-release conditions requiring a bond and bank guarantee were founded on paragraph 2 of Circular No. 35/2017-Customs dated 16.08.2017. That paragraph had been set aside to the extent it curtailed the adjudicating authority's discretion. Reliance on the invalidated paragraph rendered the conditions unsustainable.

Conclusion: The provisional-release order and its conditions were illegal.

Final Conclusion: Customs authorities must exercise seizure powers through the statutory procedure and cannot use prolonged detention without a valid order to defeat the prescribed time limits; the vehicle must be released within two weeks, with costs imposed on the authorities.

Ratio Decidendi: A panchnama-based detention cannot replace a reasoned statutory seizure or restraint order under Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962, and the authorities cannot defer the statutory limitation for confiscation proceedings by subsequently issuing a seizure memo after prolonged detention.

Issues: (i) Whether the validity of the underlying show-cause notice, including its alleged limitation, could be reopened in writ proceedings after the petitioners elected settlement and obtained an order from the Settlement Commission; (ii) Whether the Settlement Commission's direction for verification and quantification of statutory interest was infirm because the quantified interest exceeded the petitioners' computation.

Issue (i): Whether the validity of the underlying show-cause notice, including its alleged limitation, could be reopened in writ proceedings after the petitioners elected settlement and obtained an order from the Settlement Commission.

Analysis: Judicial review under Article 226 over a Settlement Commission order is confined to jurisdictional or statutory error, prejudice, fraud, bias or malice; it does not permit appellate reassessment of the settled proceedings. The petitioners did not pursue the statutory appeal against the adjudication order but voluntarily sought settlement of the proceedings arising from the show-cause notice. Their limitation and reasonable-period objections were directed at the validity of that notice and did not establish any infirmity in the Settlement Commission's exercise of jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice and its alleged limitation could not be reopened through a challenge to the settlement order. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Settlement Commission's direction for verification and quantification of statutory interest was infirm because the quantified interest exceeded the petitioners' computation.

Analysis: The Settlement Commission did not accept the petitioners' interest computation as final; it directed the jurisdictional Commissioner to verify and quantify the amount payable. Interest is a statutory consequence of duty liability and remains payable notwithstanding settlement of the duty amount. The higher quantification did not, by itself, demonstrate that the direction for quantification was contrary to the Customs Act, 1962 or beyond the Commission's jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The consequential direction to verify and quantify interest was valid. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The settlement of duty liability remains conclusive, and the consequential statutory interest quantification is not liable to be disturbed on the grounds raised.

Ratio Decidendi: A party that voluntarily obtains settlement of proceedings cannot invoke writ jurisdiction to indirectly reopen the underlying show-cause notice unless a recognised ground for limited judicial review of the settlement order is established.

Issues: (i) Whether the findings of violations of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 warranted interference under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether lending the Customs Broker licence and dongle to a G-card holder for consideration amounted to an impermissible transfer of the licence; (iii) Whether revocation of licence, forfeiture of security deposit and penalty were disproportionate.

Issue (i): Whether the findings of violations of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 warranted interference under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Regulation 10(a) requires authorisation from the person represented by the Customs Broker, while Regulation 10(n) requires verification of the client's identity and functioning through reliable and authentic material. Filing a Shipping Bill in an exporter's name without obtaining its authorisation or even contacting it established breaches of Regulations 10(a), 10(d) and 10(n). Absence of proof that the broker knew of the prohibited goods did not negate these independent regulatory breaches. The finding under Regulation 10(e) could not independently stand because no incorrect information imparted by the broker to a client was identified; however, the remaining established violations sufficiently sustained the disciplinary action.

Conclusion: The findings of violations of Regulations 10(a), 10(d) and 10(n) disclosed no perversity or error of law warranting interference, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether lending the Customs Broker licence and dongle to a G-card holder for consideration amounted to an impermissible transfer of the licence.

Analysis: Regulation 1(4) prohibits a Customs Broker licence from being sold or otherwise transferred. The admitted receipt of a fixed monthly consideration for allowing the G-card holder to use the licence and dongle enabled customs transactions through the broker's credentials. The prohibition applies to the substance of parting with use of the licence and does not require transfer of proprietary title.

Conclusion: Lending the licence and dongle for consideration amounted to an impermissible transfer under Regulation 1(4), in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether revocation of licence, forfeiture of security deposit and penalty were disproportionate.

Analysis: Proportionality was assessed cumulatively, having regard to the deliberate lending of credentials for consideration, filing of a Shipping Bill without the named exporter's authorisation, and the attempted export of prohibited Red Sanders. These were serious regulatory breaches and not isolated documentary lapses.

Conclusion: The disciplinary measures were not shockingly or manifestly disproportionate, in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The established regulatory breaches and unauthorised use of the Customs Broker credentials sustained the disciplinary consequences, and no substantial question of law arose.

Ratio Decidendi: A Customs Broker who permits another person to use his licence and credentials for consideration, and undertakes a customs transaction without the named client's authorisation or proper verification, commits independent regulatory breaches sufficient to justify stringent disciplinary action notwithstanding absence of proof of knowledge of the underlying prohibited goods.

Issues: Whether notifications revising SEIS eligibility and reward rates for financial year 2019-20 could retrospectively deny accrued SEIS benefits to service exporters.

Analysis: Section 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 empowers formulation and amendment of the Foreign Trade Policy but does not confer power to retrospectively amend a scheme so as to extinguish vested or accrued benefits. Service exporters had rendered eligible services, earned foreign exchange, and acquired entitlement under the prevailing SEIS framework before the subsequent notifications introduced Appendix 3X, excluded Appendix 3E services, and imposed a cap for financial year 2019-20. The retrospective application of those changes would take away accrued scheme benefits.

Conclusion: The notifications operate prospectively from their respective dates of issue, and their retrospective operation denying accrued SEIS benefits for financial year 2019-20 is quashed. Eligible claims for the period before the notifications are to be processed and benefits extended.

Issues: (i) Whether an importer using forged or manipulated transferable duty-credit scrips through an authorised customs-clearance agent can claim protection as a bona fide purchaser; (ii) Whether non-production of original scrips and allied documents, and denial of cross-examination of Customs officers, vitiate the proceedings for breach of natural justice; (iii) Whether penalties under Sections 112 and 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 are sustainable where the importer claims lack of actual knowledge of the manipulation.

Issue (i): Whether an importer using forged or manipulated transferable duty-credit scrips through an authorised customs-clearance agent can claim protection as a bona fide purchaser.

Analysis: An authorised agent's acts within the scope of authority are attributable to the importer under Sections 182, 186 and 226 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and Section 147 of the Customs Act, 1962. The importer authorised the agent to undertake customs clearance and utilise scrips, obtained the resulting duty benefit, and could not disclaim the consequences of that agency.

Analysis: The equitable principle underlying Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 requires good faith and reasonable care. The excess value reflected in manipulated EDI records was never part of the entitlement issued by the DGFT and could not be transferred under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet. The importer neither verified the scrips, their source, validity or available balance, nor questioned material irregularities in the clearance arrangements. Caveat emptor required such due diligence.

Conclusion: The importer cannot claim bona fide purchaser protection or avoid liability for duty benefits derived from manipulated scrips. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether non-production of original scrips and allied documents, and denial of cross-examination of Customs officers, vitiate the proceedings for breach of natural justice.

Analysis: The evidentiary basis comprised DGFT entitlement data, customs registration records, EDI transaction trails, electronic records and statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962. Under Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, an adverse inference from non-production is discretionary and does not arise where the relevant facts are independently established.

Analysis: The importer had never possessed or independently verified the disputed original scrips and did not establish any actual prejudice from their absence. The denial of cross-examination likewise did not invalidate the proceedings because no material fact or resulting prejudice was identified.

Conclusion: The proceedings are not vitiated by non-production of original documents or denial of cross-examination. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties under Sections 112 and 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 are sustainable where the importer claims lack of actual knowledge of the manipulation.

Analysis: Section 114A applies where duty is short-levied through fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression intended to evade duty. The importer filed Bills of Entry relying on scrips without verifying their existence, validity or credit balance, and directly benefited from the manipulated credits. Personal execution of the electronic manipulation was not necessary for the statutory penalty.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 114A excludes a separate penalty under Section 112 where penalty is imposed under Section 114A.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 114A is sustained, while the separate penalty under Section 112 is set aside. This issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The findings apply equally to the connected writ matters arising from the same investigation, and the customs-duty consequences founded on the manipulated duty-credit scrips remain enforceable subject to removal of the separate Section 112 penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: An importer that authorises an agent to use transferable duty-credit scrips and obtains the resulting benefit remains responsible for manipulated or excess credits where it failed to exercise reasonable diligence; absence of original instruments does not invalidate proceedings supported by independent reliable evidence and absent demonstrable prejudice.

Issues: Whether the extended limitation provision could be invoked on the allegation of suppression, and whether the imported monitors were correctly classified under the claimed customs tariff entry.

Analysis: The questions concerning identity and classification of the imported goods, alleged suppression or mis-declaration, and limitation require examination by the adjudicating authority upon the petitioner's explanation. No final adjudication on these questions has taken place in the writ proceedings.

Outcome: The petitioner was directed to submit its explanation to the show cause notice within four weeks, following which the respondent must decide the matter in accordance with law after considering the relevant prior judgment and the reply to the audit consultative letter.

Issues: (i) Whether recovery of drawback allegedly erroneously availed could be initiated more than ten years after the last drawback payment where no fraud or suppression was alleged; (ii) Whether the writ petition should be declined on the grounds of an alternative statutory appeal or delay in approaching the Court.

Issue (i): Whether recovery of drawback allegedly erroneously availed could be initiated more than ten years after the last drawback payment where no fraud or suppression was alleged.

Analysis: Although Rule 16 does not prescribe a limitation period, recovery action must be commenced within a reasonable time. The drawback was availed between 2004 and 2007, while the notice was issued only in 2018 and the recovery order followed in 2022, without any explanation for either delay. The principle permitting delayed action in cases involving fraudulent availment was inapplicable because there was no allegation of fraud or suppression; the allegation was confined to non-production of proof of export-proceeds realisation.

Conclusion: The belated drawback-recovery proceedings were unsustainable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition should be declined on the grounds of an alternative statutory appeal or delay in approaching the Court.

Analysis: The availability of an appeal did not require relegation to that remedy because the recovery proceedings were initiated beyond a reasonable period and lacked statutory authority. The asserted delay in filing the writ petition did not preclude relief, as the assessee stated that it learnt of the recovery order upon freezing of its bank account and the foundational recovery action was itself invalid.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable despite the alternative remedy and the asserted delay, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The belated recovery demand and consequential bank-account attachment were deprived of legal effect.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute prescribes no limitation period for recovery, the power must nevertheless be exercised within a reasonable time; exceptional tolerance of delay based on fraud cannot apply without an allegation of fraudulent availment or suppression.

Issues: Whether a customs-clearance facilitator could be fastened with differential customs duty, interest and penalties without proof that he was the owner, beneficial owner, duly authorised agent, or had knowledge of the concealed goods and false documentation.

Analysis: Handling import documents, instructing the Customs Broker, paying assessed duty, and arranging examination, clearance and transportation may establish involvement in clearance, but do not by themselves establish beneficial ownership, agency under Section 147(3), or knowing participation in misdeclaration and attempted smuggling. The foundational facts showing express or implied authorisation by the actual owner or importer were absent. The adjudicating authority also failed to make the specifically required finding that the petitioner had prior knowledge of the undeclared goods or knowingly facilitated their concealment. Penalty under Section 114A required prior establishment of duty liability arising from collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression, while penalty under Section 114AA required proof that the petitioner knowingly or intentionally used or caused the use of a materially false document. Those statutory ingredients were not established.

Conclusion: The differential-duty liability, consequential interest, and penalties could not be imposed upon the petitioner.

Issues: (i) Whether a single Common Adjudicating Authority should be appointed for all three show cause notices arising from the investigation; (ii) whether pendency of the writ petition concerning common adjudication and the order dated 19.08.2025 rendered the adjudication of two show cause notices impermissible; and (iii) whether challenges to the orders-in-original, including procedural and limitation objections, should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite the statutory appeal.

Issue (i): Whether a single Common Adjudicating Authority should be appointed for all three show cause notices arising from the investigation.

Analysis: Although the notices arose from a common investigation and involved overlapping material, they concerned distinct subject matters, including live intercepted consignments, previously cleared consignments, and goods found at multiple data centres. Two notices had already been adjudicated, and directing common adjudication at this stage would require displacement of that adjudication while its validity was separately under challenge.

Conclusion: Appointment of a single Common Adjudicating Authority for all three notices was declined, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether pendency of the writ petition concerning common adjudication and the order dated 19.08.2025 rendered the adjudication of two show cause notices impermissible.

Analysis: The order dated 19.08.2025 contained prima facie observations and directed adjournment only of the hearing before the Mumbai authority. It did not stay or restrain adjudication of the two notices pending before the competent authority at New Delhi.

Conclusion: The pending writ petition and the order dated 19.08.2025 did not render the New Delhi adjudication without jurisdiction, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether challenges to the orders-in-original, including procedural and limitation objections, should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite the statutory appeal.

Analysis: Availability of an alternative statutory remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction. However, the alleged non-consideration of replies, service of hearing notices, adequacy of hearing, limitation, and related objections required examination of the adjudication record and disputed factual matters. The statutory appellate authority was competent to examine those matters and grant appropriate relief.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction was not invoked to determine the procedural, limitation, or substantive objections; those objections may be pursued before the statutory appellate forum, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The merits of the allegations, valuation, duty and penalty liability, limitation, and the individual natural-justice objections remain open for determination in the statutory appellate proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Where objections to a consolidated customs adjudication depend on disputed facts and examination of the complete record, the statutory appellate remedy should ordinarily be pursued unless an inherent jurisdictional defect or exceptional ground is established.

Issues: Whether equipment moved from the Domestic Tariff Area to a Free Trade Warehousing Zone after completion of one petroleum contract and subsequently cleared into the Domestic Tariff Area under a fresh essentiality certificate for another contract qualifies as re-imported goods entitled to exemption under Serial No. 5 of Notification No. 45/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017.

Analysis: The concessional import benefit under Notification No. 50/2017-Customs is conditional upon the equipment being deployed for the petroleum operation certified under the relevant essentiality certificate. Condition No. 48 of that notification provides a specific mechanism for transfer of equipment to another specified person for a subsequent eligible petroleum operation, subject to prescribed undertakings and customs safeguards. That express mechanism cannot be displaced by an implied alternative route through a Free Trade Warehousing Zone yielding an additional fiscal benefit.

Analysis: The statutory fictions under the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 regarding the customs treatment of Special Economic Zones and clearance into the Domestic Tariff Area operate for their prescribed purposes and do not create a universal re-import exemption. Re-import requires not merely identity of goods but continuity between the outward movement and their return. Equipment warehoused in a Free Trade Warehousing Zone after completion of one contract, and later cleared only upon securing a new domestic contract and a fresh essentiality certificate, is not returned in reversal of the earlier transaction. The original certified deployment is a closed transaction and the later clearance is founded on a distinct transaction. Rule 48(3) of the Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006 does not apply where the Free Trade Warehousing Zone merely holds the owner's goods without procuring them.

Conclusion: The subsequent clearance of the equipment from the Free Trade Warehousing Zone into the Domestic Tariff Area is a fresh import and not a re-import under Serial No. 5 of Notification No. 45/2017-Customs dated 30.06.2017; the claimed exemption is unavailable against the assessee.

Issues: Whether refusal to condone the delay of approximately 968 days in filing customs appeals disclosed any perversity or substantial question of law warranting interference.

Analysis: An appeal under Section 130 of the Customs Act lies only on a substantial question of law and does not permit re-appreciation of factual findings unless they are perverse, unsupported by evidence, or reached by ignoring material evidence. Under Section 129A(3) and (5), condonation requires sufficient cause, assessed with reference to bona fides, diligence and a satisfactory explanation for the entire delay. The appellants participated in the adjudication through counsel, the order was sent to that counsel by e-mail, attempts were made to dispatch it to the recorded address, and it was displayed on the notice board. The appellants made no enquiry about the adjudication outcome for nearly three years, and the explanation did not account for this prolonged inaction. The Tribunal's rejection of condonation was based on a cumulative assessment of relevant material and could not be displaced by seeking a different factual view.

Conclusion: The refusal to condone the delay was lawful and disclosed no perversity, error of law, or substantial question of law; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the imported areca-nut consignments should be released pending adjudication of their classification and customs-duty liability.

Analysis: The classification dispute was already the subject of show-cause proceedings, and no view on whether the goods were roasted or dried areca nuts was warranted at this stage. The laboratory reports classified the goods principally from physical appearance, while the moisture content was below the prescribed limit and was comparable with consignments earlier released on personal bond. In the circumstances, continued withholding of the goods or insistence upon a bank guarantee was unjustified.

Conclusion: The imported consignments must be released forthwith upon the petitioner furnishing a personal bond, without prejudice to the pending proceedings for determination of customs duty.

Issues: Whether the application for provisional release of seized goods and the connected vehicle should be decided under the statutory mechanism pending customs adjudication.

Analysis: Section 110A provides for provisional release of goods seized under Section 110 pending adjudication, upon bond, security and such conditions as may be required. The investigation stood completed and a show-cause notice had been issued, while the application for provisional release remained pending before the competent Adjudicating Authority. Disputed matters concerning the invoice and valuation fall within that authority's adjudicatory domain and require a reasoned determination in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The competent Adjudicating Authority must expeditiously decide the application for provisional release of the seized goods and vehicle under Section 110A, determine valuation in accordance with law, and pass a reasoned order.

Issues: Whether revocation of the Customs Broker licence, forfeiture of security deposit and penalty were sustainable for undertaking clearance activities through another Customs Broker's credentials without the requisite authorisation and in breach of Customs Broker obligations.

Analysis: The Appellant admittedly undertook clearance-related work, received the import documents, and deputed its G-Card holder for examination, although the Bill of Entry bore another Customs Broker's credentials. Consent or a mutual arrangement with that broker could not authorise the Appellant to transact without an importer authorisation in its own name. The goods were prohibited for import under the applicable plant-quarantine regime; accordingly, the Appellant was required to exercise diligence, advise the importer of applicable restrictions, report non-compliance to Customs, and maintain and produce relevant business records. The established conduct supported violations of Regulations 10(a), 10(d), 10(e), 10(f) and 10(k) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018. Relief granted to the other broker in separate proceedings did not eliminate the Appellant's independent statutory breaches. Given the conscious use of another broker's credentials in a transaction involving prohibited goods, the sanctions were not manifestly disproportionate, and no substantial question of law arose under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Conclusion: The revocation of the licence, forfeiture of security deposit and penalty were sustained against the assessee.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to file a comprehensive petition challenging the subsequent order.

Issues: Whether a regular criminal court could grant interim custody of goods seized under the Customs Act, 1962 where no prior sanction for prosecution or cognizance of a Customs offence had been recorded.

Analysis: Sections 110 and 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 provide the special statutory mechanism for seizure and provisional release of goods pending adjudication. Confiscation and penalties are to be adjudicated by the officers specified under Sections 122 and 122A. Although a complaint referred to Section 135, the record disclosed neither the prior sanction mandated by Section 137 nor an order taking cognizance. In the absence of cognizance of an offence under the Customs Act, the criminal court could not invoke the general power under Section 497 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 to order release of the seized goods, overriding the special Customs regime.

Conclusion: The regular criminal court lacked jurisdiction to grant zimma of the Customs-seized areca nuts; the order granting their release was without jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether the setting aside of revocation of the Customs Broker licence for alleged violations of Regulations 10(d), 10(e) and 10(f) of the Customs Broker Licensing Regulations, 2018, gave rise to a substantial question of law.

Analysis: The revocation proceedings concerned alleged regulatory breaches in relation to export shipments for which Let Export Orders had been issued under Section 51 of the Customs Act, 1962. CESTAT found the allegations unsustainable by applying its reasoned decision in an identical matter concerning the same exporter. No material factual distinction between that matter and the present case was demonstrated, and the Revenue had accepted the earlier CESTAT decision without challenge.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose; the order setting aside revocation of the Customs Broker licence stood undisturbed.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal could set aside the licensing order on the grounds of inordinate delay in the inquiry and identity of the investigating and inquiry officers, without determining the alleged breaches of customs broker obligations on merits.

Analysis: The record showed that the inquiry report followed the show-cause notice within the prescribed period; consequently, the premise of inordinate delay and resulting prejudice was factually incorrect. The officers performing the investigation and inquiry functions were different. The finding of a breach of the principles of natural justice was therefore also founded on an incorrect factual premise. The alleged violations of the customs broker obligations had not been examined on merits.

Conclusion: The setting aside of the licensing order was unsustainable; the alleged violations of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 must be adjudicated on merits.