Industrial dispute reference powers are independent of winding up leave requirements, and protection proceedings follow the employer at the relevant time.

A reference of an industrial dispute under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act was treated as an independent statutory power of the appropriate Government and was not made subject to prior leave under section 171 of the Companies Act, 1913 after winding up. Proceedings under sections 33 and 33A were held maintainable against the employer at the time of the impugned discharge or service action, even if that party was not the employer when the original reference was made. The company's continued legal existence after winding up, together with notice to the official liquidator, meant that the reference and later proceedings were not invalid for non-impleading the liquidator.

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Issues: (i) Whether a reference of an industrial dispute under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act required leave of the court under section 171 of the Companies Act, 1913, after a winding up order had been made; (ii) whether proceedings under sections 33 and 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act could be maintained against a lessee who was not the employer at the time of the original reference; and (iii) whether the reference and subsequent proceedings were invalid for want of impleading or notice to the official liquidator.

Issue (i): Whether a reference of an industrial dispute under section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act required leave of the court under section 171 of the Companies Act, 1913, after a winding up order had been made.

Analysis: The expression "legal proceeding" in section 171 was treated as wide enough to include proceedings by law, but section 10(1) created an independent statutory power in the appropriate Government to refer an industrial dispute whenever it formed the requisite opinion, and in some cases imposed a statutory duty to make a reference. A construction making such reference contingent on prior leave under section 171 would conflict with the scheme and object of the Industrial Disputes Act and would defeat the public-interest purpose of the reference power.

Conclusion: Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act was not controlled by section 171 of the Companies Act, 1913, and prior leave of the High Court was not required before making the reference.

Issue (ii): Whether proceedings under sections 33 and 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act could be maintained against a lessee who was not the employer at the time of the original reference.

Analysis: The language of sections 33 and 33A was held to be unqualified. The relevant relationship was that of employer and employee at the time of discharge, punishment, or alteration of service conditions, and not identity with the employer involved in the pending industrial dispute. A contrary view would frustrate the protective purpose of the provisions and produce an unjust result by shifting liability to a party not responsible for the impugned acts.

Conclusion: Proceedings under sections 33 and 33A were maintainable against the petitioner as the employer at the relevant time.

Issue (iii): Whether the reference and subsequent proceedings were invalid for want of impleading or notice to the official liquidator.

Analysis: The company remained a legal entity notwithstanding winding up, and the reference order showed that the company itself was named as a party. Notice was also given to the official liquidator before the award was made. No jurisdictional defect arose from the absence of separate impleading of the official liquidator.

Conclusion: The reference and proceedings were not invalid on this ground.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition failed on all material grounds and the challenge to the tribunal proceedings was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory reference or proceeding made in exercise of an independent public-law power is not curtailed by section 171 of the Companies Act unless the later statute is expressly or necessarily subject to that leave requirement, and liability under industrial protection provisions depends on the employer-employee relationship at the time of the impugned act.

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