Court-made call required to enforce contributory liability; liquidator cannot bypass winding-up procedure by ordinary suit.

The statutory liability of a contributory on winding up can be enforced only through a Court-made call; the liquidator has no inherent power to make a call unless authority is conferred by rules or judicial delegation. A simple demand by the liquidator is therefore ineffective as a call. The text also distinguishes ordinary contractual debts from the separate statutory liability arising on winding up: unpaid pre-liquidation calls may be pursued as debts, but the statutory liability itself cannot be enforced by an independent suit. Where treated as a contractual claim, limitation applies and may bar recovery if time has expired.

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Issues: (i) Whether the liquidator had authority to make a call on contributories in the absence of a rule conferring that power; (ii) whether a suit to recover unpaid calls could be maintained as a statutory liability of the contributory, and whether it was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether the liquidator had authority to make a call on contributories in the absence of a rule conferring that power.

Analysis: The statutory scheme distinguished between the nature of a contributory's liability and the power to enforce it. The liability of a contributory was described as a debt payable at the time specified in calls, but the section did not itself confer authority on the liquidator to make calls. The power to make calls was vested in the Court, and although the statute contemplated delegation in appropriate cases, that delegation had to be through rules framed by the Court and subject to judicial control. No rule had been made conferring such power on the liquidator. A simple demand by the liquidator could not therefore be treated as a valid call in liquidation proceedings.

Conclusion: The liquidator had no authority to make the call, and any purported call by him was ineffective.

Issue (ii): Whether a suit to recover unpaid calls could be maintained as a statutory liability of the contributory, and whether it was barred by limitation.

Analysis: A clear distinction was drawn between contractual debts due to the company and the separate statutory liability of contributories arising on winding up. A contractual debt, including unpaid calls made before liquidation, could be sued for or pursued under the summary machinery for existing debts. But if the liquidator sought to enforce the statutory liability created on winding up, the exclusive mode was a call made by the Court under the winding-up provisions. An ordinary suit could not be used to enforce that statutory liability. On the facts, if the claim was treated as one for a contractual debt, it was beyond time under the limitation article governing calls. If treated as an attempt to realise statutory liability, it failed because no call had been made by the Court under the prescribed procedure. The authorities relied upon did not support a contrary result.

Conclusion: The suit was not maintainable as a statutory claim and, if treated as a contractual claim, was time-barred.

Final Conclusion: The decree in favour of the plaintiff could not stand, and the defendant succeeded in the appeal with costs.

Ratio Decidendi: The statutory liability of a contributory on winding up can be enforced only through the procedure of a Court-made call; a liquidator cannot bypass that machinery by treating the liability as an ordinary debt in an independent suit, and contractual limitation continues to govern unpaid calls until the statutory procedure is invoked.

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