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Issues: (i) whether the notice issued under section 34(1)(a) was barred by limitation or saved by section 34(4); (ii) whether the writ petition should be rejected on the ground of laches.
Issue (i): whether the notice issued under section 34(1)(a) was barred by limitation or saved by section 34(4).
Analysis: The notice was issued after the 1956 amendment. The governing limitation, therefore, was the limitation introduced by the 1956 amendment and not the earlier eight-year period as it stood after the 1948 amendment. Section 34(4) saved only notices from the earlier bar and did not cure a notice that was already barred under the post-1956 regime. The authorities and the later Supreme Court reasoning relied on in the judgment required the notice to be tested by the limitation in force when it was issued.
Conclusion: The notice was time-barred and not saved by section 34(4), and the finding is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): whether the writ petition should be rejected on the ground of laches.
Analysis: The delay in filing the writ petition was held to be insignificant compared with the delay in issuing the impugned notice, and the notice itself was found to be without jurisdiction. In those circumstances, laches did not justify refusal of relief.
Conclusion: The writ petition was not liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches, and the finding is in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The impugned reopening notice and all proceedings taken pursuant to it were quashed, and the assessee obtained relief with costs.
Ratio Decidendi: A notice for reassessment issued after the 1956 amendment is governed by the limitation introduced by that amendment, and section 34(4) does not validate a notice that is already barred under that regime.