Refund limitation for returned goods is tested from the original filing at the reprocessing factory's jurisdictional officer.

For refund claims relating to returned goods reprocessed in a factory, limitation is tested from the original filing made with the officer having jurisdiction over that reprocessing factory, because Section 11B treats the relevant date as the date of entry for remaking, refining or reconditioning. Rule 97 also contemplates verification at the factory where the goods are actually processed, so a later departmental transmission of papers to another collectorate is only a procedural step and cannot defeat a bona fide claim filed within time. The earlier remand likewise did not finally reject the limitation plea, so the de novo adjudication remained within the remand scope. The refund claim was therefore not time-barred and had to be decided on merits.

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Issues: (i) whether the refund claims, though ultimately received by the jurisdictional officer beyond six months, were in time because they had been filed earlier with the officer having jurisdiction over the factory where the returned goods were reprocessed; and (ii) whether the de novo adjudication exceeded the scope of the earlier remand order.

Issue (i): whether the refund claims, though ultimately received by the jurisdictional officer beyond six months, were in time because they had been filed earlier with the officer having jurisdiction over the factory where the returned goods were reprocessed.

Analysis: Section 11B fixes the relevant date for returned goods as the date of entry into the factory for remaking, refining or reconditioning. Rule 97 permits refund in respect of goods returned to the same or any other factory for such processing and contemplates compliance and verification at the factory where reprocessing is actually carried out. The claims were first presented within time to the officer of the collectorate having jurisdiction over the reprocessing factory, the goods were examined and certificates were issued, and the later transmission of the papers to another collectorate was a procedural step. The procedural course adopted by the department could not defeat a claim that had been made bona fide within the prescribed period.

Conclusion: the refund claims were not barred by limitation and the date of the original filing with the Calcutta collectorate was the material date.

Issue (ii): whether the de novo adjudication exceeded the scope of the earlier remand order.

Analysis: The earlier remand did not finally decide the limitation question against the assessee. It left the officer free to examine the contention that the earlier filing with the Calcutta collectorate should be treated as the filing date. The de novo order therefore did not travel beyond the remand directions.

Conclusion: the de novo adjudication was not beyond the scope of remand.

Final Conclusion: the departmental appeal failed on the limitation issue, but the refund claim was sent back for adjudication on merits after hearing the assessee and following natural justice.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a refund claim under the excise refund provisions is bona fide filed within limitation before the officer connected with the factory where the returned goods are reprocessed, a subsequent procedural return of the papers to another officer cannot render the claim time-barred; limitation must be tested from the original timely presentation.

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