Late-filed cheque bounce complaint u/s138-delay condonation u/s142(b) must come before cognizance; proceedings set aside.

Under the proviso to s. 142(b) of the NI Act, a court may take cognizance of a complaint under s. 138 only after the complainant establishes "sufficient cause" for filing beyond limitation and the court records satisfaction by condoning the delay; such condonation must precede cognizance. Treating condonation and cognizance as interchangeable defeats the statutory mandate, and a belated matter does not properly enter the court's file until delay is condoned, analogous to the CPC scheme for delayed appeals. As the complaint was filed two days late and cognizance was taken without prior condonation, the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction; the HC order declining to quash was set aside and the appeal was allowed.

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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED

(i) Whether, under the proviso to Section 142(1)(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a Court can validly take cognisance of a complaint presented beyond the prescribed period before recording satisfaction of "sufficient cause" and condoning the delay.

(ii) Whether subsequent condonation of delay cures the prior act of taking cognisance on a time-barred complaint so as to sustain the proceedings.

2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS

Issue (i): Requirement that condonation of delay must precede taking cognisance

Legal framework: The Court examined the proviso to Section 142(1)(b), which permits cognisance after the prescribed period only if the complainant satisfies the Court that there was "sufficient cause" for not filing within time. The Court treated this proviso as controlling the Court's power to take cognisance of a belated complaint.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the proviso's language makes the power to take cognisance of a belated complaint conditional upon the complainant first satisfying the Court regarding "sufficient cause." This satisfaction, resulting in condonation, must precede the act of taking cognisance. The Court rejected the view that condonation and cognisance are interchangeable steps. It reasoned that limitation-linked delay prevents a proceeding from being treated as a regular matter on the file until delay is condoned, and therefore taking cognisance first is contrary to the proviso's mandate.

Conclusion: Taking cognisance of a belated complaint without first condoning delay is impermissible; the Magistrate erred in taking cognisance before condoning the two-day delay.

Issue (ii): Whether later condonation cures earlier improper cognisance

Legal framework: The Court applied the same proviso to Section 142(1)(b) to assess whether subsequent condonation could validate cognisance taken earlier.

Interpretation and reasoning: The Court disagreed with the approach that the defect is merely curable by later condonation. It held that, because the statutory condition requires prior satisfaction and condonation, subsequent condonation cannot retrospectively legitimise cognisance already taken in breach of that condition. The Court also held that earlier non-challenge to intermediate orders did not matter, since condonation occurred much later and the core illegality concerned cognisance having been taken before delay was condoned.

Conclusion: Subsequent condonation does not cure the illegality of cognisance taken prior to condonation; the High Court's refusal to quash was incorrect, and the complaint was quashed as a consequence.

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