2025 (12) TMI 445 - SC - Indian Laws

Application for cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) CrPC dismissed as retaliatory, no breach or misuse shown

SK. MD. ANISUR RAHAMAN, AFJAL ALI SHA @ ABJAL SHAUKAT SHA Versus THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.

SC rejected the complainant's application for cancellation of bail granted to the accused. The Court held that the application was essentially ... Cancellation of bail granted - release resulted in unfair trial or not - possibility of tampering evidence or influencing witnesses or not - HELD THAT:- The application for cancellation of bail at the instance of Afjal seems to be more of a retaliatory response to Anisur's application for modification of bail condition rather than a genuine effort to further project before this Court how Anisur has breached the terms and conditions of bail. The anxiety and concern of Afjal is understandable. Having lost his brother in a homicidal attack, it is quite but natural that regardless of the State's effort to scuttle the trial he would sincerely and earnestly wish to have the culprits brought to book. It has, however, not been shown how a breach has occasioned. The State seems to have crossed the line of being an honest and fair prosecutor and bordered on becoming a real facilitator for the accused in the sessions trial to evade conviction. There is also little doubt that witnesses for the prosecution have turned hostile, but that Anisur is directly responsible for the damage caused has not been conclusively established before us. Be that as it may, having regard to the stage the trial has progressed, there are no any useful purpose being served by cancelling the bail granted in favour of Anisur. The application for cancellation of bail, thus, stands rejected. 1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1.1 Whether bail granted to the accused should be cancelled on the ground that his release has resulted in intimidation of witnesses and an unfair trial. 1.2 Whether the condition of bail confining the accused to the city of Kolkata violates his right to personal liberty under Article 21 and warrants modification. 1.3 Whether delay in filing the application for modification of bail condition deserved to be condoned. 1.4 Whether a subsequent Bench of the Court could, in substance, revisit and dilute a prior coordinate Bench's bail order and conditions in the absence of any gross error or change in circumstances, having regard to the principle of finality and Article 141. 1.5 Whether critical remarks made by the Sessions Court against the Special Public Prosecutor, and the reference to the Legal Remembrancer, in an order partly allowing the prosecution's application to examine/re-examine witnesses, were justified and could stand. 2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1: Cancellation of bail Interpretation and reasoning 2.1 The Court noted the chequered history of the trial, including attempts by the State to withdraw the prosecution under Section 321 Cr.PC, the turning hostile of several witnesses, and prior judicial observations indicating the State's bias in favour of the accused and the atmosphere of fear among witnesses. 2.2 It accepted that the anxiety and concern of the victim's brother were understandable, and that the State had 'crossed the line' of being an honest prosecutor and tended towards facilitating the accused; it was also not in dispute that several witnesses had turned hostile. 2.3 However, the Court found that the application appeared more retaliatory to the accused's move for modification of bail than based on demonstrable breach of bail conditions. No conclusive material was shown to establish that the accused, while on bail, had violated the conditions or was directly responsible for witnesses turning hostile. 2.4 Having regard to the advanced stage of the trial, with only a few witnesses (including PW-88, two Magistrates, a doctor and some others) yet to be examined or recalled, the Court held that no useful purpose would be served by cancelling bail at that stage. Conclusions 2.5 The application for cancellation of bail was rejected; the accused was not taken back into custody. Issue 2: Modification of the bail condition confining the accused to Kolkata Legal framework (as discussed) 2.6 The Court considered the constitutional context of the right to personal liberty and freedom of movement under Article 21 but emphasised that bail is discretionary and subject to conditions imposed to balance liberty with the interests of justice. 2.7 It referred to the principle of finality of judicial decisions and to the role of Article 141, observing that decisions of the Court are binding and are not to be lightly revisited except through recognised procedures such as review or curative jurisdiction (as explained in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra). Interpretation and reasoning 2.8 The original bail order had granted bail after five years of custody and failure to complete the trial within the time earlier fixed by the Court, but only on stringent conditions including confinement of the accused to Kolkata and daily marking of attendance. 2.9 A previous application to modify this very condition had already been rejected by a coordinate Bench 'at this stage.' The present modification application was filed shortly after the presiding Judge of that Bench demitted office and after a period of Partial Working Days, which the Court viewed as an attempt to seek a different result due to a changed Bench composition. 2.10 The Court emphasised that the strength of judicial power lies in the finality of decisions; allowing repeated reopening of settled issues before differently composed Benches would undermine Article 141, judicial discipline, consistency and public confidence. A matter once decided by a Bench cannot ordinarily be reopened by another coordinate Bench unless there is something grossly erroneous or palpably wrong justifying recourse to review or curative processes. 2.11 While recognising that restrictions on a citizen's right to move freely are serious and that strict finality may not always apply in such cases, the Court held that the antecedent facts and reasons for imposing the restriction here were weighty and remained unchanged. The condition was deliberately imposed to balance the accused's liberty with the need to protect the integrity of the trial, given his antecedents and the history of the case. 2.12 The Court reasoned that modifying the condition would dilute the stringency that formed the very basis on which bail was granted and would amount to overstepping the earlier bail order. There was no 'significant change in circumstances' warranting relaxation. 2.13 The Court also noted that the accused had been provided police security by the Superintendent of Police of his home district without any fresh assessment of threat perception. If there was any genuine threat to his life in Purba Medinipur, that itself made it appropriate that he should not leave Kolkata until completion of the trial. Conclusions 2.14 The delay in filing the modification application was condoned, but the prayer to revoke or relax the condition confining the accused to Kolkata was rejected. 2.15 The Court held that the stringent condition imposed in the earlier bail order remained justified on the facts and circumstances; the application for modification of bail condition was dismissed. Issue 3: Condonation of delay in filing modification application Interpretation and reasoning 2.16 The Court separately addressed the application seeking condonation of delay in presenting the modification application. No elaborate reasoning is recorded beyond the allowance. Conclusions 2.17 The application for condonation of delay in filing the modification application was allowed. Issue 4: Finality of prior Supreme Court decisions, coordinate Bench discipline and Article 141 in bail matters Legal framework (as discussed) 2.18 The Court discussed the constitutional role of Article 141, under which the 'law declared' by the Court is binding and intended to settle controversies finally. 2.19 It referred to the scope of reopening concluded decisions only through recognised mechanisms such as review and curative petitions, with reference to Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra. Interpretation and reasoning 2.20 The Court expressed concern over an emerging trend of later Benches revisiting and overturning prior verdicts-whether the deciding Judges remained in office or not-at the behest of aggrieved parties, purely because a differently composed Bench might take a different view. 2.21 It held that the design of Article 141 requires that once a Bench has determined an issue of law arising from the facts of a case, that pronouncement must ordinarily settle the controversy, and successive Benches must defer to that view unless there is manifest error warranting review/curative intervention. 2.22 The Court stressed that allowing parties to re-litigate issues before new Benches in the hope of a different outcome undermines the authority of the Court, erodes consistency in legal interpretation, and diminishes the 'special authority' of its decisions. 2.23 Applying this to the present case, it held that the bail condition confining the accused to Kolkata had already been considered and maintained by a coordinate Bench. Absent gross error or a substantial change in circumstances, the subsequent Bench was bound, as a matter of judicial discipline, propriety and comity, not to dilute or revisit that condition. Conclusions 2.24 The Court reaffirmed the principle that coordinate Benches must respect and not disturb earlier decisions on the same issue between the same parties, save through proper procedural avenues. 2.25 On this basis, it refused to interfere with or relax the previously imposed bail condition. Issue 5: Propriety of the Sessions Court's critical remarks against the Special Public Prosecutor and reference to the Legal Remembrancer Interpretation and reasoning 2.26 After reserving judgment, the Court was informed of a subsequent order of the Sessions Court dated 21 November 2025, wherein the Special Public Prosecutor's application to re-examine/examine certain witnesses was partly allowed but was accompanied by severe criticism of the Special Public Prosecutor and a reference to the Legal Remembrancer for action. 2.27 The Court extracted the portions where the Sessions Court described the Special Public Prosecutor's conduct as torpid and indifferent, 'contra officii dignitatem', 'non toleranda', and called upon the Legal Remembrancer to take cognizance. 2.28 While acknowledging that the prosecution's application had been partly allowed, the Court found the critical remarks 'wholly uncalled for, thoroughly unwarranted and absolutely unnecessary.' The order was internally inconsistent: the Sessions Court could not logically allow part of the application and yet portray the prosecution's conduct as blameworthy to the extent of warranting disciplinary reference. 2.29 The Court stressed that the directions for expeditious conclusion of trial were originally driven by concern over the accused's prolonged incarceration. Once the accused had been released on bail by the Court's order dated 3 January 2025 (with movement restrictions), the extreme urgency to adhere to strict timelines had eased. The Sessions Court ought not to discourage the prosecution from presenting its full case within the law by seeking re-examination or additional examination of witnesses. 2.30 The Court noted that the predecessor prosecutor had been lethargic, which made the current Special Public Prosecutor's initiative necessary for a fair and meaningful trial. In that backdrop, branding his approach as torpid and indifferent was unjust and ignored the case history and the fact that the Special Public Prosecutor had been appointed pursuant to this Court's earlier order in the transfer proceedings. 2.31 The Court also observed that use of Latin maxims should not overshadow the substantive issues; overuse risked appearing ostentatious. Conclusions 2.32 The Court treated the Sessions Judge's conduct as a one-off aberration but intervened to set aside the part of the order referring the matter to the Legal Remembrancer and the associated scathing comments against the Special Public Prosecutor. 2.33 It affirmed that the prosecution's application remained partly allowed and could otherwise be challenged, if at all, in appropriate proceedings. 2.34 The Special Public Prosecutor was encouraged to continue to conduct the trial with fairness, integrity and diligence. 2.35 The Sessions Court was directed to deal with all applications by the parties on their own merits, to conclude the trial in accordance with law without being unduly constrained by earlier timelines, and not to treat this order as restricting the accused from raising legitimate objections during the trial.