Parallel PMLA attachment and SFIO investigation can proceed on recorded material without a mandatory pre-attachment hearing.

Parallel investigation under the Companies Act and PMLA was not treated as barred because Section 212 of the Companies Act applies only to offences under that Act and permits sharing of information with other agencies. A provisional attachment under Section 5(1) of PMLA was not read as requiring prior filing of a Section 173 CrPC report in every case; recorded reasons and available material were sufficient. Reason to believe must rest on objective material, and no separate pre-attachment hearing was required. Writ interference was declined where the statutory appellate remedy had been invoked.

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Issues: (i) whether investigation by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office under the Companies Act, 2013 barred parallel proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (ii) whether a provisional attachment order under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 required prior filing of a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (iii) whether the provisional attachment order was vitiated for want of reason to believe or for absence of a pre-attachment hearing; and (iv) whether the writ petitions should be entertained in view of the statutory remedy before the Appellate Tribunal.

Issue (i): whether investigation by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office under the Companies Act, 2013 barred parallel proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Analysis: Section 212(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 operates only in respect of offences under that Act. The statutory scheme does not create a bar against investigation under other enactments, and Section 212(17)(b) contemplates sharing of information with other investigating agencies under other laws. The two enactments address distinct wrongs and operate in separate fields.

Conclusion: The bar on parallel proceedings was not accepted and the contention failed.

Issue (ii): whether a provisional attachment order under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 required prior filing of a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Analysis: The attachment power under Section 5(1) is conditioned by recorded reasons and material showing possession of proceeds of crime and likelihood of concealment or transfer. The first proviso is not to be read as making a charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 an absolute precondition in every case. The statutory scheme permits provisional attachment on the basis of the material available to the authorised officer.

Conclusion: Prior filing of a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not held to be a mandatory precondition in the manner urged by the petitioners.

Issue (iii): whether the provisional attachment order was vitiated for want of reason to believe or for absence of a pre-attachment hearing

Analysis: The expression reason to believe requires an objective, evidence-based satisfaction founded on tangible material. The record referred to the underlying FIR, the ECIR, seized documents, electronic material, and recorded statements, which furnished a rational basis for the belief that the properties were involved in money-laundering and that immediate attachment was warranted. The statute does not require a separate pre-attachment hearing before issuance of the provisional attachment order.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment order was not found to be invalid on the grounds of absence of reason to believe or want of pre-attachment hearing.

Issue (iv): whether the writ petitions should be entertained in view of the statutory remedy before the Appellate Tribunal

Analysis: The provisional attachment order had already been confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority, and the petitioners had availed the appellate remedy under the special statute. In such circumstances, judicial interference in writ jurisdiction was considered unwarranted, leaving the merits to be examined by the statutory appellate forum.

Conclusion: The writ petitions were not entertained on merits in view of the available statutory appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the enforcement proceedings did not succeed, and the petitioners were left to pursue the remedy provided under the special statutory appellate mechanism.

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