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<h1>Election void for candidate's failure to disclose Section 138 NI Act conviction required by Rule 24-A(1) of 1994 Municipal Rules</h1> <h3>Poonam Versus Dule Singh & Ors.</h3> SC dismissed the Special Leave Petition, holding the returned candidate's election void for failing to disclose a conviction under Section 138 NI Act in ... Conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - fact of conviction not been disclosed by the petitioner in the affidavit filed along with the nomination form as required by Rule 24-A of Municipal Election Rules of 1994 - HELD THAT:- The holding of the subsequent election for filling in the vacancy caused by the unseating of the petitioner was made subject to outcome of these proceedings. It therefore cannot be gainsaid that with the conduct of the bye elections, the challenge raised by the petitioner to the order passed by the trial Court had become infructuous. Notwithstanding the conduct of the bye elections, the present challenge would be required to be adjudicated on merits since the rights of the petitioner stand protected by virtue of the interim order dated 25.06.2025. On consideration of the statutory provisions as well as the documentary material on record it becomes clear that under Rule 24-A (1) of the Rules of 1994, every candidate contesting elections is required to furnish information which includes declaration of criminal antecedents, etc. The information required to be furnished is with regard to any pending criminal case in which the candidate is charged or any criminal case that has been disposed of and has resulted in his conviction. Failure to furnish such affidavit can result in rejection of the nomination paper. The Returning Officer is required to display the nomination furnished by each candidate by affixing a copy of the affidavit at a conspicuous place at his office so as to provide information to the electors from the concerned ward. He is also required to publicise the information received through the media. In the present case, the petitioner after her conviction was sentenced to an imprisonment for a period of one year. The affidavit required to be filed under Rule 24-A (1) of the Rules of 1994 specifically requires furnishing of details as regards any sentence of imprisonment for a period of one year or more. The statutory requirement in the present case is thus distinct from the requirements in Ravi Namboothiri [2022 (11) TMI 1573 - SUPREME COURT] which makes the said decision distinguishable. Rule 24A-(1) requires a candidate to disclose any order of conviction suffered by him by filing an affidavit along with the relevant information before the Returning Officer. The format of the affidavit prescribed under the Rules of 1994 requires a disclosure as regards conviction and sentence of imprisonment for a duration of one year and more. The validity of Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules of 1994 has not been subjected to any challenge. It would therefore have to be treated as valid. Its compliance has been made mandatory as failure to furnish such information along with an affidavit as prescribed visits a candidate with the consequence of non-compliance of the provisions of the Rules of 1994. It is thus clear that by failing to disclose her conviction under Section 138 of the Act of 1881, the petitioner suppressed material information and thus failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules of 1994. The acceptance of her nomination form has therefore been rightly held to be improper. She being the returned candidate, her election was rendered void. It is thus obvious that on account of such wrongful acceptance of her nomination form, the election was materially affected. This contention of the petitioner also fails. It is not persuaded to hold that the petitioner has made out an exceptional case for this Court to hold that notwithstanding the failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose her conviction leading to the sentence of imprisonment of one year, such lapse should be condoned. The information furnished in her affidavit filed under Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules of 1994 has been found to be incorrect and false. The petitioner rests on her subsequent acquittal in appeal, which event occurred after her election. She did not step into the witness box to explain her inadvertence, which is now sought to be put forward. The plain reading of Rule 24-A(1) and its requirement does not admit of any doubt whatsoever. Moreover, both the Courts have concurrently found that the petitioner failed to disclose her conviction without any justifiable reason. The Special Leave Petition stands dismissed. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether non-disclosure of a prior conviction in the affidavit filed under Rule 24-A of the applicable municipal election rules renders a returned candidate's nomination improperly accepted and thereby vitiates the election under the municipal statute's provision for declaring an election void. 2. Whether the nature or seriousness of the offence (specifically a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act) or subsequent setting aside of conviction on appeal negates the effect of such non-disclosure for the purpose of invalidating the election. 3. Whether, in the absence of specific proof that the result of the election was materially affected by non-disclosure, an election can nevertheless be set aside where mandatory affidavit disclosure requirements were breached. 4. Whether the holding of a subsequent by-election (and the returned candidate's later defeat therein) renders the challenge to the original unseating infructuous. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1 - Legal framework The Act provides that a Judge shall declare the election of a returned candidate void if the result has been materially affected by, inter alia, improper acceptance of any nomination or non-compliance with the Act or rules made thereunder. Rule 24-A mandates filing an affidavit disclosing criminal antecedents, including any disposed cases resulting in conviction and any sentence of imprisonment for one year or more; failure to furnish the affidavit renders the nomination liable to rejection and the Returning Officer must publicize the information. Issue 1 - Precedent treatment The Court relied on authorities recognizing voters' right to receive material information about candidates (including Association for Democratic Reforms) and subsequent decisions holding that suppression of material information in nomination affidavits amounts to improper acceptance and can render an election void (Kisan Shankar Kathore; related rulings affirming that non-disclosure impedes informed choice). Issue 1 - Interpretation and reasoning The Court found as an undisputed fact that the candidate had been convicted and sentenced to one year's imprisonment at the time of filing the nomination affidavit but omitted to disclose that conviction. Rule 24-A's requirement to disclose convictions of one year or more is mandatory; non-compliance produced false verification. The omission interfered with the informational purpose of the affidavit and the electorate's right to make an informed choice. Consequently, the nomination was improperly accepted and the election was materially affected within the statutory scheme. Issue 1 - Ratio vs. Obiter Ratio: Mandatory compliance with Rule 24-A in disclosing convictions (including sentence of one year or more) is a prerequisite to lawful acceptance of nomination; non-disclosure of such conviction by a returned candidate constitutes improper acceptance and permits declaration of the election void under the municipal statute. Issue 1 - Conclusion The Court upheld that non-disclosure of the conviction rendered the nomination improperly accepted and justified voiding the election under the statutory grounds invoked. Issue 2 - Legal framework Rule 24-A requires disclosure of convictions irrespective of the perceived gravity of the offence; the statutory affidavit format specifically captures convictions and sentence durations. The eligibility and disclosure obligations are assessed as on the date of nomination submission. Issue 2 - Precedent treatment Decisions cited by the petitioner that relaxed consequences for non-disclosure (Ravi Namboothiri; Karikho Kri) were examined and distinguished on statutory text and facts: Ravi Namboothiri concerned a fine (no imprisonment) and different statutory wording about 'involvement'; Karikho Kri concerned non-material omissions where the nondisclosure did not materially affect election outcome. Issue 2 - Interpretation and reasoning The Court rejected the submission that Section 138 conviction (negotiable instruments) is a minor or non-moral-turpitude offence whose nondisclosure may be condoned. The mandatory disclosure requirement does not permit judicially to excise particular categories of offence from its scope: the rule requires disclosure of convictions involving imprisonment of one year or more, and the present conviction met that threshold. Subsequent setting aside of the conviction on appeal, occurring after nomination and election, cannot retroactively render the initial non-disclosure harmless for purposes of the election validity assessment governed by the law as applied on the nomination date. Issue 2 - Ratio vs. Obiter Ratio: The statutory duty to disclose a conviction of imprisonment for one year or more must be complied with irrespective of subjective assessments of moral turpitude or seriousness; subsequent appellate setting aside does not cure the original non-disclosure for purposes of the election challenge based on facts as of nomination. Issue 2 - Conclusion The nature of the offence or later acquittal did not absolve the candidate from the mandatory disclosure or prevent the election from being set aside on the established statutory ground. Issue 3 - Legal framework Sectional provisions allow declaration of an election void where the result is materially affected by improper acceptance of nomination or non-compliance with rules; jurisprudence addresses whether separate proof of material effect is required when improper acceptance is found. Issue 3 - Precedent treatment Authorities establish that when a returned candidate's nomination is improperly accepted due to suppression/misinformation in the mandatory affidavit, proof of material effect on the election's result may be unnecessary in certain contexts (e.g., where improper acceptance is admitted, or in limited-candidate contests), because suppression itself impedes free electoral choice (Kisan Shankar Kathore; Sri Mairembam Prithviraj; Krishnamoorthy on undue influence and impediment to free exercise of electoral right). Issue 3 - Interpretation and reasoning The Court held that non-disclosure of a conviction is a form of suppression/non-disclosure of material information that impedes voters' right to make informed choices and constitutes undue influence/interference with free exercise of electoral rights; therefore, the question whether the result was materially affected need not be separately proved. The finding of improper acceptance suffices to invoke the voiding provision. Issue 3 - Ratio vs. Obiter Ratio: Suppression of mandatory affidavit disclosures (criminal antecedents/convictions) constitutes such an impediment to the electorate that separate proof of material effect on the election outcome is unnecessary to declare the election void. Issue 3 - Conclusion No further proof of material effect was required; the courts correctly concluded that the election was void due to improper acceptance arising from material non-disclosure. Issue 4 - Legal framework A subsequent bye-election may render certain remedies academic, but interim orders and directions can preserve parties' rights pending adjudication; appellate or discretionary jurisdiction may be exercised only in exceptional circumstances. Issue 4 - Interpretation and reasoning The Court observed that the by-election was conducted subject to the outcome of these proceedings (interim order), and therefore the challenge was not rendered infructuous by the mere holding of the bye-election. The fact that the candidate later contested and lost the bye-election did not bar adjudication on merits while interim protection continued. Issue 4 - Ratio vs. Obiter Obiter/Ratione: The mere occurrence of a subsequent election does not automatically render a pending challenge to the original unseating infructuous where interim directions preserve rights pending final adjudication. Issue 4 - Conclusion The Court declined to treat the challenge as moot or infructuous and proceeded to decide the matter on merits. Final disposition (connected to issues above) Having found concurrent factual findings of non-disclosure to be correct, the statutory and judicial principles supporting voiding of the election on that basis applicable, and no exceptional circumstances warranting interference under the Court's discretionary jurisdiction, the challenge was dismissed and the impugned order upholding voiding of the election was affirmed.