2025 (10) TMI 1184 - HC - Indian Laws

Writ relief barred under Section 19(3)(c) PCA; petition to quash chargesheet and revisit interlocutory orders dismissed

The HC dismissed the petition seeking quashment of the chargesheet and refused to entertain writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to stay or revisit ... Rejection of discharge applications - fraudulently diverting duty-free imported materials into the open market - fabrication of export documents - invocation of extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court - institution of suit after being converted from revision proceedings - HELD THAT:- The sequence of events unmistakably demonstrates that the petitioners were fully conscious of the express bar contained in Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which precludes the grant of stay of proceedings or entertainment of revision against interlocutory orders. Ergo, it is manifest that what could not have been achieved under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C., cannot be permitted to be attained sub silentio through the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It also warrants mention that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the seminal case of Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan [2001 (9) TMI 1173 - SUPREME COURT], had occasion to examine the effect and amplitude of the non-obstante clause occurring in Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Apex Court therein categorically held that the High Courts ought not to exercise inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 to stay or interdict proceedings pending before the Special Court constituted under the Act. The ratio propounded in Satya Narayan Sharma [2001 (9) TMI 1173 - SUPREME COURT] has subsequently been reiterated and fortified by the larger Bench decision in State through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afshan Guru and Others [2003 (5) TMI 524 - SUPREME COURT], wherein the Supreme Court, while dealing with a pari materia provision under Section 34 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA), unequivocally held that petitions invoking writ or inherent jurisdiction to stall or circumvent the statutory process before the Special Court are not maintainable. Thus, in view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court, it stands well-settled that the embargo contained in Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 does not operate as an absolute interdiction upon the exercise of inherent jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Thus, it is manifest that since the petitioner invokes no provision other than Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the relief of quashing of the chargesheet, the present petition is ex facie not maintainable, and the prayer for quashment of the charge-sheet is wholly misconceived and legally untenable. Scrutiny of the petition, in its entirety, also makes it abundantly clear that there are no foundational pleadings asserting that exoneration in departmental proceedings would ipso facto entail dropping of the criminal proceedings - The petition, when read as a whole, is confined to assailing the order of the learned CBI Court rejecting the discharge application, and does not traverse any other substantive grounds warranting interference under Article 226. Ergo, the argument advanced by learned Senior Advocate on the ground of departmental exoneration is wholly devoid of legal substratum and cannot be countenanced. It is a well-settled principle of law that a ground which is not canvassed in the pleadings cannot be permitted to be urged across the bar. The petition, as framed and filed, is fundamentally misdirected and bereft of any sustainable cause to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court. Consequently, the petition, being not maintainable in the eyes of law, stands dismissed. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable to challenge an interlocutory order of a Special Court declining discharge and to seek quashment of a charge-sheet in proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, where statutory provisions appear to bar revision or stay of such proceedings. 2. Whether the bar contained in Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (prohibiting stay or revision against interlocutory orders in trials before Special Courts) precludes resort to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to obtain reliefs that could not be obtained under Sections 397/401 CrPC or Section 482 CrPC. 3. Whether exoneration or favourable findings in departmental proceedings (including orders of administrative tribunals) operating on identical facts and charges can, as a matter of law, preclude or vitiate continuation of criminal prosecution under the penal statutes invoked. 4. Whether resignation of an accused and issuance of departmental No Objection Certificate (NOC) absolves the individual from continuing criminal prosecution. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1 - Maintainability of Article 226 petition to quash charge-sheet / challenge interlocutory order declining discharge Legal framework: Article 226 confers extraordinary writ jurisdiction on High Courts; Sections 397/401 CrPC provide revisional remedy; Section 482 CrPC and inherent jurisdiction permit interference to prevent abuse of process. Once a charge-sheet is filed and cognizance taken, judicial imprimatur attaches to the criminal process. Precedent Treatment: The Court followed binding Supreme Court precedents holding that judicial orders of criminal courts are generally not amenable to challenge by writ under Article 226 once other efficacious remedies exist and especially where the statutory scheme contemplates exclusion of stays/revision (referenced: Satya Narayan Sharma and subsequent pronouncements; principle reiterated from Radhey Shyam and Neeta Singh as applied to criminal orders). Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the petition, though converted into a writ under Article 226, in substance seeks to obtain by writ what could not be obtained under revisional or inherent jurisdiction because of the bar in the Prevention of Corruption Act. The statutory objective of expediting trials under the Act and the express prohibition against staying trials or entertaining revision against interlocutory orders mean that a High Court should not permit circumvention of that statutory scheme by indirect writ challenges to interlocutory judicial orders. Where the impugned relief is essentially an indirect appeal against a judicial order declining discharge, Article 226 is an inappropriate and misdirected forum. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - A writ under Article 226 cannot be used to circumvent statutory bars on revision or stay of proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act; judicial orders declining discharge are not ordinarily challengeable by writ where alternative remedies exist. Obiter - Observations on the sequence of proceedings and tactical conversion from revision to writ as indicative of awareness of the statutory bar. Conclusions: The petition seeking quashment of the charge-sheet and interlocutory relief was held not maintainable under Article 226 and liable to be dismissed on that ground. Issue 2 - Effect of Section 19(3)(c) PCA and interaction with Section 482 CrPC / Article 226 Legal framework: Section 19(3)(c) PCA contains an express legislative prohibition against stay or entertainment of revision against interlocutory orders in trials before Special Courts; Section 482 CrPC begins with a non obstante clause but does not, by its terms, permit overriding specific bars in other statutes. Precedent Treatment: The Court followed and applied the Supreme Court's analysis in Satya Narayan Sharma and Navjot Sandhu (as to pari materia provisions) which recognized the statutory purpose of prohibiting stalling of special trials and limited the scope for granting stays even when inherent powers are invoked; Neeta Singh was also relied upon for the proposition that judicial orders are not normally amenable to writ challenge once cognizance is taken. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court reasoned that where a statute contains a specific bar, inherent jurisdiction or writ jurisdiction cannot be used to subvert that bar; though Section 482 CrPC is framed as notwithstanding anything in the Code, it does not expressly abrogate specific prohibitions in other statutes. The Statement of Objects and Reasons underlying the PCA supports an interpretation aimed at day-to-day trials and prohibition of procedural delay. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - The embargo contained in Section 19(3)(c) PCA precludes the use of writ or inherent jurisdiction to stay or otherwise stultify trials before Special Courts constituted under the PCA; Section 482/Article 226 cannot be used to circumvent that statutory scheme save in exceptional, narrowly defined circumstances. Obiter - Comments on adaptability of Section 482 in appropriate cases without permitting stays. Conclusions: The statutory bar in the PCA, read with binding precedents, rendered the present writ petition misconceived and not maintainable; the Court dismissed the petition on that ground. Issue 3 - Consequence of departmental exoneration on criminal prosecution based on identical facts Legal framework: Departmental enquiries and criminal prosecutions are distinct; departmental standard of proof differs from criminal standard (preponderance vs proof beyond reasonable doubt). However, courts have recognized that conclusory exoneration in departmental proceedings may, in certain circumstances, be relevant to criminal prosecution where the substratum and material are identical. Precedent Treatment: The petitioners relied upon Supreme Court authorities stating that concurrent departmental exoneration can vitiate criminal prosecutions founded on identical material. The Court acknowledged these authorities but examined whether the ground was properly pleaded and raised before the trial court. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court observed that the contention of departmental exoneration was not advanced before the Special Court in the discharge applications and, instead, was raised for the first time in an additional affidavit in the writ proceedings. The Court emphasized procedural principle that grounds not pleaded at the appropriate forum cannot be taken later. Further, the Court noted that exoneration in departmental proceedings does not ipso facto preclude criminal prosecution; the circumstances and identity of facts, findings and legal effect must be examined in the proper forum and by the correct procedure. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Exoneration in departmental proceedings does not automatically bar criminal prosecution; when such a contention is to be relied upon it must be pleaded and urged before the trial court and appropriate remedies; failure to do so precludes reliance in subsequent writ proceedings. Obiter - Recognition that in some cases identical findings in departmental enquiries may be a ground for quashing criminal proceedings, subject to correct pleading and adjudication. Conclusions: The Court declined to grant relief on the basis of departmental exoneration because the ground was not the foundation of the discharge applications before the Special Court and was raised belatedly; thus it could not support quashment in the present writ forum. Issue 4 - Effect of resignation and departmental NOC on criminal liability Legal framework: Resignation from service and issuance of departmental NOC affect administrative employment status but do not, as a rule, extinguish criminal liability arising under penal statutes. Precedent Treatment: The Court followed established principle that administrative clearance or resignation does not ipso facto absolve criminal liability; criminal prosecution proceeds on legal and evidentiary considerations independent of service status. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated resignation and NOC as insufficient to challenge or quash the criminal proceedings; such facts, even if relevant to mitigation or background, do not provide a legal basis for quashing charge-sheet absent substantive legal grounds properly presented and pleaded before the trial court. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Resignation and departmental NOC do not per se absolve an accused from criminal prosecution; they cannot be substitute grounds for quashing criminal proceedings where statutory and procedural bars govern the forum and remedies. Obiter - Practical observation that such facts may be relevant to trial but not determinative of maintainability of pre-trial quashment applications in the writ jurisdiction. Conclusions: The Court held that resignation and departmental NOC do not warrant quashment of the charge-sheet; the petition based on such contention was untenable. Overall Conclusion The Court concluded that the writ petition under Article 226 was not maintainable to seek quashment of the charge-sheet or to review the interlocutory order declining discharge in proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act; statutory embargo and binding precedents precluded circumvention by writ; grounds of departmental exoneration and resignation/NOC were either not properly pleaded before the trial court or do not, as a matter of law, operate to preclude criminal prosecution. The petition was dismissed and interim reliefs, if any, vacated.