2025 (7) TMI 847 - AT - IBC

Corporate debtor's appeal dismissed as restructuring termination created fresh cause of action beyond Section 10A moratorium period

NCLAT Principal Bench dismissed appeal challenging admission of Section 7 petition. Corporate debtor argued guarantee invocation notice could not revive ... Non-revival of guarantee invocation notice after withdrawal/revocation of the restructuring agreement by the Respondent No.1 - bar of moratorium u/s 10A of IBC - HELD THAT:- To answer the question as to whether the guarantee invocation notice of 16.09.2020 got revived or not upon the withdrawal/revocation of the restructuring agreement, the Adjudicating Authority has correctly taken notice of the contractual arrangement recorded in the Restructure Letter to hold that the cause of action for initiating legal action arose both from default of the restructuring terms or from withdrawal/ termination of the restructuring agreement. In the present facts of the case, the termination of restructuring was not automatic but was dependent on the exercise of this choice by the Respondent No.1-Financial Creditor to revoke the restructuring in the event of failure to comply with the restructure terms. The restructure terms provided for independent events of default and such a default having undisputedly occurred, the Financial Creditor- Respondent No.1 had exercised the option clearly available to them to file a fresh Section 7 petition with the amount of debt modified from the first Section 7 petition and a fresh date of default. The Adjudicating Authority therefore did not commit any infirmity in holding that the invocation of the guarantee by the Respondent No. 1-Financial Creditor on 23.01.2024 stemmed directly from a default under the restructured terms. The reliance placed by the Corporate Debtor on the judgment of this Tribunal in IDBI Trusteeship Services Limited vs. Direct Media Distribution Ventures Pvt. Ltd. [2023 (9) TMI 1382 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI] to contend that the Demand Notice of the Respondent No.1-Financial Creditor could not postpone or override the original date of default is also misplaced. That decision does not apply in the present case since in this case the Corporate Debtor by express consent had restructured its liability under the Restructure Letter and the default arose upon the failure of the Corporate Debtor to comply to the terms of the Restructure Letter of making good the payment of the second tranche which was due on 25 March 2023 in terms of the Restructure Letter. Moreover, the terms and condition of the Guarantee Agreement which has been captured above already makes it clear that it was in the nature of a continuing guarantee and covered every default till all the outstanding amounts under the DTD have been paid in full - The Adjudicating Authority has also correctly held that the factual matrix of the Maneesh judgment supra relied upon by the Corporate Debtor does not come to their aid since in that case cancellation of restructuring was automatic with no scope for a fresh cause of action. There is no provision under Section 10A of the IBC that prohibits parties from entering into a valid debt restructuring arrangement during or after the Section 10A suspension period. The impugned order has correctly noted at paragraph 4.9 that Section 10A was introduced to provide temporary relief during the COVID-19 pandemic which did not curtail the substantive contractual rights of parties to restructure their debts. From a reading of the Part-IV, it becomes clear that this was not a case of invocation of debt during Section 10A period. In the present case, the relevant default occurred on 25 March 2023 which was well beyond the outer limit of Section 10A, which squarely brings the claim within the permissible scope of Section 7 of the IBC. The Appellant has expressly admitted debt and default in their pleadings at page 21-22 of APB and the guarantee being a continuing nature, admission of the Section 7 application by the Adjudicating Authority is well justified. There are no substance in the Appeal - appeal dismissed. The core legal questions considered in this appeal arising under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) are:1. Whether the Section 7 application filed by the Financial Creditor against the Corporate Debtor was barred by the moratorium period under Section 10A of the IBC, given that the original default and invocation of guarantee occurred during the Section 10A prohibited period.2. Whether the date of default for the Corporate Debtor, a corporate guarantor, should be reckoned from the original default date or the subsequent default under the restructuring agreement.3. Whether a continuing guarantee can be invoked multiple times to create fresh causes of action, especially after restructuring and revocation of the restructuring agreement.4. Whether the restructuring agreement, entered into after the original default, alters or supersedes the original default date for the purposes of initiating insolvency proceedings.5. Whether the appointment of the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP), who was formerly employed by the Financial Creditor, raises a valid apprehension of bias warranting substitution.Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:1. Applicability of Section 10A Moratorium Period to the Section 7 ApplicationThe moratorium under Section 10A of the IBC prohibits initiation of insolvency proceedings for defaults occurring during the COVID-19 suspension period. The Appellant argued that the original default and invocation of guarantee notices dated 16.06.2020 and 16.09.2020 respectively fell within the Section 10A period, thereby barring the Section 7 application.The Respondent contended that the guarantee was a continuing guarantee, reaffirmed by the restructuring agreement dated 27.12.2022, and the relevant default triggering the Section 7 application was the failure to pay the second instalment due on 25.03.2023, which was outside the Section 10A moratorium period.The Court examined the Guarantee Agreement clauses (5.3, 26, 31, 33) which explicitly provided for a continuing guarantee until full payment of dues. The restructuring letter superseded all previous amendments and communications, and established new payment obligations with independent events of default.Given that the default triggering the second Section 7 application occurred on 25.03.2023, well after the expiry of the Section 10A moratorium, the Court held that the Section 7 application was not barred by Section 10A. The moratorium did not extinguish the substantive contractual rights to restructure or enforce guarantees post the moratorium period.2. Determination of the Date of Default for Corporate Debtor as GuarantorThe Appellant relied on precedents holding that the liability of a guarantor arises only upon demand, and that once a guarantee is invoked, it cannot be repeatedly invoked to create new causes of action. They argued that the original invocation during the Section 10A period could not be revived or superseded by the restructuring agreement, and thus the date of default should revert to the original date within the moratorium period, barring the Section 7 application.The Respondent countered that the restructuring agreement was a valid, consensual modification of the debt obligations, which expressly superseded prior agreements and established new payment schedules and defaults. The guarantee being continuing in nature, the invocation of guarantee post restructuring was valid and triggered by a fresh default.The Court analyzed the restructuring letter's terms, which provided that failure to meet the restructured payment schedule constituted independent events of default, enabling the Financial Creditor to file fresh insolvency proceedings. The Court distinguished the present facts from precedents where cancellation of restructuring was automatic and did not permit fresh causes of action.It was held that the default date for the Section 7 application was correctly taken as 25.03.2023, the date of default under the restructuring agreement, and not the original default date. The invocation of guarantee on 23.01.2024 was a fresh cause of action arising from the restructured debt.3. Effect of Restructuring Agreement and Its Revocation on Original Default and Guarantee InvocationThe Appellant contended that the revocation of the restructuring agreement by the Financial Creditor on 23.01.2024 revived the original default and guarantee invocation, which fell within the Section 10A moratorium period, thus barring the Section 7 application.The Respondent argued that the revocation was not automatic but a contractual option exercised upon fresh default under the restructuring terms. The continuing guarantee and restructuring letter allowed for fresh invocation and Section 7 proceedings based on the new default date.The Court agreed with the Respondent, holding that the restructuring agreement's termination was not automatic but conditional on the Financial Creditor's choice, which was exercised upon default. The fresh default under the restructured terms gave rise to a new cause of action, and the original invocation did not revive automatically. Therefore, the Section 7 application was maintainable.4. Nature of Continuing Guarantee and Its Impact on Multiple InvocationsThe Guarantee Agreement explicitly provided that the guarantee was continuing and would remain in force until all outstanding amounts were finally paid. The Court noted that this continuing nature allowed the Financial Creditor to invoke the guarantee multiple times in respect of defaults occurring under the original or restructured agreements.The Court rejected the Appellant's contention that once invoked during the moratorium period, the guarantee could not be invoked again for fresh defaults. It held that the continuing guarantee covered all defaults until full repayment, and fresh defaults post moratorium period could be validly invoked.5. Allegation of Bias Against the Interim Resolution Professional (IRP)The Appellant alleged that the IRP appointed was biased as he was previously employed by the Financial Creditor for over six years, and sought his substitution.The Respondent relied on Supreme Court precedent holding that prior employment with a Financial Creditor does not disqualify a person from acting as IRP unless there is a present conflict or connection with the parties.The Court found no evidence that the IRP had any present connection or bias, noting that the IRP was appointed post admission of the Section 7 application and was not instrumental in admission. Consequently, the allegation of bias was held to be baseless.Significant Holdings:'The Guarantee Agreement was a continuing guarantee and remains valid until all outstanding amounts have been finally paid in full, regardless of any intermediate payment or discharge.''Section 10A of the IBC provides a temporary moratorium on initiation of insolvency proceedings for defaults occurring during the COVID-19 period but does not extinguish substantive contractual rights to restructure debts or enforce guarantees post moratorium.''A valid restructuring agreement, entered into with mutual consent and expressly superseding prior agreements, establishes a fresh date of default for the purposes of insolvency proceedings.''Termination or revocation of a restructuring agreement is not automatic but contingent on the creditor's exercise of contractual rights upon fresh default, enabling fresh invocation of guarantees and fresh Section 7 applications.''Prior employment of an IRP with a Financial Creditor does not disqualify the IRP from appointment absent any present conflict or connection with the parties.'The Court concluded that the date of default triggering the Section 7 application was the default under the restructuring agreement on 25.03.2023, which was outside the Section 10A moratorium period. The continuing guarantee was validly invoked post restructuring. The Adjudicating Authority correctly admitted the Section 7 application, and the appeal was dismissed with no interference in the impugned order.