Fair-trial access to prosecution documents does not arise as of right at the charge stage; recall of the earlier order was impermissible.

A criminal court cannot recall its own earlier order where the statute bars alteration of a judgment or order, so the later recall was impermissible. The Court also linked access to prosecution documents relied upon for trial to the accused's Article 21 fair-trial rights, but distinguished the charge stage from the defence stage. It held that production of such documents may be sought at the defence stage, not as a matter of right at the charge stage. The revision succeeded, the impugned order was set aside, and the accused's ability to seek the documents at the defence stage was preserved.

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Issues: (i) Whether the trial court could recall its earlier order directing supply of documents in view of the statutory bar on altering a judgment or order; (ii) whether denial of access to relied-upon documents at the charge stage infringed the accused's right to fair trial.

Issue (i): Whether the trial court could recall its earlier order directing supply of documents in view of the statutory bar on altering a judgment or order.

Analysis: The impugned order was treated as a recall of the court's own earlier direction. The statutory bar against a criminal court altering its own judgment or order was applied, and the later order was found to be inconsistent with that prohibition.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the revisionist; the recall of the earlier order was held impermissible.

Issue (ii): Whether denial of access to relied-upon documents at the charge stage infringed the accused's right to fair trial.

Analysis: The right to access documents relied upon by the prosecution was linked to the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, because effective defence depends upon access to such material. The Court distinguished the charge stage from the stage of entering upon defence and held that the accused may seek production of documents at the defence stage, but not as a matter of right at the charge stage.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the revisionist to the extent that the accused's fair-trial right was held to be infringed by the impugned order, while the request to shift the document-production exercise to the charge stage was not accepted.

Final Conclusion: The revision succeeded and the impugned order was set aside, with the accused's entitlement to seek such documents preserved for the defence stage.

Ratio Decidendi: A criminal court cannot recall its own earlier order where the statute prohibits alteration, and an accused's fair-trial right does not entitle access to prosecution documents at the charge stage when the appropriate remedy lies at the defence stage.

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