Transitional recovery and e-mail service under GST framework upheld, while writ relief was declined for available appellate remedy.

Transitional recovery under the CGST framework was examined alongside the service provisions in Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and Sections 142(8)(a) and 169(1)(c) of the CGST Act, 2017. Communications served by e-mail were treated as valid and not impermissible merely because the earlier enactment did not expressly mention that mode, where the proceedings originated under the existing law and recovery was continued as arrears under the CGST Act. The writ petition was not entertained because an efficacious statutory appellate remedy was available, with liberty to pursue the appeal and seek condonation of delay based on the date of knowledge.

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Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the order-in-original was maintainable despite the availability of an appellate remedy, and whether service of the order through e-mail was impermissible in view of the service provisions under the earlier enactment.

Analysis: The service provisions under Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 were read with Sections 142(8)(a) and 169(1)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. It was held that proceedings instituted under the existing law could continue and amounts recoverable thereunder could be recovered as arrears under the CGST Act, and that service through e-mail could not be rejected as impermissible merely because Section 37C did not expressly mention that mode. The Court also noted that the petitioner had a statutory appellate remedy and no ground existed to bypass it.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained on merits and the petitioner was relegated to the statutory appeal remedy with liberty to seek condonation of delay on the basis of the date of knowledge.

Ratio Decidendi: Where transitional recovery under the CGST Act is attracted, service of communications by e-mail under the CGST framework can be relied upon, and the writ jurisdiction should not be invoked to bypass an efficacious statutory appeal remedy.

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