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Issues: (i) Whether separate statutory notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was mandatory before proceeding against the cheque signatory sought to be impleaded as an accused. (ii) Whether impleadment of the applicant as an accused under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was barred on limitation grounds or otherwise unsustainable at the enquiry stage.
Issue (i): Whether separate statutory notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was mandatory before proceeding against the cheque signatory sought to be impleaded as an accused.
Analysis: The complaint was already instituted against the company and its other directors, and the record showed that the applicant was the signatory of the dishonoured cheques. The Court distinguished the requirement of arraigning the company as an accused from the contention that each director or signatory must receive a separate notice. It relied on the principle that where notice is served on the company and the signatory is aware of the transaction and role in the company, a further individual notice is not a mandatory pre-condition for prosecution under the vicarious liability scheme of the Act.
Conclusion: Separate notice to the applicant was not mandatory, and the prosecution was maintainable against him.
Issue (ii): Whether impleadment of the applicant as an accused under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was barred on limitation grounds or otherwise unsustainable at the enquiry stage.
Analysis: The Court held that the limitation objection based on Section 142(1)(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 did not apply in the same manner because the trial court had not yet taken cognizance when the application under Section 319 was entertained. Since the enquiry had disclosed material showing the applicant's role as the cheque signatory, the court below was competent to implead him at that stage. The reliance placed on the contrary precedent was held inapplicable on its facts.
Conclusion: The impleadment under Section 319 was valid and not vitiated by limitation.
Final Conclusion: No ground was made out to interfere with the order impleading the applicant as an accused, and the challenge failed.
Ratio Decidendi: In a cheque dishonour prosecution, once the company is arraigned and the record shows the applicant to be the cheque signatory, separate individual notice to that signatory is not invariably required, and impleadment under Section 319 can be sustained at the enquiry stage before cognizance where the factual basis emerges from the evidence.