Remission of duty for fire-destroyed goods cannot be refused on negligence grounds where the rule limits inquiry to unavoidable loss.

Remission of duty cannot be denied for goods destroyed by fire merely because the loss is said to involve negligence or inadequate preventive measures. Where the governing rule requires only satisfaction that the goods were lost or destroyed by natural causes or unavoidable accident, the proper officer's inquiry is limited to that question alone. An authority cannot expand the scope of the remission provision by testing preventability or fault unless the rule expressly allows it. The denial of remission was therefore unsustainable, the order was set aside, and remission was held allowable with consequential relief.

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Issues: Whether remission of duty for goods destroyed by fire could be denied on the ground that the destruction was attributable to negligence, when the rule required only satisfaction that the goods were lost or destroyed by natural causes or by unavoidable accident.

Analysis: The rule governing remission of duty permits recovery only where goods are not accounted for, or are not shown to the satisfaction of the proper officer to have been lost or destroyed by natural causes or by unavoidable accident. The inquiry mandated by the rule is confined to whether the goods were lost or destroyed in the specified manner. It does not authorise an examination of whether the assessee had taken adequate precautions to prevent fire or whether the loss was otherwise preventable. By introducing negligence and preventability as grounds to reject remission, the impugned order travelled beyond the scope of the rule.

Conclusion: The denial of remission was unsustainable. The order was set aside and the claim for remission was held allowable.

Final Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to remission of duty, with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a remission provision is confined to loss or destruction by natural causes or unavoidable accident, the authority cannot expand the inquiry to questions of negligence or adequacy of preventive arrangements unless the rule expressly permits such examination.

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