2005 (12) TMI 114 - HC - Central Excise

Refund Orders Pre-Amendment Excluded from Section 11B: Court Emphasizes Strict Tax Statute Interpretation

COMMISSIONER OF C. EX., TRICHY Versus DALMIA CEMENT (BHARAT) LTD.

The High Court held that the amended Section 11B of the Central Excise Act does not apply to refund orders that were finalized before the 1991 amendment. ... Refund - Unjust enrichment - Interpretation of taxing statute Issues Involved:1. Applicability of Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, as amended in 1991, to cases where refund orders were passed before the amendment but implementation was pending.Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis:1. Applicability of Amended Section 11B to Pending Refunds:The primary question referred to the High Court was whether Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, as amended in 1991, applies to cases where an order directing a refund was passed before the amendment but the implementation of the order was pending. The proceedings originated from refund applications filed by the assessee for the years 1970 to 1978, which were initially rejected but later allowed by the CEGAT in 1989. The amounts claimed had been paid under protest, and the CEGAT's orders were accepted by the Revenue.Section 11B was amended in 1991 to include a provision that the incidence of duty should not have been passed on to any other person for a refund to be granted. The department argued that since the refunds were not paid until after the amendment, the amended Section 11B should apply, and the amounts should be credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund instead of being refunded to the assessee.2. Legal Precedents and Interpretation:The High Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, which held that if a refund application had been disposed of and the order had become final before the 1991 amendment, the principle of unjust enrichment would not apply. The majority judgment in Mafatlal's case clarified that the amended Section 11B applies to all pending proceedings but does not apply to cases where the refund proceedings had finally terminated before the amendment came into force.3. Finality of Refund Orders:The High Court emphasized that the refund applications in this case were finally disposed of by the CEGAT's orders in 1989, well before the 1991 amendment. Therefore, the amended Section 11B could not be applied retrospectively to these cases. The court noted that the principle of unjust enrichment was not applicable under the unamended Section 11B, and the amendment was made to address this issue.4. Heydon's Mischief Rule:The court applied Heydon's mischief rule, which requires identifying the mischief in the old law and the remedy provided by the amendment. The mischief was that under the unamended Section 11B, the principle of unjust enrichment was not applicable, allowing assessees to claim refunds even if they had passed on the burden to consumers. The amendment aimed to remove this mischief.5. Strict Interpretation of Taxing Statutes:The court reiterated the principle of strict interpretation of taxing statutes, stating that there is no equity in tax law. Tax statutes must be interpreted based on their clear language, without considering notions of equity or fairness. The court cited several precedents emphasizing that taxing statutes should be interpreted strictly according to their terms.Conclusion:The High Court concluded that the amended Section 11B does not apply to refund orders that became final before the amendment came into force. The court answered the question in the negative, in favor of the assessee and against the department. It clarified that the amended Section 11B would not apply to orders of refund that had become final, but would apply to cases where appeals or revisions were still pending.