Departmental exoneration does not automatically quash criminal prosecution when the two proceedings rest on different evidence and proof standards.

Departmental exoneration does not, by itself, require quashing of related criminal proceedings where the disciplinary result rests on the investigating agency's earlier decision not to file a charge-sheet rather than on identical evidence. The criminal case and the departmental inquiry are treated as distinct proceedings with different standards of proof and separate evidentiary foundations. On that basis, mere dropping of disciplinary action is not automatically a ground to terminate prosecution, and an order refusing to interfere with the criminal process remains supportable where no error in the decision to proceed is shown.

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Issues: Whether exoneration in departmental proceedings, on the facts of the case, warranted quashing of the criminal proceedings and connected orders in exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

Analysis: The departmental exoneration was found to rest substantially on the earlier decision of the investigating agency not to file a charge-sheet, rather than on evidence shown to be identical to that before the criminal court. The criminal case and departmental inquiry were treated as proceedings with different standards of proof and separate evidentiary foundations. In these circumstances, the Court held that mere dropping of disciplinary action did not automatically justify dropping the criminal prosecution, and the Special Judge's view that there were sufficient grounds to proceed was not shown to be erroneous.

Conclusion: The plea for quashing was rejected and no interference was called for.

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