1976 (11) TMI 218 - HC - Indian Laws

Tenant's revision under s.25-B(8) Delhi Rent Control Act dismissed; eviction under s.14-A(1)/14(1)(e) against statutory tenant upheld

HC dismissed the tenant's revision under s.25-B(8) Delhi Rent Control Act, upholding the Rent Controller's refusal to grant leave to contest the ... - 1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED (1) Whether the notice dated 18 June 1973 validly terminated the contractual tenancy of the deceased tenant, and whether, in consequence, the eviction petition was bad for non-joinder of other heirs. (2) Whether the premises, allegedly let for office-cum-residential purposes, could still be treated as 'residential accommodation' for the purposes of section 14A(1) and section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. (3) Whether there existed a relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the petitioner, or whether the father of the respondent was the landlord, thereby disentitling the respondent to seek eviction under section 14A(1). (4) What is the standard for grant of leave to defend under section 25B(5) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, and whether on the facts disclosed in the tenant's affidavit, any triable issue was raised so as to justify grant of such leave. 2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue (1): Validity of termination notice; devolution of tenancy and non-joinder of heirs Legal framework discussed (a) Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act - requirements of notice terminating a lease of immovable property. (b) Definition of 'tenant' in section 2(l) of the Delhi Rent Control Act - heritability of statutory tenancy only to the extent and in the manner provided therein. Interpretation and reasoning (c) The landlord's notice dated 18 June 1973 expressly terminated the tenancy of the then contractual tenant with effect from 31 July 1973. The Court held that this satisfied section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. (d) The objection was directed to the later part of the notice, which stated that the purpose of giving the notice was to ensure that the tenancy did not become heritable and that, after termination, the tenant would continue only as a statutory tenant under the Rent Control law. The Court held that this explanatory statement did not dilute or render ineffective the clear termination of tenancy, nor did it confer any licence to remain in possession. (e) The tenant had not, in the original plea for leave to defend, specifically alleged any defect in the notice; the notice and the tenant's reply thereto were undisputed on record. (f) Once the contractual tenancy was validly terminated, the tenancy became statutory; on the death of the statutory tenant, rights devolved only in accordance with section 2(l) and not under the general law of inheritance. Conclusions (g) The notice dated 18 June 1973 was valid and effectively terminated the contractual tenancy. (h) After such termination, only the petitioner, and not all heirs of the deceased tenant, inherited the statutory tenancy under the Act. (i) The eviction petition was not bad for non-joinder of other heirs; the ground of non-joinder did not disclose any triable issue. Issue (2): Purpose of letting and characterization as 'residential accommodation' under section 14A(1) Legal framework discussed (a) Section 14A(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act - requirement that the landlord be in occupation of 'residential premises' allotted by the Central Government or local authority, and be required to vacate such accommodation. (b) Section 14(1)(e) of the Act - ground of bona fide requirement of premises let for residential purposes. Interpretation and reasoning (c) The plea that the premises were let for office-cum-residential purposes was introduced only by way of an amendment application to the leave-to-defend application. (d) The Court treated the argument, even if accepted for the sake of argument, as legally irrelevant for the purpose of section 14A(1). (e) The term 'residential accommodation' in section 14A(1) was construed to mean accommodation capable of being used as a residence or built as a residence. It is sufficient that the premises are part of a residential house and are suitable for residential use. (f) Even if a portion was used as office by the tenant, that only added a non-residential element to the actual user; it did not convert the character of the premises from residential to non-residential. (g) The Court followed this approach in line with earlier judicial observations that incidental or partial non-residential use did not change the essential residential character of such premises. Conclusions (h) The premises remained 'residential accommodation' for the purposes of section 14A(1), notwithstanding any office-cum-residential user by the tenant. (i) The ground taken that the premises were not residential so as to defeat the landlord's claim under section 14A(1) and section 14(1)(e) did not raise a triable issue justifying leave to defend. Issue (3): Existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between respondent and petitioner Legal framework discussed (a) Section 14A(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act - requires that the applicant be the 'landlord' of the premises in question. (b) Sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act - compulsory registration of leases exceeding the threshold period, and bar to admissibility in evidence of unregistered documents for creation of lease or interest in immovable property. Interpretation and reasoning (c) The tenant's primary plea was that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the petitioner; it was asserted that the father of the respondent, and not the respondent, was the landlord. (d) The tenant relied on an agreement of lease dated 29 May 1962 between the deceased tenant and the respondent's father. The Court held that this document, purporting to be a lease for one year, was compulsorily registrable and was unregistered; consequently, under sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act, it was inadmissible to prove creation of the lease or any interest in the property. It could only be considered, at best, for collateral purposes as to nature of possession. (e) The tenant's affidavit in support of leave to defend did not disclose specific factual assertions such as payment of rent to the father as landlord or denial of the respondent's status as landlord during the subsistence of tenancy, except by bare reference to the inadmissible lease agreement. No independent foundational facts were disclosed to substantiate the denial of relationship. (f) The respondent's case, supported by affidavit and documents, was that he was the owner of the premises; that the premises were built on land held under a registered perpetual lease in his name; that he had executed a registered general power of attorney in favour of his father authorising him to let out the property and receive rents; and that all dealings by the father with the tenant were in his capacity as attorney of the respondent. (g) The notice of termination dated 18 June 1973 was sent expressly on behalf of the respondent as landlord through his attorney father. The reply dated 28 June 1973 from the deceased tenant, while addressed to the father, did not dispute the respondent's status as landlord or suggest that he was a stranger. (h) Counterfoils of rent receipts for the period 1971-1975 were produced by the respondent, showing the respondent as owner in whose favour rent was being received on his behalf; the counterfoils bore the signatures of the deceased tenant and, in the last instance, the tenant's son. These were not denied or explained in the rejoinder, and the original corresponding receipts were not produced by the tenant, although earlier receipts (1962-1968) issued by the father were produced. (i) An attempt in revision to argue that the documents showed only a novation of tenancy in favour of the respondent from 1971, inconsistent with the respondent's pleaded case, was treated as a new argument not founded on the pleadings below and was rejected. Conclusions (j) On the material on record, the father of the respondent was found to be acting as a general attorney of the respondent; the respondent was both owner and landlord for purposes of the Act. (k) The tenant's denial of the relationship of landlord and tenant was based on an inadmissible document and unsupported by specific factual averments in the affidavit; it did not disclose a triable issue. (l) The prerequisite under section 14A(1) of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between respondent and petitioner stood satisfied. Issue (4): Standard for grant of leave to defend under section 25B(5) and its application Legal framework discussed (a) Section 25B(5) of the Delhi Rent Control Act - special summary procedure for eviction on certain grounds, and condition for granting tenant leave to contest. (b) Order 37 rule 3(1) and (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure - comparative standard for leave to defend in summary suits. Interpretation and reasoning (c) The Court compared section 25B(5) with Order 37 rule 3(1) CPC. Under Order 37, leave to defend may be granted if the affidavit discloses such facts as may make it incumbent on the plaintiff to prove consideration, 'or such other facts as the court may deem sufficient' to support the application. Further, under rule 3(2), leave may be conditional or unconditional. (d) Section 25B(5) omits the phrase 'or such other facts as the court may deem sufficient' and does not provide for conditional leave. The language is more stringent: the Controller shall give leave if the affidavit discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession. (e) The Court held that, under section 25B(5), the tenant's affidavit must not merely recite grounds in the abstract but must set out detailed and specific facts which, if proved, would legally disentitle the landlord from obtaining an eviction order. (f) In the present case, the first application for leave to defend only raised general pleas, including denial of relationship of landlord and tenant, without supporting factual particulars. The second application, filed later, was not supported by any affidavit at all. (g) The principal pleas examined-alleged invalidity of notice and consequent non-joinder, mixed purpose of letting, and denial of landlord-tenant relationship-either failed on the legal assessment of the documents on record or were founded on inadmissible documents and bare assertions lacking requisite factual detail in the affidavit. Conclusions (h) Applying the stricter standard under section 25B(5), the tenant's affidavit did not disclose facts that, if accepted, would disentitle the landlord from obtaining eviction under section 14A(1). (i) No triable issue, within the meaning of section 25B(5), was made out; the Rent Controller rightly refused leave to defend and was justified in proceeding on the landlord's averments as uncontroverted. (j) In revision, the Court found no cogent ground to interfere with the Controller's discretionary order refusing leave to defend and upholding the eviction order.