Beneficial penal amendment applies to pending prosecutions, requiring sentencing under the later, more lenient law.

An amended penal provision that reduces the rigour of punishment applies to a prosecution still pending when the amendment comes into force, because the law in force on the date of judgment governs sentencing. Where the amendment is beneficial to the accused, it must be construed in favour of personal liberty and the later, less stringent legislative intent. The earlier harsher punishment could not be sustained in a pending case, so the conviction remained but the sentence had to be altered under the amended regime.

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Issues: Whether an amended penal provision reducing the rigour of punishment applies to a case that was pending when the amendment came into force, and whether sentence could be imposed under the earlier harsher provision.

Analysis: The amended provision substituted the earlier punishment scheme and introduced judicial discretion to impose a lesser sentence for adequate and special reasons. A prosecution that had not culminated in final judgment was treated as inchoate, and the Court held that the law in force on the date of judgment governed sentencing. In penal matters, where the legislative change is beneficial to the accused, the statute is to be construed in a manner favourable to personal liberty and consistent with the legislature's later and less stringent expression of will.

Conclusion: The amended provision applied to the pending case, and the sentence imposed under the earlier provision could not stand.

Final Conclusion: The conviction was maintained, but the punishment was altered to reflect the amended and more lenient statutory regime.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a penal amendment beneficial to the accused comes into force before final judgment, the Court must apply the amended law to the pending prosecution and sentence the accused accordingly.

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