Temporary injunction appeals require proof of perversity before interference, and pendente lite alienation may still be restrained.

In an appeal against a temporary injunction, the SC held that the appellate court may interfere only if the trial court's discretion was arbitrary, capricious, perverse, or contrary to settled principles, and it cannot substitute its own view merely because another view is possible; the High Court's wider reappraisal was therefore impermissible. The Court also held that where the suit concerned joint property allegedly transferred during litigation and the relief sought included cancellation of the sale deed, restraint against further alienation was justified to preserve the subject matter pending trial, and the injunction was restored notwithstanding pendente lite transfer principles.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court, in an appeal against an order granting temporary injunction, could substitute its own view without first recording a finding that the trial court's discretion was arbitrary, capricious, perverse, or contrary to settled principles governing interlocutory injunctions; (ii) Whether, on the materials placed before it, the order restraining further alienation of the suit property pending trial was liable to be restored.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court, in an appeal against an order granting temporary injunction, could substitute its own view without first recording a finding that the trial court's discretion was arbitrary, capricious, perverse, or contrary to settled principles governing interlocutory injunctions?

Analysis: In an appeal under Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, interference with an interlocutory injunction order is confined to examining whether the trial court exercised discretion on settled principles and without perversity. The appellate court is not to reassess the matter as a court of first instance or replace a possible view taken by the trial court merely because another view is also possible. The impugned order did not identify any perversity, arbitrariness, capriciousness, mala fides, or disregard of settled law in the trial court's order, but instead proceeded on broader observations unrelated to the narrow appellate scrutiny required in such matters.

Conclusion: The High Court exceeded the proper limits of appellate jurisdiction and its interference could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether, on the materials placed before it, the order restraining further alienation of the suit property pending trial was liable to be restored?

Analysis: The dispute concerned property said to be jointly owned and transferred during the pendency of litigation, and the suit sought cancellation of the sale deed and permanent injunction. In such circumstances, preservation of the property during trial was necessary to maintain the subject matter of the suit and prevent further complications. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 does not make interim protection unnecessary; rather, pendente lite transfers may still justify injunctive restraint in a fit case so that the property does not change hands further and the trial court can decide the rights of the parties on an undisturbed record.

Conclusion: The injunction protecting the suit property was justified and the trial court's order was restored.

Final Conclusion: The appellate interference was set aside, the temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiffs stood revived, and the parties were directed to preserve the existing state of the suit property pending final adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal against a discretionary order of temporary injunction, the appellate court may interfere only on a clear showing of perversity or other settled grounds of judicial error, and pendente lite alienation of the suit property may be restrained notwithstanding the doctrine of lis pendens where preservation of the subject matter is necessary.

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