2019 (8) TMI 1933 - SC - Indian Laws

Petition dismissed; bench competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings and suspend judicial officer under Judicial Service Rules and AIS (D&A) Rules

SC dismissed the petition, holding the HC (Full Court) was competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings and suspend the judicial officer under Delhi ... Disciplinary proceedings alleging sexual harassment - competence of High Court, a disciplinary authority of the petitioner, to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and suspend him as per Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970 and All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 - jurisdiction of decision of the Full Court on 13.07.2016 initiating enquiry against the petitioner and placing him under suspension - Preliminary Inquiry Report submitted by Internal Complaints Committee dated 05.11.2016 ought to have been supplied to the petitioner or not - non-supply of such Preliminary Inquiry Report vitiated the entire proceedings. Whether the High Court is a disciplinary authority of the petitioner, competent to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and suspend him as per Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970 and All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969? - Whether the decision of the Full Court on 13.07.2016 initiating enquiry against the petitioner and placing him under suspension was beyond jurisdiction? - HELD THAT:- In the case of Rajendra Singh Verma (Dead) through LRs. and Others Vs. Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) and Others [2011 (9) TMI 955 - SUPREME COURT], it has been clearly and categorically laid down that disciplinary authority with regard to judicial officers is the High Court and it is the High Court, which can initiate the disciplinary proceedings against judicial officers. Although, with regard to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or termination of services of judicial officers, the High Court becomes the recommending authority and it is the Governor, who is to issue the orders. In Andhra Pradesh and Others Vs. L.V.A. Dixitulu and Others [1978 (9) TMI 176 - SUPREME COURT] also, this Court held that the disciplinary jurisdiction vests in the High Court which can hold inquiries against a member of the subordinate judiciary, impose punishment other than dismissal or removal. The High Court can also suspend a member of the judiciary. Insofar as dismissal or removal is concerned, the said orders are required to be passed by the Governor on the recommendation of the High Court. The fact that the orders of dismissal or removal are issued by the approval of the Governor in no manner denude the disciplinary control of the High Court. The provisions of the Act, complaint mechanism and mechanism for constitution of the Internal Complaints Committee, mechanism to inquire the complaint are all for protection of dignity and welfare of women at workplace. The provisions of Sections 11 and 13 in no manner affect the control of the High Court under Article 235, which it has with respect to judicial officers as noted above. The power to suspend the judicial officer vests in the High Court. The Full Court of the High court is in no manner precluded from initiating disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner and placing the petitioner under suspension on being satisfied that sufficient material existed. The High Court in its meeting dated 19.07.2016 has resolved to send the complaint of the employee to the Internal Complaints Committee and the Internal Complaints Committee having opined that inquiry need to be held, further steps were taken in accordance with Act, 2013 - there is no error in the decision of the Full Court dated 13.07.2016 to suspend the petitioner and initiate the inquiry proceedings against the petitioner. Whether the Preliminary Inquiry Report submitted by Internal Complaints Committee dated 05.11.2016 ought to have been supplied to the petitioner and non-supply of such Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016 vitiated the entire proceedings? - HELD THAT:- The Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016 did not contain any findings on allegations made against the petitioner, Preliminary Inquiry Report only opined that inquiry should be held. The Inquiry Report, which has been referred to in Section 13 is an Inquiry Report, which has been submitted by Internal Complaints Committee after completion of the inquiry. In the present case, the Inquiry Report by Internal Complaints Committee is dated 09.03.2018, which has been admittedly supplied to the petitioner, the right of appeal given against the recommendation made under sub-section(2) or sub-section (3) of Section 13 are appealable under Section 18 of the Act. Thus, the right of appeal is given to an aggrieved person only when report is submitted under Section 13 to the employer. Section 13(3) contemplates the report of Internal Complaints Committee when it “arrives at the conclusion that the allegation against the respondent has been proved”. It is not the case of any of the parties that the report of the Committee dated 05.11.2016 is the report where allegation against the petitioner has been proved. Even under Section 11(1) in the second proviso, the only contemplation is to make available a copy of the findings. Thus, when the report in which there are no findings, parties are not entitled to have the copy. High Court in its counter affidavit has pleaded that the Report dated 05.11.2016 was not a report containing any findings against the petitioner rather only opinion was expressed that disciplinary inquiry be initiated against the petitioner - no prejudice can be held to be caused to the petitioner by non-supply of the Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016. The copy of memo of charge dated 23.02.2017 has been brought on the record, which also clearly indicates that the charge memo does not refer to Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016. Thus, no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the petitioner by non-supply of Report dated 05.11.2016 - the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner not accepted that due to non-supply of Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016, the proceedings have been vitiated. Petition dismissed. 1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether the High Court is the disciplinary authority competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings and suspend a subordinate judicial officer, notwithstanding the complaint process under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 ('Act, 2013'). 2. Whether the Full Court's decision dated 13.07.2016 initiating inquiry and placing the judicial officer under suspension was beyond jurisdiction or premature in the absence of an inquiry under the Act, 2013. 3. Whether non-supply to the delinquent of the Internal Complaints Committee's Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016 vitiated the subsequent disciplinary process, including the charge memo and later inquiry, by denying a right of appeal or opportunity to be heard. 2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1 - High Court as disciplinary authority competent to initiate proceedings and suspend Legal framework: Article 235 (control of subordinate courts) and Part VI/Chapter on Subordinate Courts; service rules governing judicial officers (Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970 and All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969) as applicable; Act, 2013 (mechanism for internal complaints and inquiries) as a parliamentary enactment protecting women at workplace. Precedent treatment: The Court relied on established precedents holding that 'control' in Article 235 includes disciplinary control (State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi; Baradakanta Mishra v. High Court of Orissa; Registrar (Admn.), High Court of Orissa v. Sisir Kanta Satapathy) and that the High Court may initiate inquiries, suspend officers and impose punishments other than dismissal/removal, while dismissal/removal requires Governor's action on High Court recommendation. Prior decisions emphasise the High Court's exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction over subordinate judiciary. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court interprets Article 235 and the cited line of authority to mean that the High Court has complete disciplinary control over subordinate judicial officers, including power to initiate disciplinary proceedings and to suspend pending inquiry. The object of Article 235 - securing independence of subordinate judiciary - supports an exclusive disciplinary role for the High Court. The Act, 2013's complaint and inquiry machinery (Internal Complaints Committee and its inquiry/report provisions) is protective legislation for workplace dignity and does not displace or curtail the High Court's Article 235 disciplinary control over judicial officers. The Full Court's initial steps (suspension and initiation of disciplinary process) were within the High Court's jurisdiction; subsequent referral to and action in accordance with the Act, 2013 did not oust the High Court's authority. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - The High Court is the disciplinary authority for subordinate judicial officers and may suspend and initiate disciplinary proceedings under Article 235 despite parallel inquiry mechanisms under the Act, 2013. Obiter - Observations on the interplay of specific service rules with Act, 2013 insofar as they do not alter Article 235's core allocation of disciplinary control. Conclusion: The Court concludes that the High Court had jurisdiction and competence to place the judicial officer under suspension and to initiate disciplinary proceedings; there was no jurisdictional error in the Full Court's actions under Rules, 1970 and the All India Services rules, subject to the constitutional limits on dismissal/removal requiring the Governor. Issue 2 - Validity/prematurity of Full Court's 13.07.2016 decision to suspend and initiate inquiry Legal framework: Same constitutional and service-rule framework as Issue 1; Act, 2013 provisions on constitution of Internal Complaints Committee and inquiry (Sections 11 and 13) which provide procedural safeguards including opportunity to be heard and availability of findings once inquiry is complete. Precedent treatment: Reliance on authorities recognizing the High Court's exclusive disciplinary control and its power to suspend pending inquiry; distinctions drawn from cases where disciplinary authorities other than the competent authority improperly drew up charge memos (e.g., Promod Kumar/All India Services jurisprudence) but distinguished on facts because the judicial service's disciplinary authority is the High Court. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court finds the Full Court's 13.07.2016 resolution (suspension and forwarding complaint to appropriate agencies) to be an exercise of Article 235 disciplinary power upon receipt of a complaint. Suspension pending inquiry is a recognized step to facilitate disciplinary inquiry and does not amount to premature punitive action when taken after consideration of prima facie material. The subsequent constitution of an Internal Complaints Committee and its inquiry under the Act, 2013 were complementary and did not render the Full Court's earlier measures ultra vires. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Suspension and initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the High Court upon receipt of complaint is within its jurisdiction and not premature where sufficient material exists to warrant inquiry. Obiter - Comments distinguishing disciplinary processes for other services where rule compliance about charge memo drafting is mandatory; such precedents are not applicable to High Court's disciplinary role over judicial officers. Conclusion: The Full Court's decision dated 13.07.2016 to suspend and initiate disciplinary proceedings was within jurisdiction and not vitiated by prematurity or by the existence of the Act, 2013 inquiry mechanism. Issue 3 - Non-supply of Preliminary Inquiry Report (05.11.2016) and vitiation of proceedings Legal framework: Act, 2013 Sections 11 (inquiry into complaint) and 13 (inquiry report and employer action); Section 18 (appeal against recommendations under Section 13). Principles of natural justice: opportunity to be heard and access to findings where statutorily mandated. Precedent treatment: The Court examined the scope of statutory entitlement to copies of findings and appeal rights under Section 13 and Section 18 of the Act, 2013, and distinguished cases where non-compliance with charge memo formalities (in non-judicial services) vitiated proceedings on the basis of specific mandatory rules. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court distinguishes a 'Preliminary Inquiry Report' that merely opines whether a prima facie case exists and recommends a full disciplinary inquiry from a formal inquiry report under Section 13 that contains findings on allegations. Section 13's right to availability of the report and Section 18's right to appeal arise on completion of an inquiry and upon an inquiry report that either finds allegations not proved (Section 13(2)) or proved and recommends action (Section 13(3)). Here the 05.11.2016 document was a preliminary opinion recommending that a disciplinary inquiry be held and did not contain findings of misconduct; the formal inquiry report is dated 09.03.2018 and has been supplied to the delinquent with an opportunity to make written submissions. Since the statutory rights of availability and appeal attach to the final inquiry report under Section 13, non-supply of the preliminary note did not cause prejudice nor vitiate proceedings. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Non-supply of a preliminary opinion that contains no findings does not breach the Act's provision entitling parties to inquiry findings or the right to appeal; the rights under Sections 11 and 13 are triggered by findings in the completed inquiry report. Obiter - Clarification that where a preliminary inquiry contains findings or is treated as the operative report, different considerations might apply. Conclusion: Non-supply of the Preliminary Inquiry Report dated 05.11.2016 did not vitiate the disciplinary proceedings; no prejudice arose because that report contained no findings and the formal inquiry report (09.03.2018) was made available and is the basis for any appeal under Section 18. Ancillary procedural observations The Court declined to adjudicate wide-ranging challenges to the entire disciplinary process, charge-sheet and final inquiry report while the disciplinary proceedings remain pending, observing that many contentions are properly ventilated before the disciplinary authority and that judicial pronouncements on contested factual and procedural matters at this stage may prejudice the ongoing process. The Court restricted its decision to the limited issues pressed and left open all other pleas for consideration in the disciplinary forum.